MGLE01: NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA PERSPECTIVE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000955

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA PERSPECTIVE ON
NATIONAL DIALOGUE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Shia MP Ali Bazzi and MP Ali Osseiran view the
on-going national dialogue as an important development whose
long-term impact considerably outweighs any immediate
results. These independent Shia politicians believe that,
although several formerly sensitive issues had already
entered public discourse (Hizballah's arms, Lahoud's
legitimacy, Palestinian militias),the dialogue was the first
time these issues were being discussed by the principal
protagonists face-to-face. Bazzi, however, believes that
regional involvement, specifically intermediation efforts by
Saudi Arabia, will be necessary to resolve the thorniest
issues, because they all involve the Syrian regime. Shia MP
Ali Osseiran, on the other hand, insists that US/Syrian and
US/Iranian relations are the real key to progress in Lebanon.
Osseiran contends that Damascus and Tehran still call the
shots for Hizballah and, with international pressure
increasing on Iran, is certain that Tehran will prevent
Nasrallah from moving too far -- especially with regard to
Hizballah's arms. Concerning the Palestinian militias
located in Lebanon, Osseiran believes they are a spent force,
remarking "certainly Nasrallah would prefer to keep them as a
buffer against disarmament pressure, but few in the Shia
community care for them, and Shia leaders have decided to let
the government disarm them." End summary.


2. (SBU) MP Ali Bazzi, an Amal ally of Nabih Berri who
holds a US passport and represents a constituency in Bint
Jubayl (a few miles north of the Blue Line),met with POLOFF
on March 22 at his office in parliament. MP Ali Osseiran,
who comes from a long line of political leaders -- his father
was Speaker of Parliament in the 1950s -- and represents the
south Lebanon district of Zahrani, met with POLOFF the
following day in south Beirut. Both legislators are regarded
as honest, dedicated public servants. They share the
characteristic of blunt conversation and neither believes
Hizballah should be the only representative of the country's
Shia community.

ABOVE EXPECTATIONS
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3. (C) MP Bazzi expressed modest surprise that the national
dialogue's headstrong participants have been able to maintain
relative comity during nearly three weeks of meetings. When
he first learned of Berri's plan for the conference, he did
not give it much chance of success and felt that Jumblatt and
Aoun in particular would use the forum to grandstand. He now
believes that despite the attendees apparent inability to
resolve two core issues -- Lahoud's presidency and
Hizballah's arms -- the fact that they have placed these
issues on the table is significant and will set the stage for
further discussion and resolution in the next few months,
particularly regarding the presidency.


4. (C) The chain-smoking delegate from Bint Jubayl
acknowledged that the presidency issue had become more
difficult in the past few days. Whereas in the initial
sessions, Hassan Nasrallah had indicated that a list of
several presidential candidates would be acceptable -- as
long as the candidates' intended policies regarding the
"resistance" were presented up front -- now the Hizballah
leader was insisting that only one candidate could be
proposed by the Maronitecommunity. This change of position
resulted fro a realization that the country's electoral
systm basically allows Hizballah/Amal an effective vet for
only one round of parliamentary voting to select a president.



5. (C) Bazzi felt that Nasrllah was seriously calculating
the costs of stayng with Lahoud -- who he remarked that even
in the Shia community was becoming something of a laugh line.
But being a cunning politician, Bazzi believed Nasrallah was
patiently waiting for the best deal to switch his support.


6. (C) With regard to how much the national dialogue would
actually accomplish, Bazzi said the answer depended on Saudi
Arabia's influence with the Asad regime, because nearly all
the issues under consideration had a Syrian component.
Although he was not aware of specific plans, he suspected
that next week's Arab Summit in Khartoum would be the scene
of concerted arm twisting for Syria to make concessions on
diplomatic relations, demarcation of borders, and the Lahoud
presidency.

BEIRUT 00000955 002 OF 002



ALI OSSEIRAN TAKES A BROADER VIEW
--------------


7. (C) MP Osseiran, who last year was considered a leading
candidate for Speaker before Nabih Berri seized the prize,
predicted that Hizballah would faithfully obey its Iranian
sponsors and jealously protect its arms for as long as
possible. In his opinion, Nasrallah had skillfully
eliminated all opposition in the Shia community and had made
Hizballah an important regional asset for the ambitious
Iranian regime. Osseiran strongly believed it was wishful
thinking on the part of Hariri, Aoun and others that they
could somehow moderate Hizballah and negotiate a near-term
disarmament.


8. (C) The veteran member of parliament said, like it or
not, US relations with Syria and, more importantly Iran, were
the key to resolving Lebanon's difficulties. Osseiran said
his evaluation envisions continued hostile relations between
the US and the two regional powers over the difficult issues
of Iraq and nuclear weapons, and as long as that conflict
persists, Syria and Iran will keep as many proxies as
possible in the region, specifically in Iraq, Lebanon, and
the West Bank/Gaza. He suggested that perhaps a deal could
be made that would finish off the decaying Lahoud presidency,
but the primary objectives of the international community as
expressed in UNSCR 1559 were most likely not achievable in
the current political environment. Additionally, Osseiran
was not optimistic regarding the establishment of normal
diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon and plainly
expected the Syrian regime to delay, obfuscate, and deny
responsibility.

PALESTINIAN ARMS
--------------


9. (C) Other than the status of Lahoud, the only other
issue which was possible to resolve at this time was the
disarmament of the Palestinian militias located outside the
twelve established refugee camps and "better control" of the
militias inside the camps. Osseiran remarked that the
Palestinian leadership in Lebanon was inept and had
squandered considerable goodwill. This mismanagement, along
with residual Lebanese resentment over Palestinian actions
during the long civil war, had put the community in a
vulnerable political situation. He commented on the relative
ease with which the national dialogue members reached
consensus on disarming/controlling the Palestinian militias,
and said the door to this action had actually been opened by
Abu Mazen several months ago when he stated that Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon were "guests" and had responsibilities as
such.


10. (C) Even with this success, however, the veteran
politician expressed his regret that further progress on
other issues, such as bilateral relations and offering the
Shia community political alternatives, appeared unlikely for
the foreseeable future.
FELTMAN