MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DRUSE LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DRUSE LEADER
JUMBLATT

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) For better or worse, Walid Jumblatt may well be the
single person most responsible for where we are in Lebanon
today. He was a warlord in the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war
and became a pillar of the post-Ta'if Agreement "pax
Syriana." Lately, however, he has emerged as the most
important surviving member of the 2004-2006 Lebanese movement
to end Syrian interference. Over the past year, in an
astonishing display of breaking political furniture, the
mercurial Jumblatt has encouraged Lebanon's more timid
politicians to face the critical challenges in Lebanon:
Bashar Asad's culpability in the murder of Rafiq Hariri, the
myth of Lebanese sovereignty over Shebaa Farms,
Iranian/Syrian control of Hizballah, and finally, the bete
noire of Lebanese politics, the truth behind Hizballah's
"resistance" and its powerful militia. His influence with
parliamentary leader Saad Hariri is considerable, and his
public speeches provide momentum and backbone to the March 14
coalition and the wavering reform movement. Despite his once
ugly rhetoric about us, Jumblatt -- who lost his father to
Syrian assassins -- and his advisor, Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh -- himself the target of a
near successful assassination attempt in late 2004 -- can
give Washington policy makers an unvarnished perspective on
Lebanon's reform movement, as well as regional relations,
particularly Syrian and Iranian influence, objectives, and
capabilities. End summary.

JUMBLATT THE "REVOLUTIONARY"
--------------


2. (C) Walid Jumblatt, member of the Lebanese Parliament and
minister in several cabinets over the years, is the most
important surviving member of the movement to end Syrian
interference in Lebanon that took on steam in summer 2004.
He inherited leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party
(PSP) -- like the Phalange, a Janus-faced combination of a
traditional clientele and a modern political party -- from
his father, Kamal Jumblatt, following Kamal's assassination
(almost certainly by Syrian agents) in 1977.


3. (C) With his exquisitely furnished ancestral castle in
the Chouf mountains, surrounded by supplicants (if not
serfs),Jumblatt admittedly makes for an unusual "progressive
socialist." With his long hair and predilection for blue
jeans, Jumblatt clearly enjoys affecting a "leftist
revolutionary" image. He is candid about his past dalliances
-- now long over -- with the Soviet Union, during a time when
the Cold War was one level of conflict in the 1975-1990
Lebanese civil war. (He once gave us a deadpan defense of
his friendship with the Kremlin at the time: "They gave us
(the Druse) lots of ammunition.") His surprising collection
of "socialist realism" oil paintings on the walls of his
mountain castle, and the Soviet military decorations and
other contraptions scattered throughout its rooms and
hallways -- which, while affected a bemused air, he likes to
display to visitors -- are the last vestiges of that bygone
era.

JUMBLATT THE DRUSE
--------------


4. (C) The Druse, variously estimated at three to eight
percent of Lebanon's population of approximately four
million, are heirs to the early footholds established by
Ismaili Shi'ism in the Levant in the eleventh century. While
they went into demographic decline centuries ago, the Druse
have made up for dwindling numbers with intense communal
solidarity and military prowess. There is a sense among many
Druse that they are the "real" Lebanese, the Ottoman-era core
of modern-day Lebanon having essentially been a Druse and
Maronite entity. These traits have given Jumblatt, as a
Druse leader, more influence than his community's numbers
might otherwise have justified.


5. (C) While the President of the Republic must be a
Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker
of Parliament a Shi'a Muslim, Lebanon's system of
confessional politics sets aside no high public office for
the Druse. Despite the Druses' military tradition, the
Lebanese Armed Forces are dominated by Maronites. In a
partial attempt at redress, the 1989 Ta'if Agreement called
for establishing an upper house of Parliament, a Senate, to
be presided over by a Druse -- presumably Jumblatt. This
provision of Ta'if has never been implemented, however. The

restrictions of Lebanese confessionalism tend to be a source
of some resentment -- and a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude --
among many Druse.

JUMBLATT THE POLITICIAN
--------------


6. (C) Jumblatt currently heads a 17-member parliamentary
bloc, a major element of the 71-member (out of 128 members of
Parliament) majority headed by his ally, Sa'ad Hariri, son of
assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Jumblatt's
status as a communal leader has become all the more absolute
with the decline of his distant-number-two rival for Druse
leadership, "Prince" Talal Arslan, a Damascus-aligned
lightweight. Even so, his parliamentary bloc, known as the
"Democratic Gathering," is multi-confessional in makeup --
with more Christians than Druse -- and not restricted to PSP
members.


7. (C) Jumblatt is a key figure in the so-called "March 14
forces," which -- through the Sa'ad Hariri-led majority -- is
the main base of support in Parliament for Prime Minister
Siniora's reform-oriented government. Paradoxically,
Jumblatt is no reformer. The Druse have done relatively well
in the spoils system that is Lebanese governance. As a
cabinet minister overseeing the gigantic slush fund that is
the Fund for the Displaced, Jumblatt was more intent on
distributing bounty to the Druse community than on promoting
the return of Christians to the post-civil war Chouf region.
While Jumblatt is now perhaps the strongest advocate for
ending Syrian interference in Lebanon, Jumblatt needs to be
engaged on Lebanon's urgent need for genuine reform.

THE VERSATILE JUMBLATT
--------------


8. (C) Jumblatt is infamous for changing his position, often
dramatically and with little apology or justification ("I
changed my mind" tends to suffice for him). We see an
underlying consistency to his notorious lack of consistency,
however. No matter what his position on an issue, he always
appears to be driven by two constant motivations: 1)
parlaying a position based on leadership of a small communal
group into a more powerful political role for himself, and 2)
best positioning his Druse community, protecting them from
outside threats -- and being seen by them as doing so. Once
when asked about his reputed political versatility, he gave
us a typical bug-eyed shrug, spread his hands outward, and
said, "I have these 200,000 Druse I have to look out for."

JUMBLATT BEYOND THE POINT OF NO RETURN?
--------------


9. (C) These days, however, the nimble Jumblatt almost seems
to have a death wish. It is worth noting that, after
Jumblatt engaged Christian opponents of Syrian control of
Lebanon in 2001, a death threat conveyed by the Ba'athist
then-MP Assem Qanso, along with other forms of pressure and
no sign of international support for Lebanese sovereignty,
convinced him to fall back into line. Lately, however,
Jumblatt has shattered one political taboo after another,
particularly regarding Hizballah and the Syrian regime,
despite the fact that the Syrian regime has by now imposed
(as he put it to us once) "one hundred" death sentences on
him.


10. (C) Jumblatt knows that the SARG has only to be
successful in carrying out just one of those "hundred" death
sentences to succeed in taking revenge on him. It seems
that, in his mind, he has crossed a point of no return. He
is convinced the Syrians or their Lebanese allies will
assassinate him, and wants to go to his grave knowing that he
told the truth.


11. (C) When a broader, cross-confessional opposition to
Syrian interference began to form following the
Syrian-engineered extension of President Lahoud's term in
office in 2004, some of its members expressed trepidation
that Jumblatt might revert to type and switch sides on them
yet again. (MP Samir Franjieh even asked Jumblatt to provide
just a little advance notice, please, once he decided to
defect.) Nowadays, Jumblatt's allies seem to have little to
worry about in this respect. Indeed, Jumblatt is smart
enough to know that switching sides again would not be
sufficient life insurance against the Syrians and their
Lebanese allies who are furious at his "betrayal."

JUMBLATT AND THE "INDEPENDENCE INTIFADA"
--------------



12. (C) Jumblatt's role in Lebanon's uneven transition to
sovereignty has been critical and visible. He started this
decade in a loose alliance with Rafiq Hariri and various
moderate Christian MPs. Lined up against them were President
Lahoud and the security apparatus that Jumblatt detested, as
well as Hizballah and various anti-Hariri and pro-Syrian
ministers and MPs. In 2004, as the Syrian regime began to
maneuver with its Lebanese allies to extend Lahoud's term in
office, Jumblatt teamed with Hariri to try to block it. He
was the public face of the anti-extension effort, while
Hariri with the UN, France, and the United States behind the
scenes.


13. (C) In the face of considerable pressure, Jumblatt led
his parliamentary bloc in voting against the unconstitutional
extension on September 3, 2004. Days later, he pulled his
bloc's ministers out of Hariri's cabinet -- in opposition to
the fact that the cabinet had forwarded the extension request
to the parliament -- and became a leader of the growing
opposition movement to Syrian interference. The die was cast
and since that day, Jumblatt has wasted few opportunities to
challenge Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and -- more recently --
those who believe the "resistance" movement is justified and
inviolate.


14. (C) Following Hariri's assassination in February 2005,
Jumblatt has taken the lead in challenging empty assumptions
and conceits used by anti-reform forces attempting to reverse
democratic gains. The most compelling aspect of Jumblatt's
campaign to completely sever Syrian and Iranian influence in
Lebanon is that it comes from a genuine Muslim leader (albeit
one from a sect that orthodox Muslims would consider
heretical). The same positions put forth by a Maronite
leader would not have had the impact Jumblatt has had on
Lebanon's body politic. Although the trajectory of his
public oratory regularly overshoots mainstream thinking, his
speeches and interviews shape public opinion and debate.
Beginning in 2005, Jumblatt was the first politician in
Lebanon to accuse publicly the Syrian regime of political
terrorism in the assassinations of his father, Kamal
Jumblatt, and former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. His
rhetorical blasts against the Syrians unnerve many Lebanese
leaders, and have probably increased the threat of his
assassination. Official Syrian statements, as well as those
from Hizballah, have accused him of treason and being the
"lackey" of the U.S. and Israel. But most reasonable
observers in Lebanon, remembering his past, sharp criticism
of U.S. policy in the region, recognize that Jumblatt calls
his own tune.


15. (C) In addition to his no-holds-barred criticism of the
"criminal Asad regime," and its collaborators still active in
Lebanon's security services, the Druse leader also took on
Hizballah and its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. In
late 2005, Jumblatt publicly questioned the previously
sacrosanct concept of the "resistance" and its militia.
After initially defending Hizballah's arms, he has become the
most vocal proponent of UNSCR 1559 in Lebanon and chides
other politicians, particularly FPM leader Michel Aoun, for
unwisely offering Hizballah political cover for its
state-within-a-state status. When Aoun announced a
"cooperative alliance" with Nasrallah on February 6, Jumblatt
sarcastically asked if Aoun thought he now had the presidency
within his grasp. Jumblatt regularly calls for the complete
and immediate implementation of 1559 and states that
Hizballah's arms distort the entire political process due to
the organization's allegiance to Damascus and Tehran. With
refreshing candor for a Lebanese politician, he has
acknowledged that his former support for the "resistance" was
a serious mistake, and has said that as long as Nasrallah
receives aid and direction from Tehran, the organization can
never contribute to Lebanon's nation building effort.


16. (C) In a related matter, Jumblatt has publicly stated
that Shebaa Farms is irrelevant at best. He alone among
Lebanese politicians has presented documentary evidence that
the disputed area along the Blue Line was never considered
Lebanese territory, until Nasrallah made the claim in 2000 --
and since then, Hizballah has conducted a relentless public
relations campaign to redraw previously unquestioned
boundaries. In his discussions with the Embassy and,
increasingly, even publicly, Jumblatt has acknowledged that
Shebaa is a false issue, carefully designed to bestow veto
authority concerning disarmament to both Syria and Hizballah.
It was this declaration and its corollary -- that
Hizballah's arms were no longer justified and an serious
impediment to democratic progress -- that led to scathing
denunciations from Hizballah headquarters in Haret Hreik and

also from Damascus. Again, the aspect that generates such
ferocity from Nasrallah is that this shibboleth-shattering
criticism comes from an authentic Muslim leader. It is
probably safe to assume that both Bashar and Nasrallah would
dance on Jumblatt's grave.

JUMBLATT AND LAHOUD
--------------


17. (C) Perhaps Jumblatt realizes the irony of a Druse
feudal warlord, who inherited his position, fighting for the
constitutional transfer of power from Lahoud to a
presidential candidate committed to Lebanon, but that is
simply another aspect to this unique figure. There is no
denying his willingness to risk all for the chance to unseat
Lahoud. Jumblatt understands that by taking on the
Syrian-controlled president, he is taking on Bashar Asad, the
Syrian security services, and their Lebanese friends. In the
unexpected February 14 surge of popular support for reform in
Martyr's Square, Jumblatt excoriated Lahoud as the "Syrian
puppet," calling for his immediate removal and describing him
as the central element of Syrian influence in Lebanon. He
has told the Embassy that he believes Lahoud, through his
authority to veto any appointment or statute, is the single
most serious impediment to democratic change.


18. (C) Perhaps reflecting a faint echo of his warlord
past, Jumblatt has called for street demonstrations to force
Lahoud to resign, so that parliament can constitutionally
select a successor. Whether he is willing to risk violence
to achieve the ouster of Lahoud is not yet known, but his
stubbornness and acknowledged courage have definitely given
some backbone to the normally cautious political elite.
Veteran Maronite politician MP Robert Ghanem said as much in
a conversation with the Embassy this week. Ghanem conceded,
that even allowing for Jumblatt's unpredictability and knack
for provocatively stirring the pot, Jumblatt was the
essential member of the March 14 coalition. His experience,
independence, and Islamic credentials allow him to take
positions and break barriers that no one else in the
coalition could attempt.


19. (C) While many other political decision makers appear
to be placing an inordinate amount of confidence in Nabih
Berri's "national dialogue" conference scheduled for March
2-12, Jumblatt believes that the ostensibly well-intentioned
forum cannot truly deal with the complex issues of
Syrian-Lebanese relations, Hariri's assassination and UNSCR
1559, because at least one member (Hizballah),and possibly a
second (Michel Aoun),are not able to make the independent
decisions necessary for a comprehensive resolution of the
crisis. In Jumblatt's estimation, the strategy with the
greatest chance of success of removing Lahoud (and opening
the way for political and economic reform) remains popular
pressure, similar to the mass demonstrations that ultimately
drove Syrian troops from Lebanese territory.

JUMBLATT AND US
--------------


20. (C) Jumblatt's visit to Washington affords policy
makers and area specialists an opportunity to receive blunt,
well-considered opinions and explanations of regional affairs
that are based on long experience. Conversations with
Jumblatt will not be dull. The positions that he evinces
will be those that best serve his interests; the cases that
he makes are the cases that protect best his position and the
status of his people. He should be drawn out, to the extent
possible, on the practicalities of economic reform as an
issue high USG interest. While Jumblatt is probably our best
friend in terms of an anti-Lahoud, anti-Syria,
anti-Hizballah, and anti-Iran message, he is not naturally
going to gravitate toward supporting the type of economic and
political reform that might weaken his grasp on the Druse
leadership.


21. (C) Jumblatt has certainly not always been our friend.
He has been a harsh and irrational critic of the United
States at times, and has made ugly comments about certain
high-ranking U.S. officials. Indeed, he has occasionally
directed more than just words at us. For example, in
1983-84, Syria provided his Druse militia with artillery and
ammunition to use against U.S. forces deployed around
Beirut's international airport.


22. (C) At the same time, it is a fact that Jumblatt's
positions -- on Syrian and Iranian interference in Lebanon,
on the need for an investigation into Rafiq Hariri's
assassination, on Hizballah's obligation to disarm, and on

the bogusness of the Sheba'a Farms problem -- are in
remarkable and unprecedented alignment with U.S. policy.
Nothing in the world is for certain, but -- for the reasons
described above -- we do not see Jumblatt shifting
dramatically anytime soon. We see his recent personal
apology to Secretary Rice -- and the personal apology he
seeks to make to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz when Jumblatt sees him in Washington -- as further
examples of an effort to secure some peace of mind while he
can.

TALKING TO JUMBLATT
--------------


23. (C) Jumblatt speaks fluent English, French and Arabic,
is an accomplished raconteur, and has personally known almost
every major political figure in the Levant for the last
thirty years. Jumblatt knows his history well, but appears
to believe that history is not destiny. He is not a
democrat, but he appears to understand that democracy is the
best guarantee for the rights of his people. Jumblatt speaks
candidly and does not flinch when asked straight questions,
even those that reflect poorly on his past actions and
judgment. He has a refreshingly tendency to admit his own
mistakes.


24. (C) Oddly, Jumblatt is often more sensationalist in
front of the press than he is in private meetings. It is as
if the presence of television cameras brings out a desire to
make the top of the news. In front of crowds, he can go
particularly wild. Many thought his crowd-pleasing
anti-Syrian harangues during the anniversary commemoration of
Rafiq Hariri's death went "too far." (To us, they reflected
the truth and provided important political cover for others.)
In private meetings, he will probably need to be drawn out
at first.

NOTE ON MARWAN HAMADEH
--------------


25. (C) Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh will
accompany Jumblatt on his Washington appointments. Hamadeh
was seriously injured in an October 2004 car bomb
assassination attempt, but has since recovered and is fully
engaged in Lebanon's political process. He is convinced that
Hizballah carried out the attempt on his life at the
direction of the Syrian regime. As a result, he is
vigorously anti-Hizballah and pro-disarmament. Minister
Hamadeh is a close political ally and senior advisor to the
Druse leader and, as such, will defer to Jumblatt in meetings.
FELTMAN