SERBIA: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER IN BELGRADE --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 001202 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI MW SUBJECT: SERBIA: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER IN BELGRADE -- DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS ON KOSOVO Classified By: CHARGE D AFFAIRES RODERICK MOORE PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: PM Kostunica offered to visiting Special U.S. Envoy Ambassador Frank Wisner on 7/25 a dark and emotional reaction to the prospect of Kosovo independence, an outcome he seems to increasingly see as inevitable. It was a dramatic encounter with the PM who appeared to be visibly weighed down with all of the ramifications, both domestic and otherwise, of the Kosovo end game. Kostunica referred repeatedly to &serious consequences8 both for our relationship and the region. In contrast, President Tadic told Wisner that he would move to preserve Serbia,s relationship with us and Europe (and Moscow) &one second after the outcome is announced.8 ¶2. (C) However, neither Tadic nor Kostunica were particularly reassuring on IC concerns about Northern Kosovo, although both reaffirmed the no-violence pledge that Tadic made in Vienna. Both leaders also committed themselves to staying at the decentralization table and adhering to Ahtisaari,s schedule for August. Tadic appealed strongly for a favorable decentralization package to help him get through future elections. End Summary. Kostunica: Difficult and Bleak ¶3. (U) Special Envoy to the Kosovo Negotiations Frank Wisner traveled to Belgrade on 25-26 July for meetings with PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FM Draskovic and Serbian Orthodox Church leaders. He also met separately with Tadic negotiator Leon Kojen in a working session on the decentralization talks and did outreach events with the press and the local business community. Wisner met with local Contact Group representatives before continuing his trip to Kosovo. Charge accompanied Wisner to all meetings. ¶4. (C) The meeting with Kostunica, the day after the first high level status meeting in Vienna, was bracing. The embattled Kostunica was morose, resentful and, at times almost spiteful, in discussing the Kosovo end game. His reaction suggested that it has finally dawned on him that Kosovo,s independence is actually on the horizon and that he will have to make hard and dangerous political choices with regard to the outside world. More disturbingly, the PM repeatedly asserted that Kosovo independence would bring about &serious consequences8 ) both for the stability of 
the region and for Serbia,s relations with the U.S. &We will not just vocally reject Kosovo,s independence; we will act as well,8 he asserted. ¶5. (C) Wisner was clear about how the U.S. and the Contact Group expected the talks to end. He said the U.S. had been frank with him throughout, a point Kostunica acknowledged. Wisner encouraged him to take to heart the Secretary,s assurances of American interest in Serbia,s future in Europe and in a strengthened bilateral relationship with us. He cautioned him, however, not to react to the status decision with steps that would complicate Serbia,s European prospects or its relations with the U.S. ¶6. (C) In this context, Wisner reviewed the widening list of Serb unhelpfulness on the ground, including the growing number of Serb security forces (MUP and BIA) in Kosovo, the creation of civil defense forces there, the decision by Serb municipalities to cease cooperation with Pristina, and Belgrade,s role in obstructing cooperation between Serbs in Kosovo and the PISG and UNMIK. (Regarding MUP and BIA, he dissembled, arguing that there might have been some former police and other security officials who remained in Kosovo after 1999.) Wisner appealed to Kostunica to use his influence to bring these issues under control, reminding him what he had told the Prime Minister before ) the U.S. will support protections for the minority communities but will flatly oppose a carve out ) i.e. partition &hard or soft.8 Wisner also reiterated strong U.S. support for UNOSEK Chief Martti Ahtisaari and exhorted the Serbian government to engage energetically in the demanding schedule that Ahtisaari has planned on decentralization and cultural heritage negotiations. The next six weeks, he told Kostunica, would be critical to shaping a final outcome that will have a strong influence on the security of Kosovo,s Serbs. ¶7. (C) Kostunica dismissed the charges of Serb misbehavior BELGRADE 00001202 002 OF 004 and ridiculed the Contact Group,s criticism of Serbia,s inflexibility as &almost funny.8 He derided the Albanians, presentation in Vienna for depicting Kosovo as an &El Dorado,8 emphasizing that Serbs, not Albanians, were under threat. He noted his usual complaints about how little the international community had done for Serbs in Kosovo during UNMIK,s seven years. He said the Serbian side had showed restraint and good will by even going to Vienna, considering that Kosovo PM Ceku was a war criminal and the bias in UNOSEK (he sharply criticized Ahtisaari, referring specifically to a conversation with Ahtisaari at the outset of the status process when Ahtisaari told him independence would be the outcome). Wisner expressed disagreement with the Prime Minister,s characterization. ¶8. (C) Importantly, Kostunica pledged to keep his delegation in the Vienna talks during the upcoming weeks. He also repeated three times Tadic,s promise in Vienna the day before that Serbia would not foment violence, regardless of how the negotiations end up. That was about as far as the (relatively) positive messages went, however. Kostunica made repeated references to &negative consequences8 in the event of independence. Not only would the new Serbian constitution refer to Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia (creating a &historical problem between Serbia and Kosovo8),but he openly questioned whether Serbs would decide to stay in Kosovo. He predicted regional instability in Macedonia and elsewhere. ¶9. (C) Kostunica directed his anger at the U.S as well. &I must be frank: our disagreement over the final status issue will have consequences for our cooperation (with the U.S.),8 he said. At one point, he went as far to call the 1999 bombing the first step in &the NATO invasion of Serbia,8 concluding that this would seriously undermine Serbia,s willingness to develop a relationship with NATO. &The easiest solution for the U.S. would be a Kosovo cleansed of Serbs and Serbian security services,8 he said. ¶10. (C) In the end, Kostunica almost plaintively called on us to &rethink8 our position on final status. He suggested we give his autonomy proposal a chance to &see if it can work.8 Wisner reminded him of the very clear position of the USG, most recently repeated to him by the Secretary, and backed up by the Vice President and National Security Advisor. ¶11. (C) It was not an easy meeting, with the Prime Minister quite clearly suffering the realization that there is no hope for his autonomy plan and unwilling or unable to present a constructive fall back. There were no assurances from Kostunica on maintaining security in northern Kosovo or restraining unstable forces from interfering in a nascent Kosovo. Instead, the Prime Minister continued to focus on the rejection of Kosovo independence ) suggesting at various points a continued legal and political campaign aimed at undermining the Kosovo status decision. Tadic: Elections and Support from IC in Endgame ¶12. (C) Wisner,s conversation with President Tadic at a dinner the same evening was strikingly different ) and more encouraging ) in tone. Tadic was unequivocal that he would not let Kosovo derail Serbia,s efforts to move forward on EU/NATO integration. He repeated his no-violence pledge from Vienna, but did note in an aside some uncertainty about possible Albanian violence directed against the Serbs as the end game got closer. Tadic pointed to early signs of a campaign in the Serbian press accusing him of being unpatriotic. He seemed ready and resigned to the attacks and expressed hope that the international community would provide strong support to offset this. Tadic laid out his broad hopes and plans for early elections (as early as December 2006) and a new DS/DSS-based democratic government with strong IC support. Such support ) including a favorable Kosovo decentralization package delivered before elections -- would protect Serbia,s future in Europe against attacks from the unreformed Radicals and Socialists. &We need your help,8 he said. ¶13. (C) Tadic noted his preference for elections before the end of the year, outlining his hope that the ICTY/EU review in mid-September might provide such an opportunity. It would be much more complicated if elections followed an independence outcome. Jeremic challenged Wisner on the BELGRADE 00001202 003 OF 004 &rather dead8 Bildt-Rondos plan, noting that for Tadic it was still &very much alive8 and stressing the need for significant progress on the decentralization package and an ambitious road-map on EU/NATO integration. In response to Wisner,s points about Serb unhelpfulness on the ground in Kosovo, Tadic demurred on BIA/MUP presence noting his lack of information and limited role on internal security matters. He did, however, acknowledge his responsibility as commander in chief of the military, referring to his remarks at the NAC in support of a unified Bosnia and his restraint as Minister of Defense when violence erupted in Kosovo in March 2004. Tadic was careful to point out that he would not push back on efforts to include Kosovo as a part of Serbia in the ongoing discussion on a new constitution. ¶14. (C) Tadic sidestepped Wisner,s question about how he would react if Serbs in Kosovo declared themselves to be part of Serbia. Tadic said this would present him with a legal conundrum, given that Serbia recognized Kosovo as part of Serbia. He weakly concluded only that he would ¬ encourage8 the Kosovo Serbs to take such steps, adding that he preferred ¬ to comment on hypotheticals.8 Wisner strongly conveyed to Tadic (and earlier to Kostunica) that the USG would view with great concern a failure by Belgrade to condemn any destabilizing steps by the K-Serbs. Draskovic Worrying ¶15. (C) After expressing &surprise8 that the CG statement seemed to indicate that independence was the likely outcome for Kosovo, Draskovic was particularly dramatic about the dangers of independence in his meeting with Wisner. He warned of turmoil throughout the region and yet again argued for autonomy for Kosovo for a transitional period (&to see if it works8) ) although now down from 20 to 3 years. He went over several possible problems post-settlement e.g., partition, closing the border, non-recognition of licenses and documents. These were not threats, he said. He was merely worrying out loud about Serbs on the ground and the government,s possible reaction. Kojen and Church Leaders on Negotiations ¶16. (C) Wisner met separately with Tadic negotiator Kojen (Kostunica,s advisor Samardzic has a bout of pneumonia) to discuss details of the ongoing decentralization and church property talks. Kojen charged the UNOSEK team with holding a strong pro-Albanian bias, before focusing on a number of specific Serbian red lines. Of top priority for Belgrade are: Serbian curricula in the schools; acceptable formula on police chiefs and judicial officials; the right to establish hospitals beyond the 3 currently proposed by UNOSEK; restitution of Church property. He shared the latest Serb proposal/map on new municipalities, including Church buffer zones, without reviewing the details except to observe that &he was sure8 the number of church sites was right even if the extent of the zones was admittedly overambitious. (note: Koen separately told CDA that the GOS believed the UNOSEK map would leave 50 percent of Serbs south of the Ibar outside Serb municipalities. He also indicated a willingness on the Serb side to be flexible on proposed municipalities that fall short of the 5000 inhabitants/70 percent parameters.) ¶17. (U) Wisner also met separately with SOC Bishops Irinej (Backa),Teodosije, and Irinej (Australia/New Zealand). The Church leaders raised concerns (number of protected sites, type of protections and size of buffer zones) but indicated willingness to keep at the details with both UNOSEK and directly with Kosovo Albanians. Irinej (Backa) acknowledged the need for compromise, and stressed that the Synod was most concerned with the security of its sites and followers. He hoped that the Kosovo Albanians would stand by their commitment to ensure the &crucial8 safety and security of the SOC. The SOC leaders appeared to agree with Wisner that they would not insist on the actual restitution of property prior to status, provided that a sound and fair process for restitution was in place. Outreach: Press/Business Community/Local CG ¶18. (U) Wisner held a press event with a Kosovo-saavy Serbian press pool, and an outreach event with local businessmen. Initial press play of Wisner,s visit in the Serbian dailies was ample and restrained: Kostunica advisor Jankovic was BELGRADE 00001202 004 OF 004 quoted observing that, with regard to the Kosovo talks, &things did not look good for the Serbs.8 (comment: This is the first time of which we are aware of such a signal coming from the PM,s office. End comment) Ambassador Wisner,s meeting with prominent Serbian business leaders allowed for a frank discussion about impediments to business development in Serbia and ways the business community could come together to effect change. They discussed the challenges of doing business in Kosovo and their desire to expand into Kosovo in the privatization process. (Post will follow up separately on the details of the discussion and recommendations.) Finally, Wisner reviewed the results of his visit with local Contact Group Representatives (Ambassadors Pernet (France),Soebel (Germany) and Alexseyev (Russia); First Secretaries Colombo (Italy) and (Rennie)(UK)),and discussed electoral timing and the need to continue pressing Belgrade on concerns (he noted CG agreement on a demarche on security personnel). Comment ¶19. (C) Kostunica was uncharacteristically emotional in his meeting with Wisner ) the dark mood seemed to cast a pall over the room by the end of the meeting. His bleak and weary demeanor seemed to stem not only from his fear that Kosovo is lost but equally, or more importantly, about the political complexity of the choices before him. There was the sense that he was toying with options ) the not very nice (and dangerous to Serbia) partition of northern Kosovo; a UDI by local Serbs; securing as many advantages for Kosovo Serbs at the negotiating table as he can secure and take credit for, or whether to walk away from the Ahtisaari-led negotiation. At the head of Kostunica,s dilemma is Serbian politics and how to prepare for an election. He is, as always, a man of tactics. He paid no attention to Wisner,s closing suggestion to think beyond Kosovo and the end of the year and take a strategic view of Serbia,s choices. ¶20. (C) Tadic was much better and gave reassurances that he has internalized and accepted the inevitability of an independence outcome. He has a general plan for how he will weather the storm ) elections before independence is announced, a good deal on decentralization, and a strong Euroatlantic platform. He is not willing at this point to give any specific assurances on what he will do if Serbs do the wrong thing in Kosovo. He seems to assume the DS will be in government to prevent it from happening; if it is not, he probably still does not know himself what he will do. ¶21. (C) We will continue to press for Serbian participation in the negotiations. If the Serbian assurances of flexibility are to be believed, and if UNOSEK and the Albanians are willing to be creative as well, a meeting of the minds on decentralization measures is within reach. We will also need to strongly discourage Serb moves in northern Kosovo and warn Kostunica we will tolerate neither UDI nor partition. The upcoming CG demarche will be a good opportunity to convey that message. Tadic will need more bucking up to ensure that he continues to stay strong and resistant to any post-settlement mischief. His meetings in Washington and New York in September should help. End Comment ¶22. (U) Post did not have the opportunity to clear this message with Ambassador Wisner prior to his departure. MOORE