MGLE01: STATUS OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE -- SIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: STATUS OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE -- SIDE
CONSULTATIONS CONTINUE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Following the March 14 evening session, Speaker
Nabih Berri announced a break in the national dialogue
conference until March 22. This development was somewhat
unexpected, considering that Druse leader Walid Jumblatt had
just returned to Beirut two days earlier to rejoin the talks,
but various participants informed the Embassy that the
conferees were at an impasse over the presidency and
Hizballah's arms. Sources tell us that agreements concerning
Lebanese/Syrian relations, the international tribunal, and
Palestinian arms have been reached, but the conference
participants agreed to break for consultations, before making
one last push for consensus on the big issues of Lahoud and
Hizballah's arms. Most of the political figures are voicing
cautious optimism in both public and private statements about
the possibility of reaching a comprehensive accord. Outside
political analysts, with various degrees of access to the
talks, are more pessimistic and are resigning themselves to
another year and half of Lahoud and an increase of
Hizballah's influence in the Siniora government. Several
have commented that perhaps the most important achievement of
the dialogue is the lowering of tensions between the Sunni
and Shia communities. End summary.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS THUS FAR
--------------


2. (C) The 14 participants of the national dialogue ended
the second phase of the talks with a limited number of
agreements, but in a spirit of communal cooperation that did
not previously exist. The sponsor of the dialogue, Speaker
of Parliament Nabih Berri, announced that consensus
agreements had been reached calling for: the disarmament of
Palestinian militias located outside the refugee camps within
six months, normalized diplomatic relations with Syria,
comprehensive support for the UNIIIC and the establishment of
an international tribunal, and an appeal to the United
Nations to validate Lebanon's claim to the Sheba'a Farms
region along the Blue Line. There was also a unanimous
decision to "monitor and control" Palestinian arms inside the
refugee camps, but specifics were not provided.


3. (C) As would be expected, "rejectionist" Palestinian
groups did not welcome the announcement concerning
Palestinian arms. A spokesperson for Syrian-sponsored
PFLP-GC, Anwar Raja, said his organization was "surprised" by
the action and complained that the various Palestinian groups
had not been consulted in advance of the conference.
Independent political analyst Jawad Adra, however, said the
rejectionist groups were on thin ice in Lebanon and did not
have many allies. He noted that even PLO leader Mahmoud
Abbas had earlier assured the Lebanese government that
Palestinians understand they were "guests" in the country and
had to abide by the laws of Lebanon. Adra commented that no
one in the March 14 coalition cares for the Palestinian
militias, as they are regarded as a vestige of Syria's
occupation. In his view, even Hizballah would not mind
seeing them removed from the political scene, because it
would reaffirm their monopoly as the country's true
"resistance," comprising only Lebanese citizens.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
--------------


4. (C) Concerning the dialogue's agreement to attempt to
normalize diplomatic relations with Syria, Independent Shia
MP Yassine Jaber told poloff that the Saudi ambassador to
Lebanon had played an important role in ensuring the proposal
would not be rejected out-of-hand by Syria. Jaber believes
that this agreement, and the overall effect of reducing
Sunni-Shia tensions in Lebanon, were the most important
achievements of the dialogue. He said the call for normal
bilateral relations effectively puts the Syrian regime in a
difficult corner -- that is, in his view they must respond
constructively and in a timely fashion. Jaber maintained
that with the UN Security Council closely monitoring Syria's
cooperation with the UNIIIC, the Asad regime could ill afford
intransigence and bad faith toward Lebanon's proposal. He
commented, "Although most observers don't recognize the
connection, Berri has shrewdly introduced a difficult issue
at the most opportune time for Lebanon -- when Syria is
trying to act like a responsible member of the international
community."


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5. (C) Probably the easiest issue for consensus was the
agreement to fully support UNIIIC in its investigations, as
well as the early establishment of the international
tribunal. Even though GOL support for the tribunal was
ostensibly the reason five Shia ministers withdrew from the
Siniora cabinet on December 12 and paralyzed the government
for seven weeks, several factors have contributed to making
the issue more acceptable to the March 8 forces. First, the
issue was decided within the national dialogue framework;
second, the issue enjoys broad popular support among the
Lebanese public; and finally, the investigative process of
the new chief investigator, Serge Brammertz, is viewed more
favorably than that of his predecessor. There is a
substantial risk for Hizballah due to questions of its
possible involvement in some of the acts of political
violence committed since October 2004, but it would have been
difficult for Nasrallah to go against the other 13
participants on this issue.


6. (C) To neutral observers, the agreement to make a
sovereignty claim on the territory of the Sheba'a Farms is
the issue most intertwined with Syria. Although Berri made
light of the complications in his March 14 news conference,
political analyst Jawad Adra believes this territorial claim
gives the Syrian regime considerable leverage in the
Hizballah disarmament issue. Adra said in his opinion, the
Asad regime will never actually cede "one inch" of
traditional Syrian territory, no matter what they may say in
public. Adra is certain the Syrians will keep this matter in
limbo as long as possible -- with the resulting ambiguity
providing adequate political cover for Hizballah. The
independent Sunni analyst did not understand why the March 14
participants gave such an important concession to Nasrallah
without receiving a commitment to change the presidency in
return. He ventured that there may still be a quid pro quo
to be delivered, but Adra was mystified by the timing of
Berri's pronouncement on this issue.

STATUS OF THE PRESIDENCY
--------------


7. (C) The status of President Lahoud, although much
discussed in the ten dialogue sessions held thus far, remains
unresolved. At the start of the conference, Saad Hariri
insisted it was far and away the most critical order of
business, but a wide gulf persists between the March 14 and
March 8 forces, with Michel Aoun complicating the process.
There are reports that Aoun's representatives are cautiously
discussing possible alternatives with Samir Ja'ja', Saad
Hariri, and Amin Gemayel. On March 10, Aounist MP Ibrahim
Kanaan advised poloff that Michel Aoun was "not absolutely
against" a non-Aoun presidency, but it was essential to know
the composition and policy guidelines of any post-Lahoud
government. MP Yassine Jaber told poloff on March 16 that
side-bar conversations were taking place among several
participants that may break the stalemate. Jawad Adra, on
the other hand, said on March 15 that to think Michel Aoun
would accept anyone else as president was naivete of the
highest order. From discussions with his sources, Adra was
certain the presidency issue was now nearly off the table due
to the agreement to claim Lebanese sovereignty over Sheba'a
Farms, and that Lahoud would finish out his extended term.


8. (C) Concerning the disarmament of Hizballah, independent
Shia MP Yassine Jaber told us that although the idea was
gaining currency in Lebanon's public domain, Nasrallah will
be strong enough to have it referred to a post-dialogue
"working group" and, in effect, diffuse the issue's momentum.
Jaber said Nasrallah's offer to discuss Lebanon's defense
plan -- which most participants interpreted as an offer to
study the gradual replacement of Hizballah by LAF forces --
was in reality an elegant maneuver to deflect growing
pressure and gain an almost limitless amount of time.

GETTING OFF THE RIDE
--------------


9. (C) MP Jaber said it was amusing to watch Nabih Berri at
his news conference. He felt that Berri wanted nothing
better than to declare victory and close down the conference.
But Jaber felt the Speaker was now the victim of his own
success, and was on a ride he did not know how to stop.
Jaber predicted the national dialogue would hold a few
meetings next week (starting on March 22 since PM Siniora is
traveling on March 20/21) and then recess until after the
Arab Summit scheduled for March 28 in Khartoum. In his
opinion, this would give Saudi Arabia a final opportunity to

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broker a Lahoud deal with the Syrian regime, but he also said
he wouldn't hold his breath. Despite the likely
less-than-ideal results, Jaber felt that the national
dialogue would be considered an important achievement in that
it re-established national comity at a time when
inter-communal tensions were reaching a dangerous level. He
was also confident that the experience of sitting across from
each other and hearing first-hand each others' positions
unfiltered by their supporters would encourage each
participant to continue with dialogue rather than
confrontation.
MURRAY