SINIORA BRINGS THE POPE ON BOARD, SAYS "NO" TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000567

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PTER SY LE IR
SUBJECT: SINIORA BRINGS THE POPE ON BOARD, SAYS "NO" TO
INTERIM AOUN

REF: BEIRUT 506

BEIRUT 00000567 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 2/22 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister
Siniora claimed to have convinced the Vatican to push for
President Lahoud's resignation. He said that the Maronite
Patriarch and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri are both on
board with Lahoud's resignation, but that Michel Aoun still
needs to be persuaded that the Baabda Palace is beyond his
grasp. Siniora said that Aoun's stated price for ceding
Baabda -- a minimum of six cabinet seats -- was not worth
paying. Turning to Syria, Siniora said that Damascus is
working with the Qataris to facilitate a deal that will ease
international pressure on President Asad's regime. Siniora
predicted that the SARG would use Lahoud as a bargaining chip
to take pressure off itself, and that it would hang him out
to dry when the time was right. End summary.

BAABDA AND AOUN
--------------


2. (C) On February 22, the Ambassador and emboff met with
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at the Grand Serail. The prime
minister's comments focused on the Lebanese presidency and
the various forces coalescing to push Emile Lahoud from
office. As in a previous meeting (reftel),Siniora described
his recent trip to Rome and the Vatican as highly successful.
He claimed to have convinced Pope Benedict XVI to pressure
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir to take a stronger role in calling
for Lahoud's resignation. Siniora said the French would be
pressuring the Vatican to take a stand against Lahoud as
well.


3. (C) Siniora described the overall situation in Lebanon as
one where the forces against Lahoud were gaining real
momentum. With Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri apparently
on board now as well, Siniora said that Emile Lahoud's days
in Baabda would be numbered. The only remaining obstacles,
according to Siniora, were: 1) to ensure that the Patriarch
and Berri keep up the pressure on Lahoud, and 2) to prevent
Aoun from playing the spoiler by initiating massive street
demonstrations if he does not win the presidency.


4. (C) The prime minister described recent suggestions by a
chorus of prominent Lebanese politicians, including Elias
al-Murr, that Aoun serve as an "interim president" for 18
months following a Lahoud resignation as a gambit to force
new Parliamentary elections. Siniora further criticized the
"interim Aoun" proposal, saying that Lebanon needs a strong
president with a full six years in office to continue
advancing a reform agenda. An interim presidency, Siniora
argued, will only stifle reform efforts.


5. (C) Siniora said that keeping Berri's support should be
relatively simple. Describing Berri as a "pragmatist and
survivor," the prime minister said that Berri only needs to
be reassured that moving against Lahoud now will guarantee
him a strong position in Lebanon's volatile political
hierarchy. Handling Aoun, however, would be more difficult.
Aoun has to realize that he has no chance to be elected
president. Regrettably, Siniora continued, Aoun remains
blind and deaf to this fact.


6. (C) Therefore, according to Siniora, if Aoun will not
realize he has no chance at becoming president, the only
recourse is to convince him to play "by the rules,"
refraining from initiating unrest and street violence. As
for Aoun's stated asking price for foregoing the presidency
-- six cabinet positions on the Council of Ministers --
Siniora dismissed the proposal as "unrealistic" and
exorbitantly high, far exceeding is actual representation in
Parliament or his actual support on the street. Siniora
closed the topic by once again referring to Aoun as
"unbalanced." "Really," the prime minister said, "mentally,
he's not right."

SYRIA, TEHRAN AND WMD
--------------


BEIRUT 00000567 002.2 OF 002



7. (C) Turning to Syria, Siniora said that Damascus was
working with Qatar to broker some kind of deal to relieve
some of the pressure on Bashar. (Comment: Siniora had met
with the Qatari foreign minister in Beirut earlier that day.
End comment.) When the Ambassador asked what Damascus
wanted, Siniora replied that they were trying to open up, and
were willing to use President Lahoud as a bargaining chip.
According to Siniora, Damascus realizes that Lahoud is little
more than a symbol of their influence in Lebanon, but they
will be willing to cut him loose if they think they can
benefit from the deal.


8. (C) Later in the conversation, Siniora admitted his
concern that Tehran would try to use Hizballah in Lebanon to
leverage its position on the development of their nuclear
program. Siniora said he thought Tehran would be rational,
but admitted his surprise that they had pushed the stakes as
high as they have. He said that a Russian offer to provide
nuclear fuel was the best deal that anyone could hope for,
but said he was not sure if the Iranians would take it. He
speculated that the USG could encourage the Iranians to
accept the Russian deal if the administration publicly
announced a position calling for all countries in the Middle
East to renounce nuclear weapons, (including, of course,
Israel).
FELTMAN