MGLE01: PRO-SYRIAN MARONITE PERCEIVES SUNNI THREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000969

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: PRO-SYRIAN MARONITE PERCEIVES SUNNI THREAT

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Former Minister of Interior Suleiman Franjieh
believes the greatest threat facing Lebanon is the
concentration of power in the hands of Saad Hariri's Sunni
majority. He maintains that both Christian and Shia
communities fear marginalization as Hariri's political bloc
dominates the political process, with a bankroll supplied by
Saudi Arabia. In Franjieh's opinion, this fear is blocking
progress on other issues, such as the presidency, Hizballah's
arms, relations with Syria, and critical political
appointments. Franjieh supports Michel Aoun to succeed Emile
Lahoud, but is convinced that if Aoun assumed the presidency,
he would open up a number of corruption files which would
inevitably tar many of Lebanon's leading political figures.
In his view, this action would throw the country's political
system into turmoil. For this reason, Franjieh believes Saad
Hariri will prevent Aoun's candidacy, which in turn will most
likely result in Emile Lahoud serving out his term. He
reasoned that Syria's Bashar Asad could instruct Lahoud to
leave, but will not do so unless Saudi Arabia publicly makes
the request. End summary.


2. (C) Former Minister of Interior Suleiman Franjieh met
with the Ambassador and poloff on March 27 in his home
village of Zgharta east of Tripoli. Franjieh's pro-Syrian
sympathies come from his close relationship with the Asad
family. In 1978, the Lebanese Forces militia of Samir Ja'ja'
killed his parents and younger sister in a reprisal raid on
Zgharta. Franjieh's grandfather brought the eight year old
Suleiman to Syria, where he was taken under the wing of
Bashar's older brother Bassil. His friendship with the Asad
family has remained close for nearly 30 years. It is assumed
he communicates with them often and his observations
regarding their motivations would be fairly accurate.
Although currently out of office, his political support in
the Christian Zgharta region remains strong.

SUNNI'S MONOPOLY ON POWER...
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3. (C) It is clear that Franjieh does not trust Saad Hariri
nor his Saudi benefactors. He believes the Sunnis in Lebanon
are not benign democrats, but are intent on implementing a
long term dominance over the country's political and economic
affairs. The former minister believes the Saudi royal family
has regional designs, including replacing the Asad regime
with a Sunni dominated government.


4. (C) This perceived effort by Saad Hariri and his Sunni
followers to establish hegemony in Lebanon has convinced
Franjieh that both the Christian and Shia communities are
being forced to the sidelines. He argued that many of the
difficult problems facing Lebanon are not being resolved
principally because the Christians and Shia are pushing back.


5. (C) To illustrate, he expounded that the stalemate
concerning the Lahoud presidency is not due to any deep
allegiance to Emile Lahoud, but is rather an effort to deny
Saad Hariri from dictating his choice to the Christian
community. Franjieh said he would support Michel Aoun
without question, because he was clearly the elected choice
of the Christians. But Franjieh insisted that Saad Hariri
was committed to preventing an Aoun presidency, partly due to
personal animosity, but mostly because Aoun could not be
trusted to not rock the boat in terms of investigating the
complex web of corrupt practices which allegedly involve a
large number of prominent politicians. He commented that
even though he supports the leader of the Free Patriotic
Movement, in reality, he believes an Aoun presidency -- which
would presumably feature a no-holds-barred drive against
corruption -- would lead to increased turmoil.


6. (C) His second example of the corrosive influence of
Saad Hariri's unchecked power involves the Shia community,
specifically Hizballah's obsessive attachment to its arms.
Franjieh implicitly acknowledged the organization really no
longer had a need to maintain its militia and that Sheba
Farms provided a convenient pretext. Rather he argued, the
Shia were fearful of renewed Sunni dominance over their
historically oppressed community. Of course, he said he
understood their concern over the possibility of hostilities
with Israel, but Franjieh insisted the Shia's real historical
adversary was the Sunnis and their political and economic
dominance.


BEIRUT 00000969 002 OF 002



7. (C) Franjieh, who enjoys close relations with almost
anyone opposed to Hariri's Future Movement, said he discussed
these matters with Hassan Nasrallah soon after the Hizballah
leader met with Saad Hariri three weeks ago. He believes the
Christian and Sunni communities have to give Hizballah
confidence that giving up its arms will not mean a return to
a second-class citizenship. For this reason, he supported
Michel Aoun's "cooperative alliance" with Hizballah as
formalized by their February 6 communique.

...RESULTS IN POLITICAL STALEMATE
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8. (C) In Franjieh's analysis, as long as Saad Hariri and
his Saudi backers seek unchallenged control, the political
process in Lebanon is likely to be laborious and
inconclusive. He maintained that until Saad Hariri
understands that dominance by any one community in Lebanon
will result in effective blockage of all progress, the
country will merely stumble forward.


9. (C) He remarked that he visits Emile Lahoud every month
and is convinced the president is intent on staying until the
last day of his (extended) term -- unless he is told to go by
the Syrians. Concerning that possibility, Franjieh said that
only if Saudi Arabia (or presumably Egypt) publicly requests
Syria to resolve the presidency issue will it be solved --
and then only with a genuine (i.e. non-Hariri) Maronite
candidate. In Franjieh's opinion, even the issues of the
Syrian/Lebanese border and exchange of diplomatic relations
could be resolved if the Saudis would recognize Syria as a
country of regional influence.

COMMENT
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10. (C) When one speaks with Suleiman Franjieh, one
receives an unvarnished view of still-powerful Syrian
influence in Lebanon. Franjieh's loyalties are out in the
open and although he reflects a minority view, his contention
that Saad Hariri and his Sunni colleagues have acquired too
much power in Lebanon's finely balanced society resonates
with more than an insignificant proportion of Christians and
Shia. His illustration of Hizballah holding onto its arms to
fend off Sunni dominance is a stretch, but his example of
Christian fear of Hariri manipulating the next president is
widely held. Once again, the Lebanese penchant for putting
anything and everything in sectarian terms is evident, even
when speaking with a political outrider like Franjieh. End
comment.
FELTMAN