MGLE01: SALIM AL-HOSS'S "INDEPENDENT" THIRD FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000705

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SALIM AL-HOSS'S "INDEPENDENT" THIRD FORCE
LOOKS A LOT LIKE MARCH 8


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 3/7 meeting with the Ambassador, former Prime
Minister Salim al-Hoss doubted that Lebanon's parliamentary
dialogue process (suspended later that day) would succeed.
He thought participants would be unable to agree on
Hizballah's weapons, the presidency, or relations with Syria.
Regarding the presidency, Hoss -- despite being on opposite
sides during the civil war -- said he considered Michel Aoun
the candidate best able to represent all Lebanese, Muslim and
Christian alike. Hoss described his own efforts, as the
self-proclaimed representative of Lebanon's "Third Force," to
persuade President Lahoud to step down in exchange for new
parliamentary elections. (According to Hoss, Lahoud
capriciously turned down the deal at the last minute.) Hoss
also staked a claim for the Sheba'a Farms as Lebanese
territory, although he was unable to explain why Lebanon had
never raised the issue in international fora between 1967 and
2000 (part of which time he had been prime minister). Even
though Hoss attempted to present himself as an independent
statesman working in the national interest, there was an
uninspiring lack of daylight between his own positions and
those of the Hizballah-dominated "March 8 forces." End
summary.

AMBIVALENT ABOUT NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador and emboff called on former Prime
Minister Salim al-Hoss on March 7. Discussing the ongoing
parliamentary dialogue, Hoss agreed it was a positive step
that Lebanese political leaders were, for the first time in
modern history, engaging in a independent, substantive
dialogue in Beirut without foreign oversight. He doubted,
however, that the dialogue would be a complete success, and
said it would leave major political issues unresolved. He
speculated that there would at least be a consensus on the
UNIIIC investigation and the need to eliminate Palestinian
weapons outside the camps. Hizballah's participation would
be particularly important on these issues, he said.


3. (C) Hoss was skeptical, however, that there would be any
agreement on Hizballah's weapons, the presidency, or
relations with Syria. He suggested that the conference would
be called off before these issues even reached the table. He
singled out Ja'Ja' and Jumblatt as two leaders who wouldn't
agree to good relations with Syria, saying that they would
rather push for regime change. Speaking of the dialogue
process as a whole, he said, "They won't declare it a
complete failure. But they'll need three more sessions at
least."

LAHOUD SHOULD GO (BUT WON'T LISTEN TO ME)
--------------


4. (C) The conversation soon turned to the presidency and
Emile Lahoud. Hoss initially feigned reservations about
discussing the subject. "We're talking about the presidency
before Lahoud has even stepped down," he said, only to launch
into a prolonged account of his own efforts to coax Lahoud
into resigning in exchange for new parliamentary elections.
According to Hoss, he drafted a statement last week with one
of Lahoud's top advisors, in the name of Lebanon's "Third
Force," criticizing the March 14 camp for attacking the
President of the Republic, and especially the 14 MP's who
have come out and said that Syria coerced them into voting
for Lahoud's extension, a betrayal of public trust which Hoss
characterized as "appalling."


5. (C) Hoss said he then met with Lahoud and, after
appealing to his "dignity" and the need to make a "sacrifice
for the nation," convinced Lahoud to resign, under cover of
the supportive "Third Force" letter. As a final condition
for his resignation, the president would call for new
parliamentary elections within six months. The new
parliament, not the current one, would elect the new
president. Hoss said that he had the agreement of his "Third
Force" gathering, and of Lahoud as well. But then, he said,
Lahoud's advisor called him and said the president would only
step down if Hoss agreed to "any initiative" with broad

BEIRUT 00000705 002 OF 003


Lebanese support. Hoss said he "revolted" at the idea of
having to agree with Ja'Ja or Jumblatt. He and Lahoud
discussed the issue on the phone and had a falling out. "Now
there's a distance between us," he said.


6. (C) Hoss said that, following his argument with Lahoud,
he had just written a letter to Berri, Aoun, and Nasrallah,
wishing them success in the national dialogue, but informing
them that his own plan to resolve the presidential crisis was
unlikely to work. The Ambassador suggested that Hoss had
been careful to separate himself from both the "March 14" and
"March 8" crowds. In Hoss's own telling of this story,
however, it sounded like he was approaching the "March 8"
forces as allies.


7. (C) The Ambassador then asked Hoss for the "Third
Force's" position on electoral reform. Hoss responded that
proportional representation would be a good thing for easing
sectarian tensions, but the most important thing would be
that the national commission charged with drafting a new law
include a provision calling for new elections right away.
The Ambassador noted that such a strategy would put the
"March 14" forces in a tough bind; they want Lahoud out of
office, but are eager to avoid new elections. Hoss gave a
noncommittal shrug.

AOUN'S A UNITER, NOT A DIVIDER
--------------


8. (C) Returning to the issue of the presidency, Hoss
criticized what he described as a Christian tendency to
exclude other Lebanese sectarian groups. "Look at Sheikh
Amin al-Gemayel, the (Christian summit) he hosted the other
week. There is this feeling that the Christians segregate
themselves from others." However, Hoss's description of the
Christian-Muslim divide soon turned into a hard sell for
Michel Aoun. Hoss described the Hrawi government's military
campaign to expel Aoun from the Baabda palace in 1990, saying
that, ever since, he had considered Aoun to be an extremist.
(Comment: At the time, Aoun was the Gemayel-appointed
"interim prime minister" in East Beirut, facing a
Syrian-backed mirror-image government in West Beirut with
Hoss at its head.)


9. (C) Recently, however, Hoss had been surprised to see
Aoun, following his return from exile, as the only Christian
politician reaching out to other sectarian groups
(principally, of course, the Shi'ite heavyweights Hizballah
and Amal). Hoss commended Aoun, claiming that he is the only
Christian contender who never says, "we, the Maronites," and
"we, the Christians." He and Aoun have since built a
positive relationship on the prospect of cross-confessional
cooperation, and that Aoun's partnership with Hizballah has
eliminated the possibility of conflict between Christians and
Shiites.


10. (C) Ultimately, Hoss said, the President of the Republic
is the president of all Lebanese, and that as such, he hoped
that the Christians would pick a candidate acceptable to all
the confessional groups. He said that he understood the
Christians' desire to pick a president who would narrowly
defend their own interests without wider concerns for Lebanon
as a whole. "After all," he explained, "Sa'ad (Hariri)
picked Siniora. The Shiites picked Berri. They didn't give
anyone else a choice. So the Christians think, 'Why should
we have to include the others?'" He hoped, however, that the
Christians would make a good choice, and wouldn't compound
situation by making the same mistakes as the Shia and Sunni.

LEBANESE GOTHIC: MILITIAS ON THE FARM
--------------


11. (C) Discussing Hizballah and the national dialogue, Hoss
said we would be unlikely to see any decision on disarmament.
Hizballah is still too strong, and they still have too much
popular support. In effect, Hoss described Hizballah's
weapons as "arms of resistance" against Israel, but warned
that, as soon as "one Hizballah bullet is fired against
another Lebanese," they would be forced to turn over their
weapons.


12. (C) The Ambassador asked Hoss to what degree he thought
Hizballah was able to negotiate in the national dialogue,
independent of instructions from Iran. Hoss said that

BEIRUT 00000705 003 OF 003


Hizballah "almost has a free hand" on domestic issues, but
that, on regional and security issues, they coordinate
closely with Tehran. Hoss claimed, however, that Iran was
not a traditional empire with a regional goals, and that they
are interested only in self-defense. "Unless," the
Ambassador countered, "you consider Hizballah an Iranian
military base on the Mediterranean poised to attack Israel."
Hoss ceded the point, but still claimed that Iran has no
larger territorial ambitions.


13. (C) Hoss suggested that Hizballah had enough
independence from Iran to make a deal on Palestinian
disarmament outside the camps. He said that the Palestinians
would accept such a deal from Hizballah, seeming to suggest
that the PFLP-GC will only accept disarmament outside the
camps with Hizballah on board.


14. (C) As the conversation turned to the Sheba'a Farms, the
Ambassador asked the former prime minister why Lebanon never
protested the Israeli occupation of Sheba'a Farms between
1967-2000. At first, Hoss appeared to be caught off guard,
only to reply with Damascene bluntness, "I have no excuse.
But why should we surrender it?" "Your case needs to be
stronger than that," the Ambassador suggested.


15. (C) Hoss said that, as Sheba'a had been seized during
the 1967 war, it should be addressed in the context of UNSCR

242. The Ambassador reminded Hoss, however, that, during the
Madrid conference in 1991, President Hrawi said that Lebanon
was only concerned with UNSCR 425, and that UNSCR 242 did not
apply to Lebanon. Unable to explain his position in the
context of international law, Hoss offered that the civil
registries in Saida show that all the property in Sheba'a is
owned by Lebanese citizens.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Even though Hoss attempted to present himself as an
independent statesman working in the national interest, there
was an uninspiring lack of daylight between his own positions
and those of the Hizballah-dominated "March 8 forces." The
idea of having new parliamentary elections in advance of
changing the presidency is currently a favorite among the
March 8 crowd and their fellow travelers.
FELTMAN