MGLE01: MARCH 14 PARLIAMENTARIANS DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000736 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016 TAGS: EFIN IR KISL LE PGOV PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: MARCH 14 PARLIAMENTARIANS DISCUSS ELECTORAL LAW, THE PRESIDENCY, AND HIZBALLAH Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On March 8, the DCM hosted a lunch attended by MP Samir Franjieh, MP Mosbah al-Ahdab, former MP Fares Suaid, visiting NEA/ELA Syria Desk Officer, econoff, and FSN political specialist. On the electoral law, al-Ahdab noted that Amal-Hizballah would not have monopolized the Shia vote had there been a proportional law in the 2005 elections. Suaid said that Christians want 13 districts, while Muslims want 9 districts. All three prominent March 14 figures viewed Aoun as an unstable element and questioned press reports that he represented the majority of Christians. They saw Aoun as playing on Christian fears for his own personal gain. Franjieh spoke about a deadline on Hizballah disarmament, ranging from six months to 18 months from now, depending on how soon President Emile Lahoud leaves office. Franjieh saw signs that Hizballah is willing to compromise. Al-Ahdab saw the issue of Hizballahdisarmament in a socio-economic light, wondering ow the Shia community could survive if Hizballahdisarms and Iran cuts off its USD 30-50 million n monthly aid. Al-Ahdab estimated that Hizballah employs some 30,000 people whose salaries supporthundreds of thousands of family members. Franjie noted that Hizballah is trying to block economi reforms that could take away government program that benefit poor Shia Muslims. End summary. ELECTORAL LAW GRIDLOCK -------------- ¶2. (C) In a March 8 luncheon at the DCM's residece, MP Samir Franjieh, MP Mosbah al-Ahdab, and frmer MP Fares Suaid discussed the next steps forthe March 14 coalition in the National Dialogue cheduled to resume on March 13. The parliamentaians discussed the philosophy of the electoral la. al-Ahdab said that the 2000 electoral law had wonged the southern Lebanese. He believed that oly 65 percent of Shia supported the Amal-Hizballh alliance, yet the Amal-Hizballah alliance was ble to claim for itself a monopoly on the Shia voe. Had there been a proportional law, Al-Ahdab stimated, seven or eight Shia MPs outside of Ama-Hizballah would have been elected. He suggested he 1960 electoral as a good model because of itssmall districts. (Note: Our sources in the Shiacommunity estimate a higher level of support forAmal-Hizballah. An independent Shia politician ho ran in the 2005 parliamentary elections estimted that two Shia seats would have been awarded o non-Amal-Hizballah candidates if the system hadbeen proportional. End note.) To emphasize his pint about the corruption of the Amal-Hizballah boc, al-Ahdab noted that the parliament is equippd with electronic voting machines that are capabe of recording how each MP voted on bills and dislaying the votes on an electronic screen. He sad that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri pretends hat the machines don't work because he prefers t conduct votes by the raising of hands. This wa, according to al-Ahdab, Berri and his allies canavoid accountability on votes in the parliament. ¶3. (C) Suaid said that the electoral commissin was deadlocked. Christians wanted 13 district, while Muslims were seeking 9 districts. al-Ahab asked rhetorically: "Do we want small district that elect extremists, or large, proportional districts that elect moderates?" Franjieh commented that it may be better to delay discussion of the new electoral law until the other problems of Lebanon are solved. In particular, the question of the presidency must be dealt with. DEALING WITH THE PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to the presidency, Al-Ahdab, a Sunni Muslim from Tripoli, doubted media reports that MP Michel Aoun represented a majority of Christians. It must be "fuzzy math," contended al-Ahdab. The Christians are split, but the March 14 coalition is not a fake majority. He continued that Aoun is playing on Christian sensitivities and fears. The Christians must be strong and resist his attempts to stoke confessional feelings. al-Ahdab noted that at the beginning of the Bristol gathering, it had Shia allies. Now that presence is gone with the rise in confessional tensions. Aoun is putting Sunnis in an embarrassing situation, said al-Ahdab. BEIRUT 00000736 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Franjieh described Aoun as being concerned mostly with his personal ambition to be the next president. Franjieh, a Christian from northern Lebanon, said that since Aoun returned to Lebanon, the Christian community has been nervously discussing its future. "If you don't get on a train, you're finished," said Franjieh, meaning that Christians are told that unless they back Aoun now the interests of the Christian community won't be protected. Suaid added that Aoun is a very unstable person leading an unstable group. "Predictably unpredictable," interjected al-Ahdab. Regarding Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Sfeir, Franjieh said that Sfeir is clearly against both Emile Lahoud and Aoun for the presidency. SEEKING A DEADLINE FOR HIZBALLAH DISARMAMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The three parliamentarians discussed a timetable to disarm Hizballah. Suaid said that 18 months is the deadline being discussed for Hizballah to give up its arms. Franjieh clarified that 18 months also happens to be the remaining time on President Emile Lahoud's term. However, Franjieh said, if Lahoud leaves office, then six months could be a realistic goal for disarmament. He said that compromise with Hizballah is possible. Hizballah has already made some concessions at the National Dialogue, for example, linking disarmament to the liberation of the Shebaa Farms instead of to the liberation of Jerusalem. Franjieh believed that although Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah consulted with Syria and Iran, he would ultimately make his own decisions on what is best for Hizballah. Franjieh thought that more involvement by the UN would facilitate disarming Hizballah. He speculated that Hizballah is not really behind Aoun for the presidency. Hizballah just wants to use Aoun as a negotiating tactic to say that it has a Christian on its side. Franjieh was also encouraged by the symbolism of a joint visit by Nasrallah and Saad Hariri to the late Rafiq Hariri's grave. Rafiq Hariri is a man Syria called a Zionist agent, and Nasrallah visited his grave, mused Franjieh. The Nasrallah-Hariri relationship is key to the issue of Hizballah's arms, said Franjieh. ¶7. (C) al-Ahdab said the issue of disarmament has a socio-economic dimension as well. If Hizballah disarms, and as a result Iran cuts off its funding, then how will the Shia survive? al-Ahdab estimated that Iran gives Hizballah USD 30-50 million a month. With that funding, Hizballah has 30,000 people on its payroll, according to al-Ahdab. And the salaries of those 30,000 Hizballah employees probably support hundreds of thousands of family members. Franjieh wondered how so many Shia could manage without Iranian funding to Hizballah. He noted that even at the height of the civil war, the Christian Lebanese Forces only spent USD 25 million a month as they were running their quasi state-within-a-state. Al-Ahdab offered the historical example of hashish cultivation in Lebanon. When the Syrian occupation forces cracked down on hashish cultivation in the 1980s, rural, poor Shia families were disproportionately affected. They were deprived of their livelihood just as Hizballah, backed by Iranian funding, was rising. Thus, much of the Shia community was driven into the arms of Hizballah. If Iranian funding were ended today, where would the Shia go, asked al-Ahdab rhetorically. ¶8. (C) Turning to economic reform, Franjieh said that Hizballah is also blocking attempts at economic reform. The Shia are not competitive in the economy, so they don't want reforms that would endanger the government programs they depend on. Hizballah member and Minister of Energy and Water Mohammad Fneish is very competent in his job, but he is also playing his political role of blocking any reforms. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Al-Ahdab, Franjieh, and Suaid openly shared their viewpoints in this discussion. Their comments are encouraging in that they show that March 14 is thinking about how to deal with the major issues of the day, and the fact that a deadline on Hizballah disarmament is being considered. Their comments also left it evident that March 14 has not yet decided on a clear strategy for dealing with the presidency and Hizballah. FELTMAN