MGLE01: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000714

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES
NATIONAL DIALOGUE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Former Foreign Minister (and eternal presidential
aspirant) Jean Obeid believes the national dialogue effort
will founder unless regional assistance is provided on the
two critical issues: the fate of President Lahoud, and
disarming Hizballah. According to Obeid, Lahoud will not
resign the presidency without acquiescence from the Syrian
regime, and Hizballah has little room to maneuver on its arms
without consulting Iran. Although the dialogue is a very
real achievement and can be used as a platform to continue
the consensus-building process, Obeid believes it cannot
deliver unless Saudi Arabia and Egypt pressure Syria and the
rest of the international community pressures Iran. In his
view, the key to progress in Lebanon is the constitutional
removal of Lahoud (and, presumably, Obeid's own ascendency to
Baabda Palace). End summary.


2. (C) Jean Obeid, who was Lebanon's foreign minister in
2003-2004 during the last government of Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri, met the Ambassador and POLOFF on March 7 in his
office. Obeid, a long-shot (except in his mind) candidate
for president, worked closely with the Syrian regime during
his time in office. But he is also generally regarded as an
honest politician who has few enemies. Unlike many other
Lebanese politicians, he does not attempt to hide his past
affiliations with Syria, and in fact can be relied upon to
give a fairly straight-forward analysis of their intentions,
capabilities and weaknesses. Speaker (and national dialogue
sponsor) Nabih Berri has previously mentioned Obeid as a
presidential candidate, but this endorsement -- which doesn't
exactly win Obeid many othe friends-- is relatively isolated.
Obeid does not enjoy a great deal of support in the Maronite
community.


3. (C) In Obeid's opinion, the national dialogue conference
(currently on hold until Monday, March 13) is a useful step
forward, but the 14 participants at the table understand that
without regional assistance/acceptance on some issues, it
will soon break up without solid agreements. He explained
that the "international umbrella" offered by UNSCR 1559 has
permitted the discussion of previously red-line issues, but
what is actually needed at this point is indirect
participation by either Saudi Arabia or Egypt to gain
regional acceptance of dialogue solutions. Specifically,
Obeid contended that the issue of Lahoud's removal and
selection of his successor could not be realized without the
acquiescence of Syria -- that is, the Asad regime would never
allow Nasrallah to accept a candidate openly hostile to it.
Likewise, he believes the issue of Hizballah's arms is also
controlled by a regional force, namely Iran. Although the
open relatively open exchange of positions in the dialogue is
a positive development, Obeid is convinced that by itself,
the talks will likely break up in the coming week.

PUTTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA
--------------


4. (C) The former foreign minister argued these two issues
(presidency and disarmament) had to be addressed in sequence.
The primary objective, in his opinion, must be a change in
the presidency -- but to a president whose policies could be
reliably predicted by both internal political forces and
neighboring countries. Obeid said his long experience with
the Syrian regime (he claimed to meet often with former
Syrian Vice President Abdelhalim Khaddam and Bashar's father,
Hafez Asad) led him to believe that, even if Syria's primary
aim to reassert control over Lebanon is thwarted, the regime
would never permit the selection of an anti-Syrian Lebanese
president -- they would unhesitatingly and rapidly create
instability to prevent that development. But, according to
Obeid, they are now under severe pressure and could be
convinced to give up on Lahoud and accept a "neutral"
president. He argued this is where President Mubarak and
King Abdullah could play a decisive role and allow the
dialogue to achieve its primary objective -- the removal of
Lahoud, and its liberating effect on Lebanon's political and
economic progress.


5. (C) Obeid is convinced that without the acquiescence of
the Syrian regime, Lahoud will remain until the last day of
his extended term. He stated, "Lahoud entered the (extended)
presidency of his own accord, but he is not free to leave
without Syria's permission." According to Obeid, even the
Maronite patriarch could not convince Lahoud to resign,

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because without Syrian concurrence, Lahoud would be killed.


6. (C) Obeid maintained that Lahoud's removal is the key to
correcting Labanon's instability. Obeid believes that Syria
still wants to convince the Lebanese citizenry that their
country is worse off without Syrian control, therefore, it is
up to the US and France to convince Bashar Asad (through
regional intermediaries) that it is better to allow Lebanon
to stabilize, establish normal bi-lateral relations, and
thereby earn improved relations with the international
community. He concluded that, "...even though Lahoud is the
worst president in Lebanon's history, you must talk to his
masters in Damascus (through Mubarak or Abdullah). The US
and France should not base their policy on wishful thinking."


NATIONAL DIALOGUE -- A BEGINNING
--------------


7. (C) The ever-hopeful presidential candidate stated that
the opening of the national dialogue was in itself a
considerable achievement. He described the "culture of
divergence" that had been growing with each passing week as
sectarian leaders attacked each other and issued
ill-conceived ultimatums. That being the case, Obeid
expressed mild surprise at the apparent civility of the
current discussions and said that perhaps a new way of
handling differences was slowly emerging. If nothing else,
the dialogue had created a "new base" for handling divisive
issues.


8. (C) The former minister reiterated that the dialogue
still had a chance to accomplish its most important objective
-- a constitutional change in the presidency -- if regional
(i.e. Syrian) acceptance could be engineered.

DEALING WITH AOUN'S TARGET FIXATION
--------------


9. (C) Obeid (with some obvious self-interest) argued that
an Aoun presidency would not be a positive development.
Aoun's temperament, sense of entitlement, and lack of
(civilian) leadership would inevitably produce tension and
impede critically-needed progress. In Obeid's opinion, Berri
and Nasrallah could persuade the former general that he lacks
the necessary support, but it would be a difficult task.
Aoun understands that he will never have the support of
Jumblatt, Ja'ja', and probably Hariri and the Maronite
patriarch. Therefore, if he can be convinced his other path
(Shia support) is not available either, he would have to ("if
reasonable") accept the inevitable.
FELTMAN