Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1174
2006-07-21 14:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

Election Outlook for Serbia -- Still

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL SR 
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VZCZCXRO7792
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #1174/01 2021430
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211430Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9052
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001174 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Election Outlook for Serbia -- Still
Potentially Worrisome


BELGRADE 00001174 001.2 OF 003


Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001174 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR SUBJECT: Election Outlook for Serbia -- Still Potentially Worrisome BELGRADE 00001174 001.2 OF 003 Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Two June polls in Serbia indicate that the Radicals and Socialists continue to be within reach of together winning a majority in future elections -- particularly if turnout is low. A Kosovo outcome perceived as negative by the electorate could conceivable sap support for the democrats further, primarily through increased abstention by reform-minded voters. Nevertheless, pollsters believe that the next election could result in a democratic bloc victory, if the democratic parties can cease their infighting, strengthen their regional party structures, forge pre-election coalitions, and burn through a lot of shoe leather to win back the disillusioned democratic voters who coalesced to bring down Milosevic six years ago. End Summary. Party Support -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In two recent polls conducted by SCAN polling agency and the International Republican Institute, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) emerged as the strongest party. The Democratic Party (DS) came out in second place, with the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) a distant third (and the only three who would certainly cross the 5 percent threshold. With undecided and abstaining voters removed from the equation, G- 17+ and SPS hover around the threshold - see para 4.) --Question: If Republic Elections Were Held on Sunday, Which Party Would You Vote for (IRI): Party Percent Support Jan Mar June --- --- -------------- SRS: 24 24 27 DS: 17 19 19 DSS: 8 8 7 SPS: 4 5 4 G-17Plus: 2 3 3 LDP: 1 1 2 PSS: 6 4 1 Undecided: 34 32 33 ¶3. (U) The numbers for the DSS and G-17+ follow the recent trend of declining support, but observers have noted that their figures are stabilizing and not likely to drop further. Pollsters also commented that support for the SRS has largely remained stable over the last few years, and a significant rise or fall is improbable, even in the event of a Kosovo outcome perceived as negative. Real Possibility of SRS-led Government -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Polls since the beginning of the year have consistently indicated the electoral &#x
000A;potential of the SRS and SPS to form a government. For example, the IRI poll among likely/decided voters showed: Party Likely Voters Decided Voters SRS 35% 40% SPS 5% 6% DS 24% 28% DSS 8% 10% G-17+ 4% 5% As no other parties would cross the current 5% parliamentary threshold, these results indicate that the SRS-SPS could theoretically win a majority of seats among decided voters (i.e., SRS-SPS could amass 46% of votes, versus 43% for the democratic parties). Both polling agencies emphasized that this relative strength of the nationalists comes from reform-oriented voters abandoning the democratic parties in droves. They added that this trend is increasing. Turnout and Abstentions -------------- BELGRADE 00001174 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) Another prominent trend is a rising number of Serbs who say they would not vote. A May 2006 Gallup poll found this number to be 23 percent, compared to 20.9 percent in January. The IRI found that the number of people who say they are personally interested in politics has fallen to 31 percent. Milka Puzigaca of SCAN stated that the rise of abstainers is largely due to bickering among the democratic parties, and that the abstainers are likely to be reform- minded rather than sympathetic to the far right. The rising number of non-voters has helped inflate the numbers for the SRS when adjusted to only those who say they will vote, since the Radicals are generally not losing voters to apathy as the democratic parties are. ¶6. (SBU) Turnout is expected to be below 50 percent, and Puzigaca predicted that turnout in Belgrade may not even exceed 40 prcent. IRI's data, which only predicts trends in voting, suggested that turnout will be significantly lower than in 2003, which was about 59 percent. However, both groups emphasized that turnout is nearly impossible to predict, especially before elections are called. Puzigaca was reluctant to talk about turnout and refused to even analyze results based on current turnout surveys, arguing that such analysis is unreliable. ¶7. (SBU) Alternatively, both highlighted that the SRS is also boosted by the number of 'sure voters' of each party, meaning those who will most certainly turn out for elections: Party Percent SRS: 73.4 DS: 55.8 DSS: 47.1 G-17+: 52.5 LDP: 73 This means that the SRS can secure representation in Parliament disproportional to their actual level of support due to the loyal enthusiasm of their voters. Possible Outcomes -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Both polling organizations provided mixed answers on election outcomes. Puzigaca remained confident that the SRS would not come to power and stated that they could never form a coalition with Kostunica, without the DSS' electorate abandoning the party. However, she qualified her answer to say that, if overall turnout is below 44 percent, there is a potential that the SRS and SPS could themselves form a coalition. She stressed that the best strategy for democratic parties is not to threaten voters with a Radical victory, but rather to maintain and promote their own unique identity and goals. The most important thing is that the democratic parties refrain from attacking each other. ¶9. (SBU) IRI provided a slightly different perspective. They stressed that the democratic parties are not doing enough to prepare for elections, and they saw an outright SRS victory as a real possibility. IRI's lead pollster emphasized that the democratic parties need to start working hard to make internal party reforms, develop a positive message, and reach out personally to the electorate, in order to motivate their base and reach out to disaffected voters (see SEPTEL). He noted, however, that he had seen little movement in this direction and was decidedly skeptical that the democrats could make sufficient strides to be victorious if elections are held before 2007. He added that a victory in parliamentary elections could give the SRS enough momentum to secure the presidency as well. When asked, IRI generally agreed with Puzigace's analysis that turnout would need to drop below 44 percent for the SRS to come to power, which its polls envision as a possibility. Comment -------------- BELGRADE 00001174 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (SBU) Analysts agree that the key to a democratic victory is more a factor of turnout, than of Kosovo status. If the democratic parties develop a positive message, continue to pursue internal reforms, and reduce their infighting in order to boost turnout, the Radicals will have a difficult task to score an election victory, even if Kosovo becomes independent. Naturally, a well-planned and funded GOTV program will be crucial to helping the democrats make up for lost time and past mistakes. MOORE

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