SERBIA: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER IN BELGRADE --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 001202

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER IN BELGRADE --
DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS ON KOSOVO


Classified By: CHARGE D AFFAIRES RODERICK MOORE PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and
(D).


1. (C) Summary: PM Kostunica offered to visiting Special
U.S. Envoy Ambassador Frank Wisner on 7/25 a dark and
emotional reaction to the prospect of Kosovo independence, an
outcome he seems to increasingly see as inevitable. It was a
dramatic encounter with the PM who appeared to be visibly
weighed down with all of the ramifications, both domestic and
otherwise, of the Kosovo end game. Kostunica referred
repeatedly to &serious consequences8 both for our
relationship and the region. In contrast, President Tadic
told Wisner that he would move to preserve Serbia,s
relationship with us and Europe (and Moscow) &one second
after the outcome is announced.8


2. (C) However, neither Tadic nor Kostunica were particularly
reassuring on IC concerns about Northern Kosovo, although
both reaffirmed the no-violence pledge that Tadic made in
Vienna. Both leaders also committed themselves to staying at
the decentralization table and adhering to Ahtisaari,s
schedule for August. Tadic appealed strongly for a favorable
decentralization package to help him get through future
elections. End Summary.

Kostunica: Difficult and Bleak


3. (U) Special Envoy to the Kosovo Negotiations Frank Wisner
traveled to Belgrade on 25-26 July for meetings with PM
Kostunica, President Tadic, FM Draskovic and Serbian Orthodox
Church leaders. He also met separately with Tadic negotiator
Leon Kojen in a working session on the decentralization talks
and did outreach events with the press and the local business
community. Wisner met with local Contact Group
representatives before continuing his trip to Kosovo. Charge
accompanied Wisner to all meetings.


4. (C) The meeting with Kostunica, the day after the first
high level status meeting in Vienna, was bracing. The
embattled Kostunica was morose, resentful and, at times
almost spiteful, in discussing the Kosovo end game. His
reaction suggested that it has finally dawned on him that
Kosovo,s independence is actually on the horizon and that he
will have to make hard and dangerous political choices with
regard to the outside world. More disturbingly, the PM
repeatedly asserted that Kosovo independence would bring
about &serious consequences8 ) both for the stability of
the region and for Serbia,s relations with the U.S. &We
will not just vocally reject Kosovo,s independence; we will
act as well,8 he asserted.


5. (C) Wisner was clear about how the U.S. and the Contact
Group expected the talks to end. He said the U.S. had been
frank with him throughout, a point Kostunica acknowledged.
Wisner encouraged him to take to heart the Secretary,s
assurances of American interest in Serbia,s future in Europe
and in a strengthened bilateral relationship with us. He
cautioned him, however, not to react to the status decision
with steps that would complicate Serbia,s European prospects
or its relations with the U.S.


6. (C) In this context, Wisner reviewed the widening list of
Serb unhelpfulness on the ground, including the growing
number of Serb security forces (MUP and BIA) in Kosovo, the
creation of civil defense forces there, the decision by Serb
municipalities to cease cooperation with Pristina, and
Belgrade,s role in obstructing cooperation between Serbs in
Kosovo and the PISG and UNMIK. (Regarding MUP and BIA, he
dissembled, arguing that there might have been some former
police and other security officials who remained in Kosovo
after 1999.) Wisner appealed to Kostunica to use his
influence to bring these issues under control, reminding him
what he had told the Prime Minister before ) the U.S. will
support protections for the minority communities but will
flatly oppose a carve out ) i.e. partition &hard or soft.8
Wisner also reiterated strong U.S. support for UNOSEK Chief
Martti Ahtisaari and exhorted the Serbian government to
engage energetically in the demanding schedule that Ahtisaari
has planned on decentralization and cultural heritage
negotiations. The next six weeks, he told Kostunica, would
be critical to shaping a final outcome that will have a
strong influence on the security of Kosovo,s Serbs.


7. (C) Kostunica dismissed the charges of Serb misbehavior

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and ridiculed the Contact Group,s criticism of Serbia,s
inflexibility as &almost funny.8 He derided the
Albanians, presentation in Vienna for depicting Kosovo as an
&El Dorado,8 emphasizing that Serbs, not Albanians, were
under threat. He noted his usual complaints about how little
the international community had done for Serbs in Kosovo
during UNMIK,s seven years. He said the Serbian side had
showed restraint and good will by even going to Vienna,
considering that Kosovo PM Ceku was a war criminal and the
bias in UNOSEK (he sharply criticized Ahtisaari, referring
specifically to a conversation with Ahtisaari at the outset
of the status process when Ahtisaari told him independence
would be the outcome). Wisner expressed disagreement with
the Prime Minister,s characterization.


8. (C) Importantly, Kostunica pledged to keep his delegation
in the Vienna talks during the upcoming weeks. He also
repeated three times Tadic,s promise in Vienna the day
before that Serbia would not foment violence, regardless of
how the negotiations end up. That was about as far as the
(relatively) positive messages went, however. Kostunica made
repeated references to &negative consequences8 in the event
of independence. Not only would the new Serbian constitution
refer to Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia (creating a
&historical problem between Serbia and Kosovo8),but he
openly questioned whether Serbs would decide to stay in
Kosovo. He predicted regional instability in Macedonia and
elsewhere.


9. (C) Kostunica directed his anger at the U.S as well. &I
must be frank: our disagreement over the final status issue
will have consequences for our cooperation (with the U.S.),8
he said. At one point, he went as far to call the 1999
bombing the first step in &the NATO invasion of Serbia,8
concluding that this would seriously undermine Serbia,s
willingness to develop a relationship with NATO. &The
easiest solution for the U.S. would be a Kosovo cleansed of
Serbs and Serbian security services,8 he said.


10. (C) In the end, Kostunica almost plaintively called on
us to &rethink8 our position on final status. He suggested
we give his autonomy proposal a chance to &see if it can
work.8 Wisner reminded him of the very clear position of
the USG, most recently repeated to him by the Secretary, and
backed up by the Vice President and National Security Advisor.


11. (C) It was not an easy meeting, with the Prime Minister
quite clearly suffering the realization that there is no hope
for his autonomy plan and unwilling or unable to present a
constructive fall back. There were no assurances from
Kostunica on maintaining security in northern Kosovo or
restraining unstable forces from interfering in a nascent
Kosovo. Instead, the Prime Minister continued to focus on
the rejection of Kosovo independence ) suggesting at various
points a continued legal and political campaign aimed at
undermining the Kosovo status decision.

Tadic: Elections and Support from IC in Endgame


12. (C) Wisner,s conversation with President Tadic at a
dinner the same evening was strikingly different ) and more
encouraging ) in tone. Tadic was unequivocal that he would
not let Kosovo derail Serbia,s efforts to move forward on
EU/NATO integration. He repeated his no-violence pledge from
Vienna, but did note in an aside some uncertainty about
possible Albanian violence directed against the Serbs as the
end game got closer. Tadic pointed to early signs of a
campaign in the Serbian press accusing him of being
unpatriotic. He seemed ready and resigned to the attacks and
expressed hope that the international community would provide
strong support to offset this. Tadic laid out his broad
hopes and plans for early elections (as early as December
2006) and a new DS/DSS-based democratic government with
strong IC support. Such support ) including a favorable
Kosovo decentralization package delivered before elections --
would protect Serbia,s future in Europe against attacks from
the unreformed Radicals and Socialists. &We need your
help,8 he said.


13. (C) Tadic noted his preference for elections before the
end of the year, outlining his hope that the ICTY/EU review
in mid-September might provide such an opportunity. It would
be much more complicated if elections followed an
independence outcome. Jeremic challenged Wisner on the

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&rather dead8 Bildt-Rondos plan, noting that for Tadic it
was still &very much alive8 and stressing the need for
significant progress on the decentralization package and an
ambitious road-map on EU/NATO integration. In response to
Wisner,s points about Serb unhelpfulness on the ground in
Kosovo, Tadic demurred on BIA/MUP presence noting his lack of
information and limited role on internal security matters.
He did, however, acknowledge his responsibility as commander
in chief of the military, referring to his remarks at the NAC
in support of a unified Bosnia and his restraint as Minister
of Defense when violence erupted in Kosovo in March 2004.
Tadic was careful to point out that he would not push back on
efforts to include Kosovo as a part of Serbia in the ongoing
discussion on a new constitution.


14. (C) Tadic sidestepped Wisner,s question about how he
would react if Serbs in Kosovo declared themselves to be part
of Serbia. Tadic said this would present him with a legal
conundrum, given that Serbia recognized Kosovo as part of
Serbia. He weakly concluded only that he would ¬
encourage8 the Kosovo Serbs to take such steps, adding that
he preferred ¬ to comment on hypotheticals.8 Wisner
strongly conveyed to Tadic (and earlier to Kostunica) that
the USG would view with great concern a failure by Belgrade
to condemn any destabilizing steps by the K-Serbs.

Draskovic Worrying


15. (C) After expressing &surprise8 that the CG statement
seemed to indicate that independence was the likely outcome
for Kosovo, Draskovic was particularly dramatic about the
dangers of independence in his meeting with Wisner. He
warned of turmoil throughout the region and yet again argued
for autonomy for Kosovo for a transitional period (&to see
if it works8) ) although now down from 20 to 3 years. He
went over several possible problems post-settlement e.g.,
partition, closing the border, non-recognition of licenses
and documents. These were not threats, he said. He was
merely worrying out loud about Serbs on the ground and the
government,s possible reaction.

Kojen and Church Leaders on Negotiations


16. (C) Wisner met separately with Tadic negotiator Kojen
(Kostunica,s advisor Samardzic has a bout of pneumonia) to
discuss details of the ongoing decentralization and church
property talks. Kojen charged the UNOSEK team with holding a
strong pro-Albanian bias, before focusing on a number of
specific Serbian red lines. Of top priority for Belgrade
are: Serbian curricula in the schools; acceptable formula on
police chiefs and judicial officials; the right to establish
hospitals beyond the 3 currently proposed by UNOSEK;
restitution of Church property. He shared the latest Serb
proposal/map on new municipalities, including Church buffer
zones, without reviewing the details except to observe that
&he was sure8 the number of church sites was right even if
the extent of the zones was admittedly overambitious. (note:
Koen separately told CDA that the GOS believed the UNOSEK
map would leave 50 percent of Serbs south of the Ibar outside
Serb municipalities. He also indicated a willingness on the
Serb side to be flexible on proposed municipalities that fall
short of the 5000 inhabitants/70 percent parameters.)


17. (U) Wisner also met separately with SOC Bishops Irinej
(Backa),Teodosije, and Irinej (Australia/New Zealand). The
Church leaders raised concerns (number of protected sites,
type of protections and size of buffer zones) but indicated
willingness to keep at the details with both UNOSEK and
directly with Kosovo Albanians. Irinej (Backa) acknowledged
the need for compromise, and stressed that the Synod was most
concerned with the security of its sites and followers. He
hoped that the Kosovo Albanians would stand by their
commitment to ensure the &crucial8 safety and security of
the SOC. The SOC leaders appeared to agree with Wisner that
they would not insist on the actual restitution of property
prior to status, provided that a sound and fair process for
restitution was in place.

Outreach: Press/Business Community/Local CG


18. (U) Wisner held a press event with a Kosovo-saavy Serbian
press pool, and an outreach event with local businessmen.
Initial press play of Wisner,s visit in the Serbian dailies
was ample and restrained: Kostunica advisor Jankovic was

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quoted observing that, with regard to the Kosovo talks,
&things did not look good for the Serbs.8 (comment: This
is the first time of which we are aware of such a signal
coming from the PM,s office. End comment) Ambassador
Wisner,s meeting with prominent Serbian business leaders
allowed for a frank discussion about impediments to business
development in Serbia and ways the business community could
come together to effect change. They discussed the
challenges of doing business in Kosovo and their desire to
expand into Kosovo in the privatization process. (Post will
follow up separately on the details of the discussion and
recommendations.) Finally, Wisner reviewed the results of
his visit with local Contact Group Representatives
(Ambassadors Pernet (France),Soebel (Germany) and Alexseyev
(Russia); First Secretaries Colombo (Italy) and
(Rennie)(UK)),and discussed electoral timing and the need to
continue pressing Belgrade on concerns (he noted CG agreement
on a demarche on security personnel).

Comment


19. (C) Kostunica was uncharacteristically emotional in his
meeting with Wisner ) the dark mood seemed to cast a pall
over the room by the end of the meeting. His bleak and weary
demeanor seemed to stem not only from his fear that Kosovo is
lost but equally, or more importantly, about the political
complexity of the choices before him. There was the sense
that he was toying with options ) the not very nice (and
dangerous to Serbia) partition of northern Kosovo; a UDI by
local Serbs; securing as many advantages for Kosovo Serbs at
the negotiating table as he can secure and take credit for,
or whether to walk away from the Ahtisaari-led negotiation.
At the head of Kostunica,s dilemma is Serbian politics and
how to prepare for an election. He is, as always, a man of
tactics. He paid no attention to Wisner,s closing
suggestion to think beyond Kosovo and the end of the year and
take a strategic view of Serbia,s choices.


20. (C) Tadic was much better and gave reassurances that he
has internalized and accepted the inevitability of an
independence outcome. He has a general plan for how he will
weather the storm ) elections before independence is
announced, a good deal on decentralization, and a strong
Euroatlantic platform. He is not willing at this point to
give any specific assurances on what he will do if Serbs do
the wrong thing in Kosovo. He seems to assume the DS will be
in government to prevent it from happening; if it is not, he
probably still does not know himself what he will do.


21. (C) We will continue to press for Serbian participation
in the negotiations. If the Serbian assurances of
flexibility are to be believed, and if UNOSEK and the
Albanians are willing to be creative as well, a meeting of
the minds on decentralization measures is within reach. We
will also need to strongly discourage Serb moves in northern
Kosovo and warn Kostunica we will tolerate neither UDI nor
partition. The upcoming CG demarche will be a good
opportunity to convey that message. Tadic will need more
bucking up to ensure that he continues to stay strong and
resistant to any post-settlement mischief. His meetings in
Washington and New York in September should help. End Comment


22. (U) Post did not have the opportunity to clear this
message with Ambassador Wisner prior to his departure.
MOORE