SERBIA: PRESIDENT TADIC ON UPCOMING TRIP TO U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001294

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EMB CLEARS SHARING MESSAGE WITH AHTISAARI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PRESIDENT TADIC ON UPCOMING TRIP TO U.S.

Classified By: POL COUNSELOR GUSTAVO DELGADO PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D
).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with President Tadic on 9
August to discuss preparations for his upcoming visit to the
U.S., scheduled for the first week of September. Tadic
returned to the usual broad themes ) the need for elections
before the end-game on Kosovo; the need to work closely with
Kostunica,s DSS (and the IC) in organizing a &democrats vs.
radicals8 campaign; vague assurances that he will move
quickly to turn the page and focus on post-Kosovo issues
after status is settled. Tadic is ready to talk about a
strategic partnership that goes beyond Kosovo status but his
trademark caution still raises questions about what he is
willing to do to make it happen.


2. (U) We will need Washington,s input on the SOFA NLT 8/21
if we are to have any chance of getting it through the GOS in
time for the Secretary to sign it with Tadic. A
scene-setting message for Tadic,s trip will follow septel.
End summary


3. (U) Tadic started by reviewing items pending before he
departs for the U.S. He said it was important to confirm
General Ponos as Chief of the General Staff quickly, ideally
before his trip. He referred to ratification of the SOFA
agreement in the same vein, noting the need to get the green
light from the U.S. so he would have enough time to work it
through the government when it reconvenes on 17 August. He
referred to ongoing private discussions with the PM,s staff
and efforts to arrange a meeting between him and Kostunica to
push Ponos and the SOFA through and to begin talking about
more coordinated efforts in preparation for possible
elections.


4. (C) In response to the Ambassador,s question on whether
he was prepared to appoint Ponos unilaterally if Kostunica
refused, Tadic demurred, noting his need to preserve maximum
space for future collaboration with Kostunica. Tadic said he
feared that if he pressed the issue on his own the government
might withhold desperately needed funds from the military as
a way to undermine his authority over the armed forces.
Tadic said Kostunica,s recent effort to claim authority over
anti-terrorist forces in the army was a &dangerous move8
and he was heartened that the Defense Minister had clarified
the comment in the press several days later. Tadic urged us
to use our contacts with the government, including the
Finance minister, to push the pending defense related items.


5. (C) The Ambassador touched on several points in
preparation for Tadic,s visit to Washington. The Ambassador
encouraged Tadic to actively engage in his meetings on ways
of strengthening bilateral ties in the future. ICTY
cooperation was critical. The Ambassador reminded Tadic of
our 11 action points passed to the GOS and him. Tadic said
he would continue to do everything he could to support the
government,s efforts and acknowledged the need to add more
details to the government,s own Mladic Action plan.


6. (C) The Ambassador observed that while the outcome of the
Kosovo settlement talks was generally known and likely be
difficult for Serbia, it would be manageable. There was no
expectation that Serbia would &welcome8 the outcome; the
important thing was to quickly move on in a constructive way.
Tadic recalled what he had told Ambassador Wisner during his
recent late July visit to Serbia: he would begin the day
after the settlement to strengthen his relations with the
three axes of Serbia,s foreign policy (U.S., Europe and
Russia). The trip to the U.S. would allow him to get a jump
start on that effort. For that reason, he hoped to sign the
SOFA agreement with Secretary Rice and planned to continue on
to Ohio to meet with the head of the National guard there.
(Tadic agreed that it made sense to also meet with the
governor and other local civilian leaders in Ohio to talk
about the full range of cooperation opened up under the State
Partnership Program (SPP).)


7. (C) The Ambassador praised Tadic for his positive response
to the recent Contact Group demarche and for his help in
ensuring that Serbia stayed engaged in Vienna. Tadic said
that he was reassured by Kostunica that the PM had no
intention of pulling out of the talks. Tadic said, however,
that he was concerned about reports that Ahtisaari, in a

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private meeting with Serb negotiators after the minority
rights discussion in Vienna on 8 July, had said that Serbia
was &guilty as a nation for what happened in Kosovo.8
Tadic said he was surprised given the IC,s focus on
individual responsibility; a public statement by Ahtisaari to
that effect would create huge problems for Tadic. The
Ambassador noted increasing concern about developments in
northern Kosovo and urged Tadic to commit to using his
influence as well as his authority as commander in chief to
ensure against any dangerous mischief. Tadic said he would
do so, but noted his own worries how things would develop on
the ground.


8. (C) Tadic returned to his oft-repeated arguments about the
need for early elections before the Kosovo settlement is
announced. The Ambassador said that the we would be ready
with an aggressive Get Out the Vote (GOTV) campaign to help
get democratic voters to the polls; was Tadic ready to do the
coalition building that would be necessary? Tadic said he
would be working with the PM as well as with all the small
democratic parties to defeat the Radicals. He would not be
able to support FM Draskovic to continue as FM (&my party
would revolt if I did anything to block early elections8)
but would consider enlisting his SPO party further down the
line. The next election, said Tadic, would be the most
important in Serbia,s history. It would be important to
work closely in the GOTV and to carefully control the NGO,s
involved.



8. (C) Comment: Tadic showed once again his preference to
discuss Serbia,s future, after Kosovo. He is committed to a
stronger relationship with the U.S. and with Europe if not
always willing to push decisively in the right direction.
His upcoming visit will offer an opportunity to engage him in
a direct way on his vision of the future as well as his plans
for getting there.
MOORE