SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001211 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SWCI AND EUR/SCE DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY TAGS: ICTY GPGOV PREL SR SUBJECT: SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE Classified By: DCM Rod Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) SUMMARY ¶1. (c) S/WCI Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson told the senior GoS leadership that we are eager to see Serbia integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions, but that we needed to see results on Mladic and ICTY cooperation first. Calling the GOS' Action Plan on ICTY a good starting point (as a "statement of intent"),he urged the GoS to incorporate into the implementation of its Plan the eleven USG recommendations on ICTY. PM Kostunica voiced a strong commitment to "complete" ICTY cooperation. The GOS has already taken initial procedural steps to implement its new Action Plan, but much work remains to be done before it can be judged credible and effective. Ambassador Williamson called on Serbian law enforcement and judicial authorities to be more pro-active in investigating new war crimes cases and exhorted them to bring justice in the Bytyqi brothers case. End summary. ¶2. (c) S/WCI Ambassador Clint WilliamsQs visit to Belgrade July 26-28 included separate meetings with every key plQ in the ICTY portfolio - PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FONMIN Draskovic,QFMIN Stankovic (with VBA chief Kovac alongside),MININT Jocic, BIA chief Rade Bulatovic, and DPM Dulic-Markovic. He also met with Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic in their new positions as coordinators for the GoS Action Plan. The Ambassador also toured the Special Court and met with key officials involved in the Bytyqi brothers' murder case. Media coverage of the visit was generally positive, carrying Ambassador Williamson's messages about our desire to assist Serbia and the need to implement the Action Plan. KEY MESSAGES ¶3. (c) Ambassador Williamson conveyed five key messages to senior officials regarding ICTY cooperation. He reassured the leadership of the USG's strong interest in helping Serbia integrate into the EU and NATO, emphasizing that transferring Mladic to the ICTY is a key obstacle to progress in these processes. He noted that he was encouraged by the GOS' progress on transferring 16 indictees to the Hague in 2005, but stressed the need for all sides to move beyond combative rhetoric and start building productive, professional working relationships to finish with Mladic. He welcomed the Action Plan as a good statement of intent for the GoS, but cautioned that the international community would expect to see strong and concrete operational implementation measures. One key component, he stressed, would be an aggressive media campaign to reshape public opinion and change the terms of the debate about Mladic - i.e., to stop characterizing ICTY cooperation as sacrificing a hero in exchange for EU membership, and to instead to show the public that the government believes ICTY cooperation is in the interest of Serbia as a modern and just democracy that promotes the rule of law. Finally, he urged the GOS to incorporate the USG's recently-presented eleven recommendations into its operational plan for implementation of the Action Plan. He noted that the USG recommendations had been positively received by ICTY and the EU. GOS REACTIONS ¶4. (c) All of the GoS leadership welcomed Ambassador Williamson's visit and expressed willingness to work with us closely on the Mladic issue. Kostunica was in surprisingly high spirits ) in marked contrast to his bitterness in the previous day's meetings with Ambassador Wisner on Kosovo status issues. The PM assured Ambassador Williamson that the GoS is totally committed to finding Mladic, noting: "it is in our utmost interest to complete this." Kostunica noted that the GoS's transfer of 16 PIFWCs in 2005 was proof of its commitment to cooperation. In another signal of the GoS's commitment, Kostunica included war crimes prosecutor and operational coordinator for the Action Plan, Vladimir Vukcevic, in his meeting with Ambassador Williamson. In a separate meeting, Ljajic told Ambassador Williamson he would not have agreed to take a key role in the Plan if he was not absolutely convinced the government was serious about finishing the job. ¶5. (c) All the leadership voiced support for VukceQs BELGRADE 00001211 002 OF 003 appointment, and officials responsible for operations (BIA chief Bulatovic, VBA chief Kovac, and MUP General Veljevic) all assured Ambassador Williamson they would support Vukcevic. While Bulatovic acknowledged he had reservations about Vukcevic's qualifications to coordinate the effort, he pledged BIA operations would continue to approach the Mladic hunt with the utmost professionalism, and welcomed the GoS's commitment in the Action Plan to more closely coordinate the efforts of BIA, VBA, and MUP. ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION ¶6. (c) Jocic noted, and others later confirmed, that the GoS had already started putting in place the appropriate structure to implement the Action Plan. Of note, the GoS had already delineated responsibilities - Rasim Ljajic will serve as the diplomatic/political coordinator for the Plan, and along with DPM Dulic-Markovic, Jocic, Stankovic, and others as necessary, will represent a sort of executive council for the Plan. Vukcevic, meanwhile, will be the operational coordinator, in consultation with Bulatovic, Kovac, and Veljevic - each of whom, in turn, will establish separate operational teams that will carry out the "leg work" of the search effort. Jocic told Ambassador Williamson, and Ljajic and Dulic-Markovic confirmed, that the political and operational coordinators had already held two meetings to set up these structures, and they expected the operational teams from each of the three services to have work plans completed by July 31. Both Ljajic and Vukcevic will have regular meetings (at least weekly) separately with USG, EU, and ICTY officials to brief on GoS actions and share information. MEDIA PLAN ¶7. (c) Ljajic will be in charge of developing the media plan, and wasted no time asking for help from the USG in creating a convincing plan. Ambassador Williamson stressed to Ljajic and the rest of the leadership that personal involvement from the top-most ranks of the GoS ) including the PM - would be critical to public acceptance of the Action Plan itself and of the Government's commitment to capture Mladic. He said it was not enough to tell the Serbian people that Mladic was a "box to check" to get into the EU. Mladic would have to be de-mythologized so that average Serbs stopped viewing him as a martyr/hero and started viewing him as an indicted criminal and fugitive from justice. He noted the importance of portraying efforts to bring indicted fugitives to justice as the right thing to do in order to promote the rule of law and a just society. Ambassador Williamson expressed confidence that, once the people started hearing this message consistently from the highest levels of the Serbian leadership, this would help to sway public opinion. ¶8. (c) The USG recommendations were welcomed by Tadic, Draskovic, and Dulic-Markovic, all of whom have made statements in support of this approach in the past. Ljajic, too, recognized the efficacy of such an approach, admitting also that the GoS would have to work to restore the confidence of the international community. He admitted that GoS "errors in assessment" and "promises made too soon" had led to an atmosphere of distrust with ICTY, and that the GoS would now have to engage strongly to dispel this. Kostunica did not comment on the leadership's role in the media plan, but he did acknowledge that the government would have to focus on reshaping public opinion, much as it had done in advance of the PIFWC transfers in 2005. Kostunica advisor Vladeta Jankovic pointed to recent increased press attention on Mladic and his recent whereabouts as proof that the GoS had already started trying to reshape public opinion. Jocic, meanwhile, expressed his opinion that there would likely not/not be any significant public backlash even if Mladic was apprehended "tomorrow." ELEVEN POINTS ¶9. (c) Most officials ) some of whom had just seen the USG recommendations for the first time in their meetings with Ambassador Williamson ) expressed general support for our recommendations. DEFMIN Stankovic said he fully supported the recommendations on a first reading, while Draskovic, Dulic-Markovic and Tadic all expressed support for the key aims of the recommendations, noting especially the need for BELGRADE 00001211 003 OF 003 Kostunica to take a leadership role in the media campaign. Tadic, in particular, told Ambassador Williamson he has been "listening every day" for Kostunica to take a public, personal stand on Mladic's arrest. Kostunica took a more cautious approach to the USG recommendations, telling Ambassador Williamson the GoS will "go on with implementation of the Action Plan as presented and accepted by the ICTY," but allowing that they would "consider the proposals" presented in the paper. REGIONAL COOPERATION ¶10. (c) Several officials, including Ljajic, Dulic-Markovic and Vukcevic, expressed their desire for improved cooperation with neighboring countries for apprehending ICTY fugitives and for facilitating investigations and prosecutions of domestic war crimes cases. They warmly welcomed Ambassador Williamson's proposed initiative to provide a regional liaison who would engage regional governments on a regular basis to failitate cooperation and information sharing among prosecutors, security an law enforcement services, an enhance cooperation with the ICTY. OTHER ISSUES: DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS AND BYTYQI BROTHERS ¶11. (c) In addition to his extensive meetings on Mladic and the Action Plan, Ambassador Williamson spent considerable time discussing domestic prosecutions, especially the Bytyqi brothers murder case, with officials in MUP and the Special Court for War Crimes. Officials at all levels, including MININT Jocic, reiterated their commitment to solving the case ) Jocic said it is his top priority after Mladic. The minister and Investigative Judge Dilparic provided detailed updates on the case (to be provided SEPTEL),and Dilparic pledged to work closely with FBI agents assigned to the case in Washington. Ambassador Williamson delivered copies of a Letter Rogatory asking for assistance in the case to Jocic, Dilparic, and Vukcevic, and advised that the formal Letter would arrive via official channels soon. ¶12. (c) Ambassador Williamson also took the opportunity to commend the work of the Special Court, and in particular the work of Vukcevic to successfully prosecute a number of high-profile cases. He expressed his hope, both to Vukcevic and to MUP War Crimes unit chief Kostic in separate meetings, that the Court and the War Crimes unit in MUP would soon be in a position to take more aggressive action to initiate their own cases in addition to following up on cases handed over to them by other parties. Kostic asserted his willingness to do so, noting only that severe resource constraints made it difficult to spread his unit too thin when priority cases still demanded the attention of all five of the investigators on his staff. He said he would welcome any additional assistance the USG could provide in terms of office space, personnel funding, and equipment. ¶13. COMMENT: This visit was timely, allowing Ambassador Williamson to convey the strong USG message that we view the Action Plan as only a first step and that we would need to see aggressive operational implementation of measures such as those contained in our 11-point recommendations in order to assess the GOS effort on Mladic as credible. Some of the initial steps the GOS has taken are moderately encouraging. Still, these steps are largely procedural at this point, and we have seen no commitments yet to follow through on many of our key recommendations - including a direct, public role by the PM. Moreover, we will have to keep a close eye on the functioning of the Action Team that will be in charge of the Mladic hunt. Given the mutual suspicions between the security services, their general lack of confidence in Vukcevic, and the fact that the services will still apparently retain separate teams (i.e., not a standing task force),a special effort will be required to make this group produce results. ¶14. (u) Ambassador Williamson has cleared this message. MOORE