MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI BLAMES MARCH 14 COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000735 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI BLAMES MARCH 14 COALITION FOR DIALOGUE IMPASSE Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Speaker Nabih Berri believes the "national dialogue" has thus far been a worthwhile endeavor, which may produce a breakthrough in the way Lebanon's traditional political blocs resolve national issues. But he expressed deep concern that an intractable Hariri-Jumblatt alliance in the conference was, in his words, "frustrating progress" on a number of issues -- due to their insistence that Lahoud be removed from office unconditionally. Berri argued that Hizballah's Nasrallah had made significant concessions, but when the two Shia leaders asked for clarification of the "day after" Lahoud, they were met with silence from the March 14 Colation participants. Berri, who organized the dialogue, expressed fear the conference may soon fail if the impasse continues. He was also angry that, according to his sources, Jumblatt had just described the Shia leaders' relationship with Syria's regime in derogatory terms. He described Aoun's presence at the conference as that of someone waiting to be crowned, while Samir Ja'ja' had been surprisingly honest and collegial. End summary. ¶2. (U) Speaker of Parliament, and sponsor of the "national dialogue," Nabih Berri received the Ambassador and poloff on March 9 at his office in West Beirut. Amal party political advisor Ali Hamdan also attended the meeting. CLAIMS OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS... -------------- ¶3. (C) Speaker Berri expressed his appreciation for U.S. support of the national dialogue process. In his opinion, the ongoing conference was proving that disparate factions in Lebanon could discuss differences in a rational manner, search for common ground, and propose consensus solutions. Berri admitted he had been particularly taken off guard by the reasoned exposition of ideas by Samir Ja'ja' and Ja'ja''s willingness to listen to other positions. Despite the measured discourse and the ability to address issues which up until recently had never been broached, Berri said he believes the dialogue is close to failure, primarily because Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt refuse to move forward without an unconditional commitment to remove Lahoud. According to Berri, there are two complications to this approach: one, Nasrallah and Berri require names of Lahoud's possible successor in order to calculate the impact on their equities, and second, the Maronites are paralyzed by a combination of ambition and fraternal enmity. ¶4. (C) Berri argued that progress had already been achieved regarding the international tribunal, relations with Syria, status of Palestinian arms, and a clear declaration by Hizballah of its "new" philosophy. According to Berri, all of these gains were now in jeopardy due to the intransigence of Hariri-Jumblatt regarding the presidency. Berri expressed frustration and anger at what he perceived as insulting language used by Jumblatt in Washington. He dismissively put down Jumblatt's "second rate" substitute in the dialogue, Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi, for being disruptive and unhelpful. Berri claimed he wanted to convey a positive message to the Lebanese people, but in accordance with the ground rules established at the outset of the talks, he could not do so without the consent of all parties. He insisted that all the March 14 participants wanted was Lahoud's head. ¶5. (C) Concerning claimed progress, Berri maintained that everyone at the meeting, including Nasrallah, had agreed that Palestinian militias had to be disarmed within six months. The means to achieve this end would be the formation of a committee, with the participation of Amal and Hizballah, that would systematically arrange and monitor the process. According to Berri, Nasrallah had even offered to go to Damascus to demand Syrian cooperation in this regard. Because of the strong consensus, Berri was convinced that this objective could be attained. ¶6. (C) Regarding the purported concessions by Hizballah, Berri claimed that Nasrallah had made a significant move by redefining his organization's political objectives in Lebanese terms. Berri said that Nasrallah has now limited Hizballah strictly to the "liberation of Lebanese territory" and no longer to the broader Palestinian cause of all "occupied territories." Regardless of one's position regarding Shebaa Farms, Berri argued that this concession was BEIRUT 00000735 002 OF 002 a positive development that should be seized upon. ¶7. (C) The Speaker then said that over the past few days Nasrallah had also unexpectedly begun to talk about the transfer of defense responsibilities in south Lebanon from the "resistance" to the country's regular armed forces. According to Berri, Nasrallah was ready to discuss a "defense plan" that would presumably place the Lebanese army, rather than Hizballah, as the principal defense barrier facing Israel. ¶8. (C) Finally, in addition to the already acknowledged consensus on the international tribunal, Berri said the meeting's participants were ready to demand normalized and equitable relations with Syria. He said that PM Siniora had taken the lead in this discussion, with the implicit support of Hariri, and indicated that agreement had been reached for an exchange of embassies, demarcation of boundaries, and settlement of other outstanding issues. ...BUT NOW AT AN IMPASSE -------------- ¶9. (C) Berri reiterated that although the participants had demonstrated respect for opposing positions, the conference was now on the verge of collapse due to rigid positions on two interrelated issues: the presidency and the resistance. Regarding the presidency, Berri said he realizes it would be "foolish" tQdiscuss actual candidates at the table, because "three of them are sitting right there!" But Berri had suggested (and indicated it was currently taking place) that specific names could be discussed "behind the curtains" to break the impasse. He acknowledged that he and Ja'ja' were already in such discussions, as were others. Concerning the Hizballah, Berri said Hariri and Jumblatt had to appreciate the concerns of the "resistance" and recognize that Hiballah required certain assurances that its status would be protected by a new government. ¶10. (C) With the resumption of the dialogue scheduled for March 13, Speaker Berri expressed mixed opinions about its possible success. He was clearly satisfied by the openness and lack of discord displayed thus far, and maintained that he never expected the degree of progress that had been achieved. But Berri also said he was uneasy that it would all come to naught if Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt did not show flexibility on the presidency and the concerns of the "resistance." Clearing conveying his desire to be seen as the architect of a success, Berri concluded by stating, "...if they want to keep discussing Lahoud and how to remove him, fine, but let's pocket our gains." COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) It appears that Berri is trying to play several roles at once: Lebanese statesman, leader of Amal, Hizballah ally, and Shia (and Syrian?) loyalist. He badly wants the dialogue to succeed and is attempting to keep all the factions in one room and moving forward. But he is also serving as the point man for Nasrallah, explaining (and probably exaggerating) how far the Hizballah leader has come in the past few months. And as he tries to play the statesman, old frictions are keeping emotions high -- the latest being Jumblatt's statements from Washington which apparently rubbed both Nasrallah and Berri raw, despite having been said before, most notably on February 14. ¶12. (C) The greatest challenge, however, isn't Berri's leadership of the dialogue, which has been surprisingly commendable, but the stalemate over the presidency. Although each of the 14 participants has more or less accepted the conventional wisdom that Lahoud is finished, a way still has to be found to telegraph the Maronite choice to the March 8 alliance -- and somehow convince Aoun to accept a non-Aoun presidency. End comment. FELTMAN