SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001160 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO BELGRADE BELGRADE 00001160 001.2 OF 003 Ambassador Wisner, Since your last visit to Belgrade in mid-April, the State Union with Montenegro has dissolved, the SAA talks with the EU have stalled, there is a new Deputy Prime Minister, and Belgrade continues to voice reservations with the UNOSEK-led Kosovo status process at the highest levels in Contact Group capitals and in the press. Your visit on July 25-26 will provide an important opportunity to reinforce the very clear messages Secretary Rice and other senior USG officials conveyed to Kostunica in Washington last week. You will also have the opportunity to (again) try to convince Serbia to accept our offers to help them in protecting the legitimate rights of Serbs in Kosovo and, just as importantly, to focus them on the big prize -- our sincere interest in facilitating their way to the Euro-Atlantic community. You know as well as I do that this is not an easy sell to interlocutors such as the PM, but as our private messages increasingly (we hope) sink in, we need to do our best to bring along the more flexible Serbian leadership. You will also have the chance to explore strategies with business and Church leaders on how best to support the "Serbia in Europe" vision during and after the resolution of Kosovo status. You will be arriving the day after the "Elephant Round" of status talks. The GOS is very nervous about these talks -- which they themselves have been vocally advocating for months -- and Kostunica has not even confirmed his attendance as of the time of this writing. In essence, the GOS is concerned that it has fallen into a trap of its own making. By agreeing to the Elephant Round, they fear that they will give Ahtisaari a pretext for dispensing with further negotiations and proceeding more quickly to his status recommendation. Ahtisaari's reply to the GOS that he is willing to pursue additional talks on key issues does not reassure Belgrade. Background: PM Kostunica is on a "diplomatic offensive" to convey to the world that Serbia cannot accept an independent Kosovo -- the message he so emphatically delivered at Gracanica on June 28 (the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje). He has personally delivered this message in all the Contact Group capitals: Kostunica saw French President Chirac on April 11, German Chancellor Merkel May 15, Russian President Putin June 12, UK PM Blair on June 27, Italian Premier Prodi on July 5 and came to Washington on July 11. In a rare public interview relating to Kosovo on July 5, Kostunica said categorically that he will never accept an independent Kosovo and reported that his recent engagement with Contact Group leaders "has shown results." Kostunica warned that an imposed solution in Kosovo "cannot remain without consequences" and will be a threat to Serbian democracy. Like several other Serbian leaders, he has emphasized that Serbia will reject an "imposed" solution. Most Serbs know little else about Belgrade's policy on Kosovo than what they hear from Kostunica. President Tadic, however, gave a more realistic viewpoint on the same television program one week later. He said that although he would fight against independence for Kosovo, "preventing independence cannot be guaranteed." FM Draskovic offered a similarly realistic viewpoint a day later, noting that "five of the six" CG members supported some form of "conditional independence." Tadic maintains his common policy on Kosovo with Kostunica, but you will likely again hear hints of a more realistic perspectives during your meeting with him. Political landscape: The dissolution of the State Union with Montenegro has been accepted by Belgrade, although Kostunica was predictably resentful and bitter over the results (indeed, he blames the EU SAA decision for the defeat). Kostunica gave the ex-State Union Foreign Minister Draskovic, among others, a 45-day extension in his job - something of dubious legality that met with vehement protest by the Radicals and Socialists, who want badly to unseat him. As it stands, parliament is set to reconvene in September to make the legislative changes necessary to bring the Foreign and Defense ministries in line with other Republic ministries, which could lead to changes at the top of both bodies. The unexpected resignation of Deputy PM Labus, the only principled stand by a Serbian leader in recent memory over Serbia's failure to cooperate fully with ICTY, had little long-term effect on the War Crimes and SAA issues, but did serve to solidify MINFIN Dinkic's position as undisputed G-17+ party leader. Former Agriculture Minister Ivana Dulic-Markovic (G-17+) is now Deputy PM and has remained a progressive (if lonely) voice on Kosovo, ICTY and other critical issues. BELGRADE 00001160 002.2 OF 003 Regarding domestic politics, parties across the spectrum have begun to prepare for a chaotic political period and possible early elections in 2007 in the aftermath of a Kosovo settlement. Across the board, democratic parties remain unprepared and divided, although they are undergoing an eleventh hour push to rectify their problems. The nationalist parties remain strong (polling a possible majority, according to our own surveys) with a dedicated following, but have failed to attract additional supporters to their ideology of hate. They are hoping that even a modest backlash to Kosovo independence could ensure for them a majority in the national assembly. The results of the next parliamentary elections will likely be determined by voter turnout, and the ability of democratic bloc parties to rally a largely democratic electorate that feels increasingly disenfranchised by weak leadership from the government. Your meetings: Your official calls will be with PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FM Draskovic and DPM Dulic-Markovic. You will also have a working lunch with GOS negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic and a meeting with Orthodox Church representatives. In addition to a press event and roundtable with Serbian business leaders, you will outbrief the Contact Group Chiefs of Mission. What to expect: PM Kostunica: The Prime Minister is consistent Q he has never wavered from his assertion that he will never accept an independent Kosovo, and has indeed turned up the volume in recent weeks. His op-ed in the Washington Post and remarks at the UNSC illustrate his continued intention to play the legal card with regards to Kosovo status. He will likely stick to similar themes raised at the UNSC, and by extension what comes out in Vienna. To him, the Serbs are the victims and the international community is treating Serbia as if Milosevic were still in power. President Tadic: The President maintains the same position on Kosovo as the Prime Minister, but less convincingly. Tadic will hint at a more realistic understanding of the state-of-play, but has so far been reluctant to engage on post-status strategizing. To a significant degree, Tadic views the Kosovo question through the prism of domestic politics and the fortunes of his own party. In contrast to the PM, President Tadic has said publicly that Kosovo independence might be unstoppable. He may have signaled a further step in the right direction when he told the media in Brussels on 7/19 that protecting the Serbs (i.e., not independence) in Kosovo was his "main demand." Advisors Leon Kojen and Vuk Jeremic will attend. FM Draskovic: Draskovic sincerely would like Kosovo to remain within Serbia and is still touting his idea of keeping the fig leaf of a Serbian flag on the external borders. That said, he is more realistic than the PM. The Foreign Minister echoed Tadic's public comments with an interview of his own. Draskovic said that "five of six" countries in the Contact Group have decided on supervised independence, implying Russia has not agreed. Unlike Tadic, however, Draskovic has a faltering party and imperiled cabinet position. SPO getting more than 5% of the vote and parliamentary representation remain a long shot. He will likely have to partner with other party(ies). DPM Dulic-Markovic: We are heartened by the Deputy Prime Minister's constructive approach to issues in the way of Serbia's path to Euro-Atlantic integration. In fact, you may hear a more realistic view of Serbia's vision, and Kosovo's fate, from her than from any other GOS official. Unfortunately, she wields little real power at present, with Finance Minister Dinkic the real shot-caller in her party. The Radicals have attacked her viciously for her Croat background (calling her an "Ustasa" - basically, a Nazi collaborator - on the Parliament floor),but she has not withered. She has called for Mladic to be arrested and is one of the only GOS officials to renew condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre during the recent anniversary. To her and her G-17+ colleagues, an unresolved Kosovo represents an impediment to growth and investment in Serbia. We are exploring ways in which the international community can bolster her and other progressive voices within the Government Q your meeting provides a significant opportunity. Kojen and Samardzic: This working lunch with be an opportunity to discuss in details the results of the July 24 meetings, and next steps. Church leaders: Although he was just consecrated as Bishop to Australia and New Zealand, Iriniej Dobrievic will still be involved with Kosovo status talks on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in the near term. Irinej of Backa, Bishop Artemije and BELGRADE 00001160 003.2 OF 003 Metropolitan Amfilohije will likely also attend. The SOC's official stance is very close to the Prime Minister's. Privately, we know moderate elements are committed to planning for the future of the SOC in a Kosovo separated from Serbia, and some have privately criticized the GOS' politicizing of their issues. However, given its probable composition, this group will likely take a less enlightened approach. Business leaders: In response to your successful meeting in Washington, we have arranged for a small group of business leaders in Serbia to convene for discussion with you on how best to help the Serbian economy and prospects for investment during and after the Kosovo settlement. We will be assembling primarily Serbian, rather than international, businesspersons to give you a different perspective. It will be off the record and without press. MOORE