MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI BLAMES MARCH 14 COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000735

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI BLAMES MARCH 14 COALITION
FOR DIALOGUE IMPASSE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Speaker Nabih Berri believes the "national dialogue"
has thus far been a worthwhile endeavor, which may produce a
breakthrough in the way Lebanon's traditional political blocs
resolve national issues. But he expressed deep concern that
an intractable Hariri-Jumblatt alliance in the conference
was, in his words, "frustrating progress" on a number of
issues -- due to their insistence that Lahoud be removed from
office unconditionally. Berri argued that Hizballah's
Nasrallah had made significant concessions, but when the two
Shia leaders asked for clarification of the "day after"
Lahoud, they were met with silence from the March 14 Colation
participants. Berri, who organized the dialogue, expressed
fear the conference may soon fail if the impasse continues.
He was also angry that, according to his sources, Jumblatt
had just described the Shia leaders' relationship with
Syria's regime in derogatory terms. He described Aoun's
presence at the conference as that of someone waiting to be
crowned, while Samir Ja'ja' had been surprisingly honest and
collegial. End summary.


2. (U) Speaker of Parliament, and sponsor of the "national
dialogue," Nabih Berri received the Ambassador and POLOFF on
March 9 at his office in West Beirut. Amal party political
advisor Ali Hamdan also attended the meeting.

CLAIMS OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS...
--------------


3. (C) Speaker Berri expressed his appreciation for U.S.
support of the national dialogue process. In his opinion,
the ongoing conference was proving that disparate factions in
Lebanon could discuss differences in a rational manner,
search for common ground, and propose consensus solutions.
Berri admitted he had been particularly taken off guard by
the reasoned exposition of ideas by Samir Ja'ja' and Ja'ja''s
willingness to listen to other positions. Despite the
measured discourse and the ability to address issues which up
until recently had never been broached, Berri said he
believes the dialogue is close to failure, primarily because
Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt refuse to move forward without
an unconditional commitment to remove Lahoud. According to
Berri, there are two complications to this approach: one,
Nasrallah and Berri require names of Lahoud's possible
successor in order to calculate the impact on their equities,
and second, the Maronites are paralyzed by a combination of
ambition and fraternal enmity.


4. (C) Berri argued that progress had already been achieved
regarding the international tribunal, relations with Syria,
status of Palestinian arms, and a clear declaration by
Hizballah of its "new" philosophy. According to Berri, all
of these gains were now in jeopardy due to the intransigence
of Hariri-Jumblatt regarding the presidency. Berri expressed
frustration and anger at what he perceived as insulting
language used by Jumblatt in Washington. He dismissively put
down Jumblatt's "second rate" substitute in the dialogue,
Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi, for being disruptive and
unhelpful. Berri claimed he wanted to convey a positive
message to the Lebanese people, but in accordance with the
ground rules established at the outset of the talks, he could
not do so without the consent of all parties. He insisted
that all the March 14 participants wanted was Lahoud's head.


5. (C) Concerning claimed progress, Berri maintained that
everyone at the meeting, including Nasrallah, had agreed that
Palestinian militias had to be disarmed within six months.
The means to achieve this end would be the formation of a
committee, with the participation of Amal and Hizballah, that
would systematically arrange and monitor the process.
According to Berri, Nasrallah had even offered to go to
Damascus to demand Syrian cooperation in this regard.
Because of the strong consensus, Berri was convinced that
this objective could be attained.


6. (C) Regarding the purported concessions by Hizballah,
Berri claimed that Nasrallah had made a significant move by
redefining his organization's political objectives in
Lebanese terms. Berri said that Nasrallah has now limited
Hizballah strictly to the "liberation of Lebanese territory"
and no longer to the broader Palestinian cause of all
"occupied territories." Regardless of one's position
regarding Shebaa Farms, Berri argued that this concession was

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a positive development that should be seized upon.


7. (C) The Speaker then said that over the past few days
Nasrallah had also unexpectedly begun to talk about the
transfer of defense responsibilities in south Lebanon from
the "resistance" to the country's regular armed forces.
According to Berri, Nasrallah was ready to discuss a "defense
plan" that would presumably place the Lebanese army, rather
than Hizballah, as the principal defense barrier facing
Israel.


8. (C) Finally, in addition to the already acknowledged
consensus on the international tribunal, Berri said the
meeting's participants were ready to demand normalized and
equitable relations with Syria. He said that PM Siniora had
taken the lead in this discussion, with the implicit support
of Hariri, and indicated that agreement had been reached for
an exchange of embassies, demarcation of boundaries, and
settlement of other outstanding issues.

...BUT NOW AT AN IMPASSE
--------------


9. (C) Berri reiterated that although the participants had
demonstrated respect for opposing positions, the conference
was now on the verge of collapse due to rigid positions on
two interrelated issues: the presidency and the resistance.
Regarding the presidency, Berri said he realizes it would be
"foolish" tQdiscuss actual candidates at the table, because
"three of them are sitting right there!" But Berri had
suggested (and indicated it was currently taking place) that
specific names could be discussed "behind the curtains" to
break the impasse. He acknowledged that he and Ja'ja' were
already in such discussions, as were others. Concerning the
Hizballah, Berri said Hariri and Jumblatt had to appreciate
the concerns of the "resistance" and recognize that Hiballah
required certain assurances that its status would be
protected by a new government.


10. (C) With the resumption of the dialogue scheduled for
March 13, Speaker Berri expressed mixed opinions about its
possible success. He was clearly satisfied by the openness
and lack of discord displayed thus far, and maintained that
he never expected the degree of progress that had been
achieved. But Berri also said he was uneasy that it would
all come to naught if Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt did not
show flexibility on the presidency and the concerns of the
"resistance." Clearing conveying his desire to be seen as
the architect of a success, Berri concluded by stating,
"...if they want to keep discussing Lahoud and how to remove
him, fine, but let's pocket our gains."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) It appears that Berri is trying to play several
roles at once: Lebanese statesman, leader of Amal, Hizballah
ally, and Shia (and Syrian?) loyalist. He badly wants the
dialogue to succeed and is attempting to keep all the
factions in one room and moving forward. But he is also
serving as the point man for Nasrallah, explaining (and
probably exaggerating) how far the Hizballah leader has come
in the past few months. And as he tries to play the
statesman, old frictions are keeping emotions high -- the
latest being Jumblatt's statements from Washington which
apparently rubbed both Nasrallah and Berri raw, despite
having been said before, most notably on February 14.


12. (C) The greatest challenge, however, isn't Berri's
leadership of the dialogue, which has been surprisingly
commendable, but the stalemate over the presidency. Although
each of the 14 participants has more or less accepted the
conventional wisdom that Lahoud is finished, a way still has
to be found to telegraph the Maronite choice to the March 8
alliance -- and somehow convince Aoun to accept a non-Aoun
presidency. End comment.
FELTMAN