MGLE01: SAAD HARIRI TO HOLD JOINT PRESS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WARNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: KDEM PTER KISL LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SAAD HARIRI TO HOLD JOINT PRESS
CONFERENCE WITH HASSAN NASRALLAH


Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).


1. (S) Summary: In a 2/27 meeting with the Ambassador,
Saad Hariri revealed that he would hold a join press
conference with Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of
Hizballah on 2/28. The press conference will come at the end
of Hariri's private meeting with Hizballah and will cover
three areas: arms of the Palestinians outside the recognized
camps, relations with Syria, and the presidency. Although
Hariri did not expect Hizballah to support openly his
position on the presidency, he assured the Ambassador that,
in return for Hariri's oral support for the principle of
Lebanon's right to resistance as long as Sheba'a Farms are
occupied, Nasrallah will offer tacit support for the removal
of President Lahoud. The Ambassador expressed extreme
reservations: Hariri would again recognize the resistance
without winning any real concessions from Hizballah. Hariri
seemed to be following Michel Aoun's footsteps. But Hariri
was confident that he could make progress with Nasrallah.
(Other topics with Hariri discussed septel.) End summary.


2. (S) Saad Hariri, in a meeting with the Ambassador and
PolChief, revealed that he has been talking regularly with
Hizballah officials, including Hassan Nasrallah. Subjects of
the conversations have been Syrian-Lebanese relations and the
investigation into Rafiq Hariri's assassination. On February
28, Hariri will receive Nasrallah at the Hariri home in
Beirut. At the end of the meeting, they will appear in a
joint press conference. Hariri, in a prepared statement,
will say that Lebanon has a right to resistance as long as
Sheba'a Farms remain occupied. He will acknowledge that
Hizballah was instrumental in freeing Lebanese lands from
Israeli occupation and declare that there are still occupied
Lebanese lands. Hariri said that his allies in the March
14th movement knew of, and accept, his talks with Hizballah
as well as his strategy for the press conference.


3. (S) The Ambassador cautioned that Hariri seemed to be
joining a list of Lebanese political figures who believe they
can "bring Hizballah around" by making statements in favor of
the resistance, while not gaining anything tangible in
return. Hariri will look, publicly, to be doing the same
thing as Michel Aoun. The Ambassador warned that the image
of Hariri supporting the principle of resistance will
overshadow any quiet political discussions he might have with
Nasrallah. Hariri said that he would go no further than he
already has in supporting Hizballah. In exchange for
repeating his rhetorical support for Hizballah, Hariri
thought he could get them to make a statement critical of
armed Palestinians outside recognized Palestinian camps. He
added that Hizballah was prepared to accept the departure of
Emile Lahoud from the presidency. Only the question of
naming his successor remained. Hariri said that although
Nasrallah was ready to accept the president's departure, he
would not say so publicly. Hariri said he will be satisfied
if Nasrallah acknowledges the need for dialogue on the future
of the office -- that will signal to people that Nasrallah
will not protect Lahoud.


4. (S) The Ambassador warned Hariri that his public support
for the resistance would not be welcomed by the USG. As bad
as the Aoun-Nasrallah document was, it at least did not
contain the word resistance. Worse, if Hariri's statement is
not accompanied by any tangible concessions from Hizballah,
it will seem like a victory for Nasrallah and further the
perception that Hizballah is in the most favorable position
of all Lebanese parties, that is, being sought out and
praised by all. Hariri dismissed the Ambassador's warnings
by saying that he did not go through so much in order to
"look like Michel Aoun." Hariri assured us that he would
insist that Nasrallah's statement make mention of some
concession from their side, or Hariri would distance himself
from Hizballah in his own statement. "I don't want to look
like I am doing them (Hizballah) favors," Hariri said.


5. (S) The Ambassador later contacted Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh (who reports to Walid
Jumblatt) by phone, to ask whether Hariri had cleared his
strategy for dialogue with Nasrallah with his allies. Yes,
Hamadeh said, "and we don't mind dialogue -- we need
dialogue." But, while staying circumspect on the presumably
tapped phone lines, Hamadeh added that "Walid is not entirely
comfortable with what's happening tomorrow." The Ambassador
expressed deep concern to Hamadeh. Separately, the
Ambassador cautioned Ghattas Khoury, who advises Hariri, that
Hariri must be extremely careful in his public remarks not to
make it appear as though Nasrallah is establishing a

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coalition against UNSCR 1559. With Khoury, the Ambassador
reviewed why the international community rejects the concept
that Sheba'a Farms are Lebanese territory.


6. (S) Comment: Unlike Aoun, Hariri did not surprise us
with a fait accompli with Hizballah. But like Aoun, Hariri
thinks he, and he alone, has the wisdom and charisa to charm
Hizballah into becoming a more legitiate Lebanese
organization that accepts the ineviability of eventual
disarmament. Hariri's initiaive with Nasrallah, dismaying
as it is, needs tobe seen in the context of two issues here:
Firs, the national dialogue is scheduled to start unde
Speaker Berri's leadership on March 2. By meetng with
Nasrallah publicly ahead of that dialogue Hariri no doubt
thinks he is strengthened, as Aun will not be able to count
on Hizballah's autoatic support. Second, the removal of
Lahoud is key goal of Hariri. The March 14 alliance cannot
remove Lahoud without winning the backing (or at east
neutrality) of either the Aoun bloc or Hizbllah/Amal.
Aoun's price is an Aoun presidency, smething Hariri and his
coalition are unwilling t pay. That leaves Hizballah/Amal
as the potentil partners in removing and replacing Lahoud.
For izballah, this is an ideal situation: Hizballah smply
waits for the highest bidder. Both Aoun an Hariri would
argue that this is merely a tacticl arrangement, that after
each accomplishes his hort-term goals of neutralizing the
other, then tey can focus more effectively on Hizballah
disarament. We doubt coddling Hizballah now will make ater
disarmament easier, and we will continue toraise our
concerns.
FELTMAN