MGLE01--AOUN READY TO COOPERATE WITH EVERYONE WHO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS LE SY KISL
SUBJECT: MGLE01--AOUN READY TO COOPERATE WITH EVERYONE WHO
SUPPORTS HIM


BEIRUT 00000929 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR. REASON SECTION 1.4 (B)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with the Ambassador, Michel
Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM),expressed
unquestioning convinction of the correctness of his
positions. In Aoun's world, his agreement with Hizballah is
flawless, his attack on the parliamentary majority is
righteous, all those who disagree have nefarious hidden
agendas, and the key to political stability is an Aoun
presidency. Addressing the stalled dialogue, Aoun admitted
to a Wednesday, March 22 altercation with Hariri, who he
described as inexperienced (at the end of which Aoun
apologized to Hariri for any personal offense). He added
that Hariri's media outlets had frequently hurt Aoun's
feelings by labeling him pro-Syrian. However, speaking with
the Ambassador, Aoun did not hesitate to defend the
pro-Syrian forces now speaking out in support of his
candidacy. Aoun rejected out of hand the thought that these
Syrian agents might be praising Aoun in order to stain him
with Syrian collaboration. "Some people are calling him the
Christian Jumblatt," his aide bragged, "because he can move
the Christians any way he likes." Aoun showed no sign of
compromise, conciliation or a desire to reach out to other
factions: it is up to them to be flexible. Aoun did say
that he believed that the present Lebanese leadership could,
if asked, come up with a new compromise cabinet -- including
Aoun's bloc inside -- that President Lahoud would accept.

HIZBALLAH THINKS I AM GREAT, AND I AGREE
--------------


2. (C) Accompanied by PolChief, the Ambassador met with
Michel Aoun and aide/son-in-law Gebran Bassil at Aoun's home
in suburban Beirut. The Ambassador expressed USG concerns
that, in the national dialogue, Hizballah and Amal were
outwardly cooperative, while using delaying tactics to stall
the national dialogue. In response Aoun launched into an
exposition of how he had singlehandedly, through his
agreement with Hizballah, averted a Sunni-Shia civil war in
Lebanon by returning an equilibrium to the political scene.
Hizballah, Aoun said, was becoming more Lebanese. It was
Aoun's victory that Hizballah agreed not to use their arms in
defense of Iran, or to liberate Israel. Aoun was convinced
that once "Hizballah's prisoners" in Israel are freed and
Shebaa farms is liberated, the GOL will be able to integrate
Hizballah into the national defense structure. The GOL,
under General Aoun's leadership, will then control the south.
Aoun did not directly respond when the Ambassador asked if
Hizballah's arms were really an effective means to achieve
their goals of defending Lebanon. He admitted that most of
Hizballah's arms were ballistic rockets suited only for use
as area weapons. But Aoun said that once Hizballah is
satisfied that the south is liberated and prisoners return
from Israel, they will submit to the authority of Lebanese
Army.


3. (C) Aoun said he had never discussed support for is
presidential bid with Hassan Nasrallah. However, he assumed
that Nasrallah's comment that Aoun was "a serious candidate,"
was endorsement from Hizballah. Responding to the
Ambassador's comments about rumors of others backed by Syria
and Hizballah, Aoun did not address the idea that Hizballah
was lining up back-up candidates among the Maronite political
elite. The Ambassador suggested that faced with the present
impasse, the only way forward was for compromise between the
parties. Aoun agreed but went on to say that some of the
March 14 members should come over to him. They need to be
flexible. "Maybe Walid Jumblatt would come over," Aoun
joked. Aoun said the he knew Jumblatt and others were
against him from the start "although I suffered abroad."
Before his return to Lebanon, figures close to March 14
interceded with the French government to delay his return
home, Aoun claimed. On his return, no came to call on him
except those who were close to Syria.

IF THEY GIVE, I WILL TAKE
--------------


4. (C) "Hariri must be more flexible," Aoun said. He
believes Hariri must accept that Aoun is not threatening the
March 14 interests. If they do that, and accept Aoun's
guidance on the presidency, then things can move forward. At
one point, Aoun leaned forward, pointed to his chest and said

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"No one has ever gotten 70 percent of the Christians before.
It is historic." Bassil added happily that an influential
observer had called the General "A dangerous man," because,
like Jumblatt, Aoun enjoyed complete support among his
constituency. When the Ambassador asked if Aoun was willing
to be more flexible in order to appeal to the March 14
forces, the former general shrugged and said "we have nothing
left to give." He said that his faction serves as a needed
counter-balance to Hariri and March 14. Aoun claimed that
the present majority in parliament does not reflect the true
political will of Lebanon. He and his party have appealed to
the constitutional court to contest ten seats lost to them in
the 2005 parliamentary elections. If these challenges are
decided in their favor, Aoun's FPM could challenge the
majority in parliament and rectify what Aoun sees as an
improper political balance.


5. (C) Once Aoun is president, he foresees no problems
cooperating with Hariri as Prime Minister. "As long as they
obey the law and follow the constitution." But Aoun had a
warning for March 14 as well. He accused members of March 14
of the habit of abusing power. The members of the group were
involved in business scandals in the telecommunications,
construction and contracting sectors, Aoun claimed. When the
Ambassador pointed out that Hizballah runs illegal telecom
and internet service and receives covert funds from a foreign
government, Aoun acknowledged that "Berri, Jumblatt, and
everyone except General Aoun" was involved in such activities
and they would have to "stop it," to make way for a new era
in public policy when Aoun is in charge. Aoun is still
unimpressed with Saad Hariri as a political leader, "He acts
like a Saudi prince." Aoun went on to label Hariri
inexperienced, and unwilling to share power. He doesn't even
share power within March 14. They are very obedient to
Hariri," Aoun claimed.

THE DIALOGUE WILL BE FINE IF THEY AGREE WITH ME
-------------- --


6. (C) Aoun confirmed rumors that he and Hariri had
exchanged angry words at the March 22 dialogue session, and
gave details. When he came into the meeting, Saad said to
Aoun "Rustom Ghazali (former Syrian viceroy and intelligence
chief in Lebanon)," referring to a newspaper report in which
Aoun reportedly described Hariri as the economic Rustom
Ghazali of Lebanon. Aoun recognized the reference and blamed
journalists for inaccurately reporting Aoun's remarks. He
answered Hariri saying that he never intended to label him in
that way. Injured, Hariri retorted that Ghazali killed his
father Rafiq. Aoun claims at that point he apologized,
explaining that he never intended to deliver a personal
insult, just political rhetoric. The matter was then closed
as far as Aoun was concerned. (Note: Evidently Hariri did
not agree, because Aoun displayed copies of editorials from a
Hariri paper naming Aoun as the real new Rustom Ghazali. End
note.) Aoun said that he raised the issue of March 14 name
calling with Hariri in the dialogue, pointing out that the
persistent attacks on Aoun from the Hariri-owned press were
personally hurtful to him.


7. (C) Despite the trouble with Hariri, Aoun said the
atmosphere in the dialogue was positive. He added that he
found Walid Jumblatt an interesting man with a good sense of
humor. The two men spent some time together during a break
and Aoun described the exchange as "humorous." The
Ambassador told Aoun that he USG was concerned that Hizballah
and Amal were being cooperative in the sessions, but were
using delaying tactics to prevent progress in the dialogue.
He warned Aoun that there was concern on the street that his
allies were using Aoun to take the country in a bad
direction. Aoun rejected this and restated the importance of
his alliance with Hizballah.

THE SYRIANS DON'T REALLY LIKE ME
--------------


8. (C) Aoun denied that pro-Syrian elements were
resurfacing during the dialogue to offer him support. "They
are just trouble makers who have always been there with no
support." He repeated his refrain that they, "were free to
say what they wished." Even Emile Lahoud's recent comments
naming the former general as a suitable successor, and the
"We are from the same school," comment Lahoud made seemed not
to concern Aoun. "I didn't answer him. I did not want to
enter into a polemical debate with him," Aoun said. He
refused to contemplate the Ambassador's suggestion that

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Lahoud could use him to stay in office. He insisted that it
was mistakes made by the opposition that might keep Lahoud in
office, not Aoun's protection of Lahoud. Aoun said that if
the March 14 group listens to popular appeals for Lahoud's
departure, they must also listen to popular appeals naming
Lahoud's successor. Aoun said that if the majority backs
him, Lahoud would leave.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun to consider his allies:
Hizballah, Emile Lahoud, and a variety of pro-Syrian
politicians like Wi'am Wihab, Talal Arslan, Suleiman
Franjieh, and Omar Karami. How, the Ambassador said, is the
United States supposed to interpret these alliances, when the
international community wants to see a strong, independent
and democratic Lebanon? Aoun pled helplessness, asking the
Ambassador how he might distance himself from Lahoud. "I
don't see him." Aoun said the President has asked him for an
appointment several times. However, Aoun always refuses on
the grounds that the time is not right. Aoun claimed to have
met Lahoud only once since his return to Lebanon as part of
the delegation to discuss the government formation in 2005.


10. (C) The FPM leader refused to entertain the idea that his
less reputable supporters were trying to damage him through
public support. He claimed that pro-Syrians came to his
side on his return to Lebanon, when he was snubbed by the
leaders of March 14. But he knew the pro-Syrians were coming
to him for tactical reasons. "Syria does not want me to
become president," Aoun affirmed. He said that Syria knows
that an Aoun presidency would mean a sovereign Lebanon
working as an equal partner with Syria. For good relations
with Syria, Lebanon needed a new government.


11. (C) The Ambassador raised the recent objection to early
parliamentary elections raised by the Maronite Patriarch,
Cardinal Sfeir. The USG was also concerned that the
necessary preparations for early elections, and the drafting
of a new election law would only serve to delay progress on
the political front in Lebanon. Aoun said he knew that the
GOL chartered electoral commission was working on a suitable
election law proposal. Aoun understood that only Beirut and
northern Lebanon still presented problems in the redrawing of
electoral districts. In response to a question from the
Ambassador, Aoun said, in the short term, there needed to be
a new cabinet, in which his bloc would play its proper role.
Aoun said that he believed that he and the assembled
political leaders could come assemble a new government that
President Lahoud would accept.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) True to form, Aoun demonstrated no flexibility in
his position on the presidency or cooperation with March 14.
He cannot conceive of Hizballah and the agents of Syria
duping him into serving their interests. His claim to be able
to move the Christians as he likes seems overstated. But his
conviction seems to be sincere. Aoun is not prepared to
consider any other candidate for the presidency. Within
March 14, Aoun is regarded as a difficult, even stupid
megalomaniac. The chances for real cooperation between the
two groups is at best slim. Soon after our arrival at Aoun's
home, he told the Ambassador that dissident Christian
politicians from the Liberal party of Dory Chamoun had just
left him. They had come to speak out against Dory Chamoun
and to express support for Aoun -- another example, in the
General's view, as to why he, and he alone, should serve as
Lebanon's next president.
FELTMAN