MGLE01: PATRIARCH SFEIR REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000928

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: PATRIARCH SFEIR REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTS TO
BREAK THE DEADLOCK


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) A respected intermediary who carries out dialogue
between Patriarch Sfeir and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah
said that the Maronite religious leader has decided to get
off the fence and support Nassib Lahoud as the principal
Maronite candidate to replace President Emile Lahoud. Sfeir
has reportedly conveyed Sfeir's proposal to Nasrallah to
ensure that the Shia leader would remain neutral when it
comes time to confront Michel Aoun. Nasrallah did not
immediately endorse the choice of Nassib Lahoud, but asked
for time to consider the idea. Sfeir is anxious that Aoun,
when he learns of the maneuver, will try to aggressively
block a Nassib Lahoud candidacy by appealing for Hizballah's
support. Sfeir's strategy is to present Aoun with a united
Christian front and eliminate the Hizballah factor. End
summary.


2. (SBU) Emir Hares Chehab, Director of the
Christian-Muslim Committee for Dialogue and a close confidant
of Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, met poloff on March 23.
Chehab is a former president of Maronite League who, through
his inter-faith committee, has somewhat unexpectedly
developed a workmanlike relationship with Nasrallah and other
members of the Shia leadership. Chehab meets the patriarch
on a weekly basis and has negotiated with Nasrallah
frequently.

SFEIR REPORTEDLY CHOOSES NASSIB LAHOUD
--------------


3. (C) Hares Chehab said that after long deliberation (and
much anxiety),the Maronite patriarch has decided to back the
candidate he feels is best qualified to reduce communal
tension and reconcile feuding political opponents: Nassib
Lahoud. (Note: Nassib Lahoud, an estranged cousin of
President Emile Lahoud, is a former pro-reform member of
parliament who lost to an Aounist candidate in the May 2005
parliamentary election. An engineer, who made his wealth in
construction in the Arabian peninsula, is widely acknowledged
as a highly capable, honest politician who would enjoy
cross-sectarian appeal. His principal drawbacks are
two-fold. First, he lost his parliamentary seat in the Aoun
sweep of Mount Lebanon, giving Aoun the ability to claim
Nassib has no popular support. Second, he is related by
marriage to the Saudi royal family, and as such, is suspected
of being in their debt. End note.)


4. (C) According to Chehab, Patriarch Sfeir, who has had a
troubled past with Michel Aoun (Aoun's supporters roughed up
the cardinal in 1989 in a late night raid and forced him to
issue pro-Aoun statements),is concerned that unless his
political flank is covered, Aoun will aggressively
counter-attack using every tool available. To prevent this
occurrence, Sfeir desires to neutralize Hizballah in the
anticipated presidential donnybrook.

ELIMINATING THE HIZBALLAH FACTOR
--------------


5. (C) But Sfeir also recognizes that Nasrallah wants one,
and only one, name from the Christian community, because
although Lebanon's electoral system requires a two-thirds
vote in parliament to elect a new president in the first
round, a second round vote requires only a simple majority.
This, in effect, takes away the ability of Hizballah to block
a candidate they do not approve. As a result of this complex
system, Sfeir realizes he can only cover his Shia flank if he
can come up with one name.


6. (C) Chehab indicated he received Sfeir's approval to
approach Nasrallah this week with the name of Nassib Lahoud.
The intermediary said that Nasrallah was noncommittal, but
was clearly interested. The Shia leader conveyed a message
to Sfeir that he would need time to consider the proposal.


7. (C) If recourse to Hizballah can be denied to Michel
Aoun, Chehab said the patriarch intends to encourage the
remaining Maronite leaders to approach Aoun and ask him to
stand aside in the interests of the community. In this
calculation, Aoun would be faced with an alliance of the
March 14 coalition and no avenue of escape to Hizballah and
Amal. When asked about the timing of this strategy, Chehab
said within weeks.


BEIRUT 00000928 002 OF 002


COMMENT
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8. (C) The scenario described by Emir Chehab is complex and
requires steadfast behavior from the patriarch, which he has
not always exhibited in the past. The other unknown is
whether Michel Aoun won tacit support for his own candidacy
from Nasrallah when they concluded their February 6
communique and announced a "cooperative alliance." On the
other hand, it does solve the stalemated presidential
situation with a deft maneuver that will likely catch Aoun
off guard -- and without allies. Chehab believes Nasrallah
will now surely consult with the Syrian regime, which will
have to choose between the pro-reform, but not anti-Syrian,
Nassib Lahoud or the nearly delegitimatized President Lahoud.
However, if Aoun is effectively denied the presidency he has
sought so assiduously, the Siniora government will have to
figure some way to bring him into the process -- or risk
having a powerful, angry outsider who would constantly attack
those holding authority. End comment.
FELTMAN