MGLE01: SALIM AL-HOSS'S "INDEPENDENT" THIRD FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000705 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SY LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: SALIM AL-HOSS'S "INDEPENDENT" THIRD FORCE LOOKS A LOT LIKE MARCH 8 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 3/7 meeting with the Ambassador, former Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss doubted that Lebanon's parliamentary dialogue process (suspended later that day) would succeed. He thought participants would be unable to agree on Hizballah's weapons, the presidency, or relations with Syria. Regarding the presidency, Hoss -- despite being on opposite sides during the civil war -- said he considered Michel Aoun the candidate best able to represent all Lebanese, Muslim and Christian alike. Hoss described his own efforts, as the self-proclaimed representative of Lebanon's "Third Force," to persuade President Lahoud to step down in exchange for new parliamentary elections. (According to Hoss, Lahoud capriciously turned down the deal at the last minute.) Hoss also staked a claim for the Sheba'a Farms as Lebanese territory, although he was unable to explain why Lebanon had never raised the issue in international fora between 1967 and 2000 (part of which time he had been prime minister). Even though Hoss attempted to present himself as an independent statesman working in the national interest, there was an uninspiring lack of daylight between his own positions and those of the Hizballah-dominated "March 8 forces." End summary. AMBIVALENT ABOUT NATIONAL DIALOGUE -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and emboff called on former Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss on March 7. Discussing the ongoing parliamentary dialogue, Hoss agreed it was a positive step that Lebanese political leaders were, for the first time in modern history, engaging in a independent, substantive dialogue in Beirut without foreign oversight. He doubted, however, that the dialogue would be a complete success, and said it would leave major political issues unresolved. He speculated that there would at least be a consensus on the UNIIIC investigation and the need to eliminate Palestinian weapons outside the camps. Hizballah's participation would be particularly important on these issues, he said. ¶3. (C) Hoss was skeptical, however, that there would be any agreement on Hizballah's weapons, the presidency, or relations with Syria. He suggested that the conference would be called off before these issues even reached the table. He singled out Ja'Ja' and Jumblatt as two leaders who wouldn't agree to good relations with Syria, saying that they would rather push for regime change. Speaking of the dialogue process as a whole, he said, "They won't declare it a complete failure. But they'll need three more sessions at least." LAHOUD SHOULD GO (BUT WON'T LISTEN TO ME) -------------- ¶4. (C) The conversation soon turned to the presidency and Emile Lahoud. Hoss initially feigned reservations about discussing the subject. "We're talking about the presidency before Lahoud has even stepped down," he said, only to launch into a prolonged account of his own efforts to coax Lahoud into resigning in exchange for new parliamentary elections. According to Hoss, he drafted a statement last week with one of Lahoud's top advisors, in the name of Lebanon's "Third Force," criticizing the March 14 camp for attacking the President of the Republic, and especially the 14 MP's who have come out and said that Syria coerced them into voting for Lahoud's extension, a betrayal of public trust which Hoss characterized as "appalling." ¶5. (C) Hoss said he then met with Lahoud and, after appealing to his "dignity" and the need to make a "sacrifice for the nation," convinced Lahoud to resign, under cover of the supportive "Third Force" letter. As a final condition for his resignation, the president would call for new parliamentary elections within six months. The new parliament, not the current one, would elect the new president. Hoss said that he had the agreement of his "Third Force" gathering, and of Lahoud as well. But then, he said, Lahoud's advisor called him and said the president would only step down if Hoss agreed to "any initiative" with broad BEIRUT 00000705 002 OF 003 Lebanese support. Hoss said he "revolted" at the idea of having to agree with Ja'Ja or Jumblatt. He and Lahoud discussed the issue on the phone and had a falling out. "Now there's a distance between us," he said. ¶6. (C) Hoss said that, following his argument with Lahoud, he had just written a letter to Berri, Aoun, and Nasrallah, wishing them success in the national dialogue, but informing them that his own plan to resolve the presidential crisis was unlikely to work. The Ambassador suggested that Hoss had been careful to separate himself from both the "March 14" and "March 8" crowds. In Hoss's own telling of this story, however, it sounded like he was approaching the "March 8" forces as allies. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador then asked Hoss for the "Third Force's" position on electoral reform. Hoss responded that proportional representation would be a good thing for easing sectarian tensions, but the most important thing would be that the national commission charged with drafting a new law include a provision calling for new elections right away. The Ambassador noted that such a strategy would put the "March 14" forces in a tough bind; they want Lahoud out of office, but are eager to avoid new elections. Hoss gave a noncommittal shrug. AOUN'S A UNITER, NOT A DIVIDER -------------- ¶8. (C) Returning to the issue of the presidency, Hoss criticized what he described as a Christian tendency to exclude other Lebanese sectarian groups. "Look at Sheikh Amin al-Gemayel, the (Christian summit) he hosted the other week. There is this feeling that the Christians segregate themselves from others." However, Hoss's description of the Christian-Muslim divide soon turned into a hard sell for Michel Aoun. Hoss described the Hrawi government's military campaign to expel Aoun from the Baabda palace in 1990, saying that, ever since, he had considered Aoun to be an extremist. (Comment: At the time, Aoun was the Gemayel-appointed "interim prime minister" in East Beirut, facing a Syrian-backed mirror-image government in West Beirut with Hoss at its head.) ¶9. (C) Recently, however, Hoss had been surprised to see Aoun, following his return from exile, as the only Christian politician reaching out to other sectarian groups (principally, of course, the Shi'ite heavyweights Hizballah and Amal). Hoss commended Aoun, claiming that he is the only Christian contender who never says, "we, the Maronites," and "we, the Christians." He and Aoun have since built a positive relationship on the prospect of cross-confessional cooperation, and that Aoun's partnership with Hizballah has eliminated the possibility of conflict between Christians and Shiites. ¶10. (C) Ultimately, Hoss said, the President of the Republic is the president of all Lebanese, and that as such, he hoped that the Christians would pick a candidate acceptable to all the confessional groups. He said that he understood the Christians' desire to pick a president who would narrowly defend their own interests without wider concerns for Lebanon as a whole. "After all," he explained, "Sa'ad (Hariri) picked Siniora. The Shiites picked Berri. They didn't give anyone else a choice. So the Christians think, 'Why should we have to include the others?'" He hoped, however, that the Christians would make a good choice, and wouldn't compound situation by making the same mistakes as the Shia and Sunni. LEBANESE GOTHIC: MILITIAS ON THE FARM -------------- ¶11. (C) Discussing Hizballah and the national dialogue, Hoss said we would be unlikely to see any decision on disarmament. Hizballah is still too strong, and they still have too much popular support. In effect, Hoss described Hizballah's weapons as "arms of resistance" against Israel, but warned that, as soon as "one Hizballah bullet is fired against another Lebanese," they would be forced to turn over their weapons. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked Hoss to what degree he thought Hizballah was able to negotiate in the national dialogue, independent of instructions from Iran. Hoss said that BEIRUT 00000705 003 OF 003 Hizballah "almost has a free hand" on domestic issues, but that, on regional and security issues, they coordinate closely with Tehran. Hoss claimed, however, that Iran was not a traditional empire with a regional goals, and that they are interested only in self-defense. "Unless," the Ambassador countered, "you consider Hizballah an Iranian military base on the Mediterranean poised to attack Israel." Hoss ceded the point, but still claimed that Iran has no larger territorial ambitions. ¶13. (C) Hoss suggested that Hizballah had enough independence from Iran to make a deal on Palestinian disarmament outside the camps. He said that the Palestinians would accept such a deal from Hizballah, seeming to suggest that the PFLP-GC will only accept disarmament outside the camps with Hizballah on board. ¶14. (C) As the conversation turned to the Sheba'a Farms, the Ambassador asked the former prime minister why Lebanon never protested the Israeli occupation of Sheba'a Farms between 1967-2000. At first, Hoss appeared to be caught off guard, only to reply with Damascene bluntness, "I have no excuse. But why should we surrender it?" "Your case needs to be stronger than that," the Ambassador suggested. ¶15. (C) Hoss said that, as Sheba'a had been seized during the 1967 war, it should be addressed in the context of UNSCR ¶242. The Ambassador reminded Hoss, however, that, during the Madrid conference in 1991, President Hrawi said that Lebanon was only concerned with UNSCR 425, and that UNSCR 242 did not apply to Lebanon. Unable to explain his position in the context of international law, Hoss offered that the civil registries in Saida show that all the property in Sheba'a is owned by Lebanese citizens. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Even though Hoss attempted to present himself as an independent statesman working in the national interest, there was an uninspiring lack of daylight between his own positions and those of the Hizballah-dominated "March 8 forces." The idea of having new parliamentary elections in advance of changing the presidency is currently a favorite among the March 8 crowd and their fellow travelers. FELTMAN