MGLE01: AOUN EAGER FOR LAHOUD'S GRACEFUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000568

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/SINGH/DORAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PINS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: AOUN EAGER FOR LAHOUD'S GRACEFUL
DEPARTURE AND HIS OWN PRESIDENCY


Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR. REASONS SECTION 1.4(B)


1. (C) Summary: Michel Aoun was in a good mood as he
greeted the Ambassador for their February 22 meeting. The
former General said he was encouraged by the anti-Lahoud tone
taken by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, and he insisted that Sfeir
was not referring to him when Sfeir said the next president
should not be a military man. Aoun said he would attend the
dialogue called by Speaker Nabih Berri and that he was open
to discuss all issues, including the presidency. Aoun hoped
the dialogue could end talk of popular demonstrations to oust
president Lahoud. Aoun was ready to consider all options for
removing the president, but these options must include a
decision on who will follow Lahoud. Aoun rejected any
interim solution that might allow a caretaker president to
complete Lahoud's term until new elections can be held. He
insisted that the parliamentary majority must deal with him
as a powerful Christian leader. On an encouraging note, Aoun
said Ghattas Khoury had approached him with the names of two
representatives of the March 14 Coalition who will "work with
the Aounists." Aoun will appoint two of his own people to
pursue discussions. Since signing the memorandum of
understanding with Hizballah, Aoun said he has had no further
developments in his dialogue with Hizballah. End summary.

MY WORDS WERE NOT A THREAT,
BUT A CAUTION
--------------


2. (C) On February 22, the Ambassador and Polchief met with
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun,
accompanied by his ubiquitous son-in-law/advisor Gibran
Bassil. The Ambassador began the meeting by sharing with
Aoun USG concern that Aoun's recent comments about potential
confessional violence in Beirut might be seen locally as a
threat. (Note: The oress has reported that Aoun said if
there are March 14 Coalition-inspired riots in and around the
presidential palace in Baabda, Solidere (in central Beirut)
could burn. End note.) Aoun said he only meant to warn the
March 14th group that a demonstration in Baabda might be met
by a violent response from irresponsible elements. His
remarks were in no way meant to incite violence or to
threaten the March 14th movement. Referring to February 5
riots in Beirut, Aoun said he wanted certain people to know
that they cannot control events as well as they would like.
Aoun said that the proposed demonstration to remove Prsident
Lahoud would be passing through heavily populated areas where
"everyone has their personal arms." Recalling the start of
the civil war, Aoun said he had experienced first hand how a
small incident can escalate into widespread violence. "It is
easy to begin these things, but difficult to control them."
Aoun agreed with the Ambassador that the volatile rhetoric
from the political class was increasing the possibility of
violence in Lebanon. Aoun singled out Samir Ja'ja'--"his
speeches sound like war speeches", and Walid Jumblatt--"he
has gone too far."

LAHOUD MUST GO. BUT GENTLY
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador told Aoun that the USG thought it was
time for Lahoud to leave. The international community, and
Lebanese institutions are ignoring Lahoud, making the post
effectively vacant. Lahoud has no credibility. However, we
were concerned that, in the current atmosphere, any
demonstration to oust Lahoud might turn violent. The USG
opposed any use of violence to achieve political ends; those
who wish to remove Lahoud should do so through peaceful
means. The Ambassador explained we would share that message
with members of the March 14 movement.


4. (C) Aoun admitted that there was growing consensus for
Lahoud's removal, but he rejected the notion that Lahoud
might leave his post early as part of a compromise to bring
in Aoun as an interim president to complete the remaining 20
months of Lahoud's term. "This is not constitutional," Aoun
insisted. Additionally, Aoun said an interim president would
not have the authority or power to deal with Lebanon's
problems. A two-year interim president would mean two more
years of political deadlock in the country, according to
Aoun. "We must bring respect to the position of president,"
Aoun announced.


5. (C) The Ambassador assured Aoun that the USG wanted
Lahoud's removal to be legal and peaceful. Aoun agreed with
the Ambassador that Patriarch Sfeir, in a press interview,
had been clear in his support for Lahoud's peaceful and

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orderly departure. Aoun said that there was no
constitutional means to remove Lahoud from office without the
2/3 vote of the parliament. Aoun assured the ambassador that
the anti-Lahoud forces did not have the votes to take
effective action against the president. So failing a
parliamentary compromise, the constitution would have to be
altered to allow for Lahoud's premature departure. The
Ambassador noted that some are concerned that the March 14
ultimatum for Lahoud's departure might have been a tactical
mistake. Now, all Lahoud had to do to defeat his opponents
was remain in office. When the Ambassador asked Aoun about
the Patriarch's comment to reporters that the next president
should not be a military man, Aoun was quick to point out
Sfeir's correction that, "some people have become civilians
and are no longer military men," was aimed at Aoun. (Note:
In a private conversation with the ambassador in January, the
Patriarch unequivocally said he did not want Aoun to be
President of the Republic. End note.)

I AM OPEN FOR DIALOGUE. BUT
THE MAJORITY CANNOT IGNORE MY POWER
--------------


6. (C) Aoun said he feared that the March 14 movement feels
unjustifiably powerful. Relying on the support of the
international community, they are bypassing the Parliament
and the constitution to take their case to the streets. He
warned that it is not prudent for a Sunni-Druze alliance to
attempt to overturn the presidency, and redraft the
constitution. Aoun said that if the Lebanese people feel
neglected by the parliamentary majority, they will not
support government programs or UNSCR 1559. Aoun questioned
Hariri's right to claim leadership of the parliamentary
majority. According to Aoun, his own FPM party is still
contesting ten parliamentary seats from the 2005 elections.
If the competent constitutional commission decided to
overturn the elections in those ten constituencies, the power
balance in parliament could shift. However, Aoun admitted it
unlikely that the commission would rule in his favor.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun if the Berri dialogue
called for March 2-3 might be a way out of the potential
showdown over Lahoud. Aoun said that his party was ready to
participate in the dialogue called by Nabih Berri. Aoun
claimed to have no pre-conceived agenda or redlines for the
meeting. He was prepared to discuss matters openly with all
parties. The Ambassador explained that the USG hoped that
some form of dialogue would result in a real framework for
solutions to Lebanon's troubles and allow for a peaceful
resolution of the presidential problem. Aoun said he was
willing to consider all peaceful, constitutional options for
changing the President, including the option of changing the
government before removing the president. However, Aoun
insisted that he would only want to participate in a
government if that government had real power to implement
change. The Ambassador pointed out that Prime Minister
Siniora was still working on his anticipated economic reform
plan. Aoun said that the Prime Minister had not shared the
details of his plan with the political parties. Aoun said
his economic experts had developed their own ideas which they
were preparing in response to the eventual government
submission to parliament.


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun how he and Samir Ja'ja' had
arrived at the recent compromise that allowed Pierre Daccashe
to run uncontested for the recently vacant Baabda-Aley
Maronite parliamentary seat. Aoun said he allowed the other
candidates "an honorable out." He explained that his
overwhelming support in the district intimidated the others
into withdrawing their candidacies. But Aoun did not explain
how Pierre Daccashe, a failed candidate on Aoun's electoral
ballot, was selected as a compromise candidate between the
Lebanese forces of Samir Ja'ja' and Aoun's supporters. Aoun
said only that he allowed Ja'ja' to announce that Aoun was
joining him in support for Daccashe.

PRO-SYRIAN SUPPORTERS ARE NEITHER
SOUGHT, NOR SHUNNED
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador advised Aoun that one of the problems
people had with an Aoun presidency had to do with Aoun's
questionable supporters. Comments by Hizballah on the
Baabda-Aley election compromise were not helpful. Old-line,
unreconstructed pro-Syrians like Suleiman Franjieh and Talal
Arslan speak out in support of Aoun and tar him with a
pro-Syrian brush. Aoun said he had never asked for support

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from these pro-Syrian leaders. Then he turned to Bassil with
a smile and said, "Go ahead, begin a new campaign, 'Thank you
for your support, now don't do it anymore.'" Aoun went on to
defend himself saying that the pro-Syrian camp was "shouting
so that people would know they are there," implying that
Talal, Franjieh and others rally to Aoun to avoid being
marginalized by Hariri. The Ambassador cautioned Aoun that
pro-Syrian forces were using him. Aoun rejected this notion
saying, "They know me. They have a fight with March 14."
Aoun said that the March 14 Coalition and his party were
"building bridges." To prove this, he produced a paper that
was delivered to him by the March 14 movement. In the
document, Aoun was given the name of two March 14 deputies
who would serve as his interlocutors in discussions with the
parliamentary majority. Aoun told the Ambassador that he
would respond to the March 14 overture with two names of his
own to pursue the dialogue.

I CAN HELP HIZBALLAH COME AROUND
-- JUST YOU WAIT AND SEE
--------------


10. (C) Defending his memorandum of understanding with
Hizballah, Aoun pointed out that Saad Hariri had been
forward-leaning in his own defense of the "resistance." The
Ambassador said that some of what Saad Hariri has said about
Hizballah, like Aoun's paper with Hizballah, crosses redlines
for us. The Ambassador pointed out that Hariri and others
echo Aoun's own claims that they can bring Hizballah "into
the tent" by dialogue and limited concessions. Aoun was
amused by the notion that both he and Saad Hariri were saying
the same things about Hizballah, and said, "let us do it
together." Then, aided by Bassil, Aoun again reviewed the
virtues of his memorandum with Hizballah and assured the
Ambassador that the steps Aoun has taken will lead to
Hizballah's compliance with UNSCR 1559. Bassil intervened
and said he had made the rounds of many parties and
organizations explaining their agreement with Hizballah and
no one could find fault with what they had accomplished.
Bassil said that even Siniora found no fundamental fault with
the document. The Ambassador explained that we had heard the
agreement criticized as part of a pattern of unilateral or
bilateral actions undertaken by Aoun and presented to other
parties as a fait accompli, rather than a topic for dialogue.
Aoun responded that he made no demands for agreement from
other parties. He understood that much of what was begun by
the memorandum would have to be undertaken by the GOL, but
the memorandum was a start. "Hizballah needs to feel
respected by the other parties." Aoun said that he saw no
sign that his agreement with Hizballah had caused any
internal tensions for the Shia group. He said that Nasrallah
made concessions confidently on major issues and did not seem
to be negotiating with hard-liners in his own ranks. The
Ambassador expressed the USG's desire for a broad political
dialogue, but he also expressed our severe reservations about
the utility of the memorandum and the sincerity of Hizballah.


11. (C) Comment: Aoun's remarks about confessional
violence may not have been meant as a threat. However, as
they were issued in a typically gruff Aoun-tone the formal
General could have foreseen the danger his remarks would have
been misunderstood or misused. There are concepts Michel
Aoun cannot grasp: 1) he is being used by pro-Syrians and
Syria to disrupt politics in Lebanon; 2) the Patriarch does
not want him to replace Lahoud; and 3) he is not undisputed
leader of the Christians. No amount of explaining or
cajoling will bring Aoun to accept these concepts. Given his
convictions, we do not expect him to break with the
pro-Syrian supporters who are clinging to him, nor can we
expect him to negotiate openly for any presidential solution
that does not place Aoun in the Baabda palace. End comment.

FELTMAN