Serbian Parties Begin to Prepare for Elections

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001277 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR SUBJECT: Serbian Parties Begin to Prepare for Elections BELGRADE 00001277 001.2 OF 003 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Responding to perceptions that the international community will decide Kosovo independence in the near future, parties across the spectrum have begun to prepare for a tense political period and probable early elections in the aftermath. Across the board, democratic parties remain unprepared and divided, although some are undergoing attempts to rectify their problems. The nationalist parties remain strong with a dedicated following, but have failed to attract additional supporters to their xenophobic ideology. They are hoping that even a modest backlash to Kosovo independence could secure for them a majority in the national assembly. Most parties anticipate an IC decision for Kosovo independence in late winter with elections to follow in spring. End Summary. The DSS: We're Angry and We Aren't Going to Take It Anymore -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Milos Aligrudic, the PM Kostunica's DSS Caucus Chair, avoided speculating to poloff about the future longevity of the governing coalition, but admitted the party is preparing for elections in the near future. Many in his party and the governing coalition anticipate a difficult future Kosovo status solution to be handed down in early 2007 with elections to follow. This would allow the GOS to save some face since, according to Serbian law, elections at anytime next year are not considered "early." ¶3. (SBU) In speaking of future political partners, Aligrudic told poloff that the DSS was equidistant from the Democratic Party (DS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). He was noncommittal on cooperation with the DS, while suggesting that collaboration with the SRS could be possible under the right circumstances. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Kostunica recently told Ruzica Djindjic, wife of the late premier, that he would prefer to form a coalition with the DS instead of the SRS, both of whom offered him the premiership in the next government. (Some months ago, Kostunica told the Ambassador that he would never form a government with the Radicals, arguing that it "would go against everything" he has stood for in his political life.) ¶4. (SBU) Aligrudic complained that the DSS' development was arrested during the Milosevic period and as a result its bureaucracy is overly centralized, with a disproportionate authority over party operations resting with Premier Kostunica. Conversely, local leaders have too much control over day-to-day activities on the ground, reflecting the DSS' lack of a central political strategy. Experts have complimented the DSS's recent efforts to overhaul its creaking, chaotic party structure, but acknowledge that this process will last an extended period and that the party will suffocate under the weight of its bureaucracy in the meantime. The DS: We'll Get to It...After the Vacation -------------- ¶5. (SBU) President Tadic's party has been reeling from a series of local election defeats since his 2004 presidential victory, which include losses in Nis, Novi Sad, and Kragujevac (Serbia's second, third, and fourth most populous cities). The loss of its central Serbia stronghold, Uzice, on July 16 and the recent split in its critical Belgrade chapter are yet more setbacks that threaten the party's ability to act. Party insiders are frustrated with the influence of several of Tadic's close childhood friends from the public relations sector who serve as spin-doctors/advisors, but have little standing in the party. Outside experts have lamented the DS' lack of message, its poor internal communication, weak local leadership, an aloof presidency, and--most of all--a seeming unwillingness to address these recognized problems. Pessimists within the party's leadership have grown concerned about increasingly unfavorable polls and some have even privately voiced their belief that the Radicals are unbeatable and that the next election is already lost. ¶6. (SBU) In a meeting with poloff, Dusan Petrovic, first deputy president of the party, faithfully defended the DS, highlighting its solid support (19 percent) and noting that the party was addressing its dficiencies, a response we have heard many times efore. He gave vague assurances that the party ould begn to create a platform sometime after th summer vacation, focused on economic issues, but heavily playing on the public's fear o an SRS victory. He added that President Tadic will be able to draw throngs to the polls, once he gets around to hitting the stump, and BELGRADE 00001277 002.2 OF 003 that they are relying on the West to spend lavishly on a GOTV campaign. ¶7. (SBU) Additionally, Slobodan Homen, a member of the DS Main Board, told poloff in mid-July that the Democrats would begin a more aggressive approach to coalition building due to fear that an election could occur earlier than expected. Smaller parties have complained for years that the DS offers of partnership translated as requests of servitude, providing the DS with needed support in return for nothing. Last week Tadic visited Minister Draskovic to discuss a pre-election coalition between the DS and SPO, and an insider close to Tadic has told us the president is preparing a substantial offer to the G-17 Plus that could include accepting Finance Minister Dinkic as premier. [Comment: The DS remains the key to Serbia's short-term democratic and economic transition, which makes its lackadaisical approach to preparation all the more frustrating. An honest self-appraisal, hard work, and Western assistance as part of an aggressive GOTV campaign will be needed to halt its hemorrhaging of supporters. End Comment]. The SPO: For King and President? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Vlajko Senic, General Secretary of FM Draskovic's shrinking SPO, told poloff that the party is facing a significant challenge and likely will only reenter parliament through a pre-election coalition. The party has a three part plan for early elections, which it believes will occur after an international community pronouncement of Kosovo independence early next year. First, Draskovic will spend less time concentrating on his Foreign Minister duties and begin campaigning throughout the country. Senic noted that Draskovic's aloofness from the SPO had undermined its support since 2003. Second, the party would highlight its support for restoration of the monarchy, in hopes of attracting support from the 14 percent of Serbs that advocate for a return of the king (Senic noted quietly that this is a political ploy and not a key political goal). 9.(SBU) Political analysts have opined that this unique approach could bear fruit for the SPO because even the low support for the royals is significantly better than the SPO's current polling results. Third, it will seek an alliance with President Tadic and the DS to ensure that it crosses the five percent parliamentary threshold. [Comment: Danica Draskovic, wife of the SPO president and influential party leader, allegedly half-jokingly threatened President Tadic that, if the DS did not make a good offer to the SPO, then the party would side with the DS-nemesis Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). End Comment]. The G-17+: Dazed and Confused -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Deputy Premier Dulic-Markovic (strictly protect) told poloff that she does not anticipate that the coalition will survive its mandate (while making clear her disdain for Kostunica's policies). She would not confirm to poloff (though she had done so to the Ambassador previously) that Finance Minister and G-17 Plus leader, Mladjan Dinkic, would fulfill his promise to withdraw the party's support for the GOS on October 1 if EU negotiations were still frozen. [Comment: Observers have suggested that Dinkic will renege on his promise if he cannot cut a pre-election deal with the DS and if he retains the potential to siphon off significant funds from the GOS. End Comment]. ¶11. (SBU) Dulic-Markovic acknowledged that the G-17 Plus was in trouble and would not likely enter parliament without help. Although the party has belatedly begun internal reforms, analysts point out that the G-17 Plus lacks a credible message since it failed to live up to its reform-oriented, anti-corruption platform, which prompted its base to abandon it (support for the party plummeted from about 10 percent in 2003 to 2.9 percent in June). To this end, Dulic-Markovic said the G-17 Plus is looking to form an alliance with the DS, but complained bitterly that the Democrats had offered them nothing. Many pundits also anticipate that Dinkic will attempt to redirect funds from upcoming privatizations into G-17 Plus coffers, which could dramatically increase the party's war chest and ability to utilize the media to campaign. The LDP: Momentum Versus Polling -------------- ¶12. (SBU) LDP President Cedomir "Ceda" Jovanovic presented BELGRADE 00001277 003.2 OF 003 to poloff the steps to prepare his party for elections that he foresees in spring. The party has established offices in 112 of Serbia's 145 municipalities and registered 23,000 members (although it remains well below its goal of 250,000) since its inception in November 2005. Additionally, it has scored a series of moderate successes in local elections, including its first mayoral victory in June. The LDP still faces an uphill challenge, though. It is only polling at two percent nationally and the anticipated merger with its ally, the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS),has stalled due to GSS demands for guaranteed positions in the LDP hierarchy and election list. ¶13. (SBU) Milka Puzigaca, a respected political analyst, said she is confident that the LDP will cross the threshold. She noted that the party has a lot of momentum, its supporters are the most loyal and active, and its Western, reform-oriented image and message could appeal to the mass of disaffected voters who are looking for someone with vision. Additionally, according to this one analyst, Jovanovic (though hardly an uncontroversial figure) could receive a boost from smaller parties joining his election coalition, although he admits he is battling large egos who each want to be the big man in the party. The SRS and SPS: Power to the People -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The SRS and SPS are both expecting elections in spring, following an announcement of Kosovo's final status at the end of the year. According to a reliable Embassy contact, Milorad Vucelic, the leader of the ultranationalist wing in the SPS, indicated that this was the general opnion of the governing coalition. Aleksander Vucic, the SRS General Secretary, said that the Radical expect the same. Vuclic added, however, that,the only thing that could trigger elections thisyear would be for the international community toannounce final status before expected. Regardless, this is the moment both parties have been awaiting: an unpopular GOS forced to deal with the loss of Kosovo, which they hope will give them a temporary boost in the polls that will propel them to power. ¶15. (SBU) As a result of this perceived timeline, neither the SRS nor SPS has begun to prepare actively for elections. The SPS is focused on the struggle for leadership--and the party's future ideological direction-- which will reach its climax at the party's congress in December. Analysts suggest that an election this year could be a disaster for the SPS, which will be woefully unprepared. The SRS has begun to develop a strategy, but it is in its nascent stages and the party has done little else to prepare. Vucic and acting party leader, Tomislav Nikolic, plan on implementing an extensive door-to-door campaign that utilizes the party's sizeable grassroots network. They plan to use this strategy because they know that their party cannot match the tycoon-fueled war chests of the ruling parties, which monopolize the media. Ironically, both hope to follow the example of the opposition's electoral victory over Milosevic, despite his likewise large monetary advantage and unscrupulous manipulation of state structures and media, as a guide for their strategy. Comment -------------- ¶16. (SBU) All parties assume elections will be in the spring because of their perceptions of the Kosovo timetable. We have noted recently, however, a growing fear that a pronouncement on Kosovo may come much earlier, prompting the parties to worry about their lack of preparation. Even the DS, which has been pushing for early elections since January, has not done the necessary work to win. Observers have noted that an announcement of early elections by the GOS will begin a two month period (until the actual elections are held) during which there will be no parliament and a caretaker government unwilling or unable to take any decision on important issues, e.g. Kosovo. We have begun our planning of the crucial GOTV campaign (septel),and will be working intensely in the months ahead to focus all of the democratic parties on Serbia's future after Kosovo. POLT