MGLE01: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000714 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES NATIONAL DIALOGUE Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former Foreign Minister (and eternal presidential aspirant) Jean Obeid believes the national dialogue effort will founder unless regional assistance is provided on the two critical issues: the fate of President Lahoud, and disarming Hizballah. According to Obeid, Lahoud will not resign the presidency without acquiescence from the Syrian regime, and Hizballah has little room to maneuver on its arms without consulting Iran. Although the dialogue is a very real achievement and can be used as a platform to continue the consensus-building process, Obeid believes it cannot deliver unless Saudi Arabia and Egypt pressure Syria and the rest of the international community pressures Iran. In his view, the key to progress in Lebanon is the constitutional removal of Lahoud (and, presumably, Obeid's own ascendency to Baabda Palace). End summary. ¶2. (C) Jean Obeid, who was Lebanon's foreign minister in 2003-2004 during the last government of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, met the Ambassador and poloff on March 7 in his office. Obeid, a long-shot (except in his mind) candidate for president, worked closely with the Syrian regime during his time in office. But he is also generally regarded as an honest politician who has few enemies. Unlike many other Lebanese politicians, he does not attempt to hide his past affiliations with Syria, and in fact can be relied upon to give a fairly straight-forward analysis of their intentions, capabilities and weaknesses. Speaker (and national dialogue sponsor) Nabih Berri has previously mentioned Obeid as a presidential candidate, but this endorsement -- which doesn't exactly win Obeid many othe friends-- is relatively isolated. Obeid does not enjoy a great deal of support in the Maronite community. ¶3. (C) In Obeid's opinion, the national dialogue conference (currently on hold until Monday, March 13) is a useful step forward, but the 14 participants at the table understand that without regional assistance/acceptance on some issues, it will soon break up without solid agreements. He explained that the "international umbrella" offered by UNSCR 1559 has permitted the discussion of previously red-line issues, but what is actually needed at this point is indirect participation by either Saudi Arabia or Egypt to gain regional acceptance of dialogue solutions. Specifically, Obeid contended that the issue of Lahoud's removal and selection of his successor could not be realized without the acquiescence of Syria -- that is, the Asad regime would never allow Nasrallah to accept a candidate openly hostile to it. Likewise, he believes the issue of Hizballah's arms is also controlled by a regional force, namely Iran. Although the open relatively open exchange of positions in the dialogue is a positive development, Obeid is convinced that by itself, the talks will likely break up in the coming week. PUTTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA -------------- ¶4. (C) The former foreign minister argued these two issues (presidency and disarmament) had to be addressed in sequence. The primary objective, in his opinion, must be a change in the presidency -- but to a president whose policies could be reliably predicted by both internal political forces and neighboring countries. Obeid said his long experience with the Syrian regime (he claimed to meet often with former Syrian Vice President Abdelhalim Khaddam and Bashar's father, Hafez Asad) led him to believe that, even if Syria's primary aim to reassert control over Lebanon is thwarted, the regime would never permit the selection of an anti-Syrian Lebanese president -- they would unhesitatingly and rapidly create instability to prevent that development. But, according to Obeid, they are now under severe pressure and could be convinced to give up on Lahoud and accept a "neutral" president. He argued this is where President Mubarak and King Abdullah could play a decisive role and allow the dialogue to achieve its primary objective -- the removal of Lahoud, and its liberating effect on Lebanon's political and economic progress. ¶5. (C) Obeid is convinced that without the acquiescence of the Syrian regime, Lahoud will remain until the last day of his extended term. He stated, "Lahoud entered the (extended) presidency of his own accord, but he is not free to leave without Syria's permission." According to Obeid, even the Maronite patriarch could not convince Lahoud to resign, BEIRUT 00000714 002 OF 002 because without Syrian concurrence, Lahoud would be killed. ¶6. (C) Obeid maintained that Lahoud's removal is the key to correcting Labanon's instability. Obeid believes that Syria still wants to convince the Lebanese citizenry that their country is worse off without Syrian control, therefore, it is up to the US and France to convince Bashar Asad (through regional intermediaries) that it is better to allow Lebanon to stabilize, establish normal bi-lateral relations, and thereby earn improved relations with the international community. He concluded that, "...even though Lahoud is the worst president in Lebanon's history, you must talk to his masters in Damascus (through Mubarak or Abdullah). The US and France should not base their policy on wishful thinking." NATIONAL DIALOGUE -- A BEGINNING -------------- ¶7. (C) The ever-hopeful presidential candidate stated that the opening of the national dialogue was in itself a considerable achievement. He described the "culture of divergence" that had been growing with each passing week as sectarian leaders attacked each other and issued ill-conceived ultimatums. That being the case, Obeid expressed mild surprise at the apparent civility of the current discussions and said that perhaps a new way of handling differences was slowly emerging. If nothing else, the dialogue had created a "new base" for handling divisive issues. ¶8. (C) The former minister reiterated that the dialogue still had a chance to accomplish its most important objective -- a constitutional change in the presidency -- if regional (i.e. Syrian) acceptance could be engineered. DEALING WITH AOUN'S TARGET FIXATION -------------- ¶9. (C) Obeid (with some obvious self-interest) argued that an Aoun presidency would not be a positive development. Aoun's temperament, sense of entitlement, and lack of (civilian) leadership would inevitably produce tension and impede critically-needed progress. In Obeid's opinion, Berri and Nasrallah could persuade the former general that he lacks the necessary support, but it would be a difficult task. Aoun understands that he will never have the support of Jumblatt, Ja'ja', and probably Hariri and the Maronite patriarch. Therefore, if he can be convinced his other path (Shia support) is not available either, he would have to ("if reasonable") accept the inevitable. FELTMAN