MGLE01: BACK CHANNEL TALKS BETWEEN SINIORA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000425

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BACK CHANNEL TALKS BETWEEN SINIORA AND
AOUN


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Following initial contacts between representatives
of Prime Minister Siniora and Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun in late December, a series of substantive
meetings were held in January between the two camps in an
attempt to come up with a blueprint for Lebanon's political
and economic reform. These meetings mark the first time that
Aoun's representatives directly engaged the Siniora
government in an attempt to find common ground on the way
forward for Lebanon. It would also seem to indicate that the
Aounists were interested in conducted parallel talks on
national goals: one set with the Siniora government and a
second with Hizballah's Nasrallah (which culminated in the
release of the February 6 joint communique). Although the
Aoun-Siniora talks were at a stage far behind the
Aoun-Nasrallah talks in terms of issues covered and actual
words put down on paper, the two sets of discussions have the
potential to lead to all-party talks if the political will
exists. End summary.


2. (C) Toufiq Hindi, a former political strategist for
Samir Ja'ja' who has established a fairly eclectic range of
contacts across Lebanon's political spectrum, met with poloff
on February 10 to discuss the confidential Aoun-Siniora talks
and request USG assistance in encouraging the participants to
resume and indeed accelerate the process.

CAUTIOUS BEGINNING
--------------


3. (C) According to Hindi, Michel Aoun raised the
possibility of discrete talks with the Siniora government
during a meeting in mid-December. He asked Hindi to contact
Siniora, but asked that his interest be kept confidential
until Siniora indicated some degree of support for the idea.
On December 24, in a meeting arranged by Nawaf Salam, a
member of the Electoral Law Commission, Hindi broached the
idea of an Aoun-Siniora dialogue with the prime minister.
According to Hindi, Siniora asked why Aoun hadn't mentioned
the idea when he personally visited Aoun in Rabieh in early
December. Nevertheless, Siniora placed an immediate phone
call to Aoun and the two leaders quickly agreed that their
representatives should meet to determine if there was any
basis for a more intensive effort. A few days before the end
of the year, Mohammad Chattah, the prime minister's senior
adviser, met with the ubiquitous Aoun advisor, Gibran Bassil,
at the home of Toufiq Hindi. (Note: Bassil was also then
directly engaged in negotiations with Hizballah, which
produced the February 6 communique. End note.)



4. (C) Hindi reported that the initial meeting discussed
general parameters, as well as an agreement on how the talks
would be conducted. Both representatives agreed that any
talks should be "set apart" from the often bitter attacks
that characterize political discourse in Lebanon, that is,
the talks would not be used to political advantage, or
subject to walkouts because of public clashes between the two
sides. It was also decided that the talks would remain
confidential until such time as both parties reached

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agreement, or mutually determined that continuing the talks
was no longer worthwhile.


5. (C) Almost two weeks then passed, a delay which Hindi
said was due to indecision on the part of Siniora, when in
mid January, the first of three "substantive" meetings was
conducted between Chattah and Bassil, with Hindi serving as
facilitator and recorder. (Note: Hindi showed poloff
extensive notes from the meetings, as well as a 4-page
summary of issues discussed and what he said were points
partially agreed upon. He did not provide copies for further
study. End note.) According to Hindi, the broad outline of
the "blueprint" was similar to the Aoun-Nasrallah communique,
but the planned Aoun-Siniora document also included extensive
language on the need to adapt and update the Taif Agreement,
an issue not addressed by the Aoun-Nasrallah document. In
Hindi's opinion, the discussions were going well and by the
end of the third meeting, the participants had reached
agreement on roughly one fourth the issues.

THE AOUN-NASRALLAH COMMUNIQUE INTERVENES
--------------


6. (C) Usually the meetings were held each Thursday, but at

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the request of Bassil, the schedule was accelerated and two
meetings were scheduled for Tuesday and Thursday, February 7
and 9. However, on February 6, one day after violent Sunni
protests in downtown Beirut, Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah
sent shocks through Lebanon's political system with the joint
communique -- and in so doing, delivered a sharp rebuke to
the Siniora government. On Tuesday afternoon, a few hours
before the scheduled meeting, Chattah called Hindi and said
"personal matters" would probably prevent him from attending.
In an effort to save the talks, Hindi continued plans to
hold the meeting in the hope that Chattah would change his
mind. Bassil showed up at the appointed time and immediately
suspected an apparent rebuff. However, somewhat
unexpectedly, both Chattah and Bassil did show up for
Thursday's meeting, however it immediately ended when Chattah
stated that Siniora was suspending the talks to "consider the
situation." Despite the external developments, Hindi urged
both parties to return to the talks as soon as possible.


7. (C) Toufiq Hindi has asked the embassy to discretely use
its influence with both Siniora and Aoun to return to the
talks to address the major issues confronting Lebanon, rather
than continually criticize each other through the media.
From what he had observed in the Chattah-Bassil meetings,
whose course he said was clearly being directed by Siniora
and Aoun, Hindi said he believed that a document covering
many of the same issues as the Aoun-Nasrallah communique --
but reflecting a much more democratic tone -- could be
achieved. He said he was at a loss to explain the timing of
the February 6 communique, but that pro-democratic forces had
to work with what they had.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Toufiq Hindi was considered to be a political
outsider since his estrangement from the Lebanese Forces, but
his intermediary role in these new talks indicate he has
regained legitimacy. These talks, as abbreviated as they
were, could form the basis of a broadening of the March 14
coalition, if they can be reconvened. A statement of
principles or national objectives would join Aoun's forces
with the pro-reform Siniora government, and would provide a
counter-weight to the flawed Aoun-Nasrallah communique. If
handled correctly, it could also remove the stigma of
passivity from the Siniora government, which has spent most
of its limited time and resources on trying to maintain
cabinet unity and defending itself from domestic and Syrian
criticism.


9. (C) In a meeting with Siniora on February 11, the
Ambassador brought up the possibility of dialogue with Aoun.
Siniora unexpectedly called Mohammad Chattah into the meeting
and asked him to brief the Ambassador on the discussions
broked by Hindi with Bassil. Chatta said the meetings held
thus far had been useful, but in contrast to the picture
painted by Hindi, he indicated they had not progressed very
far on substantive issues. What Hindi had told us was a
document of partially agreed upon points, Chattah and Siniora
described as merely an agenda for discussion. While agreeing
with the Ambassador that it was important to keep a dialogue
going with Aoun, neither Siniora nor Chatta indicated by
their remarks that the talks would soon resume.


10. (C) These talks have the potential to provide a
foundation for a more inclusive pro-reform coalition, or they
may simply become a missed opportunity. As it has for
several months, Embassy Beirut will continue to encourage
Siniora to engage with Aoun -- and vice versa -- to create a
united, pro-sovereignty front to contain and reduce the
influence of Hizballah and its Syrian/Iranian backers. End
comment.
FELTMAN