TADIC AND KOSTUNICA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001407

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DICARLO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: TADIC AND KOSTUNICA

Classified By: Amb. Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary and Introduction
--------------


1. (U) As Tadic heads to Washington, we would like to share
some additional observations about him, about how his views
on key issues compare with Kostunica's, and why his visit
represents an opportunity different from Kostunica's July
visit.


2. (S) Tadic tends to take a more realist, pro-Western tack
than the prime minister on major issues. In contrast with
Kostunica, Tadic attaches more importance to U.S.-Serbian
relations; he privately accepts the reality of Kosovo's
independence and is focused on "the day after;" he openly
calls for Mladic's arrest; and he publicly supports Serbia's
membership in NATO.


3. (S) As leader of Serbia's largest democratic party, Tadic
faces a daunting task of balancing his electoral ambition
(and bringing his DS into a leading position in government)
and the need for good relations with Kostunica. His desire
to avoid conflict with Kostunica and to maintain his party's
poll numbers makes him less bold than he should be on some
key issues.


4. (S) Tadic is perhaps the best interlocutor we have to
manage the Kosovo endgame and other key issues, and he is
likely the democrats' best shot to lead Serbia toward a
stable, democratic and prosperous future (although any future
democratic government would almost certainly be centered
around a Tadic-Kostunica coalition). We therefore have a
clear interest in supporting him and urging him to be bolder.
His visit to the U.S. gives us a good opportunity to do this
- by reinforcing his pro-Western vision for Serbia, by
demonstrating to the Serbian people the benefits of a strong
relationship with the U.S., and by strengthening the
President's role in the defense and security area
(particularly important as we approach the Kosovo
denouement).

Some examples of where Tadic's approach differs from that of
Kostunica:

Kosovo
--------------


5. (S) While the PM refuses, publicly or privately, to
acknowledge the likelihood of Kosovo independence, Tadic
privately recognizes the importance of preparing for
independence and securing what is possible for Serbia and
Kosovo's Serbs. He has appealed directly to us on two
occasions to "give him a good deal on decentralization and
churches" to help him through elections. You might recall
that it was Tadic who, at great political risk, called on
K-Serbs to participate in the October 2004 elections in
Kosovo. Kostunica refused to do so, and Tadic's numbers
dropped (a fact that has made him more gun shy about sticking
his neck out on Kosovo in future). As DefMin in March 2004,
Tadic played a crucial role in ensuring a calm and
responsible reaction to violence in Kosovo.


6. (S) Tadic has recently begun focusing on "the day after"
Kosovo's status is decided. In private meetings with
Ambassadors Polt and Wisner, he has emphasized that he will
begin the day after Kosovo's settlement to strengthen
relations with the three axes of Serbian foreign relations -
the U.S., Europe and, inescapably, Russia. Although he might
publicly toe the government line and stand behind Kostunica,
his head is in the right place to accept the inevitability of
Kosovo's independence and help his country move forward
toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

War Crimes
--------------


7. (S) Tadic will be more receptive to messages on ICTY
cooperation than Kostunica. Tadic openly calls for Mladic's
arrest and appears committed to real action in bringing him
and the other fugitives to justice. From the beginning of
his term in office, Tadic recognized the importance of ICTY
cooperation, whereas Kostunica has only reluctantly been
cornered into taking on the ICTY issue (when he became PM in
2004, he stated that ICTY cooperation was not a priority).
Last year, Tadic visited Srebrenica on the 10th anniversary
of the massacre, gave an emotional address to the nation
after viewing the gruesome Skorpions video, and delivered an
apology in BiH for Serb war crimes. (He did later visit the
site of Serb victims in eastern Bosnia, but refused a demand

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from Bosnian Serbs to visit that site during his Srebrenica
trip.) By contrast, Kostunica met with several PIFWCs on
their way to surrender to ICTY, has never pronounced the word
"arrest" in relation to Mladic, and called Srebrenica a
necessary cou
nteroffensive on the part of Bosnian Serbs.

Montenegro
--------------


8. (S) Tadic's approach to the Montenegro referendum also
gives us some insight into how he might be more amenable in
the Kosovo endgame. Although Tadic, like Kostunica, publicly
advocated the preservation of the State Union, he also
supported the EU/Lajcak process (Kostunica tried to work
directly with Solana, without consulting Montenegro leaders,
e.g. trying to get the 260,000 Montenegrins in Serbia on the
voters list). Tadic immediately recognized the results of
the referendum and visited Podgorica three times in the
following weeks, all while Kostunica continued to grumble
about the process and initially made an effort to bring into
question the outcome.

Relations with the U.S. and NATO
--------------


9. (S) Unlike Kostunica, Tadic is committed to building
U.S.-Serbian military cooperation. Also, unlike Kostunica,
Tadic openly supports Serbia's membership in NATO and has
actively pushed key security agreements with NATO and the
U.S. (GLOC, SOFA). Kostunica publicly criticized the GLOC
initially and hesitated in his support for the SOFA. He has
been overly timid on some counts - delaying the naming of a
new reform-minded chief of defense or retiring old-school
generals from the military, for example. Tadic's visit
offers a good opportunity to bring home deliverables (with
SOFA, discussions with Ohio) to improve U.S.-Serbian military
cooperation.


10. (S) While Tadic differs from Kostunica on these key
issues, he is caught in a balancing act as the country nears
elections. Tadic is assuming he will have to work with
Kostunica after elections, and is therefore careful not to
alienate him. Under any scenario in which democratic forces
beat the Radicals, Tadic and Kostunica will need to work
together to some extent. However, if Tadic heads into
elections with strong support (including from the U.S.),he
feels he can afford to take bolder action to lead the
democratic forces to an electoral victory.


11. (S) In sum, despite his shortcomings as a leader, Tadic
will be a much more receptive interlocutor during his visit
than the Prime Minister, especially on the major questions of
Kosovo, ICTY and mil-mil cooperation. This visit offers the
opportunity to secure at least private assurances from Tadic
of even more decisive cooperation on these issues, and to
help shape his leadership plan as elections near.
POLT