CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR RAISES ALARM BELLS ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003914 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2026 TAGS: EFIN ECON LE PGOV SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR RAISES ALARM BELLS ON FINANCIAL SITUATION, HOPES FOR UPFRONT CASH AT PARIS III Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In contrast to his usual calm-within-a-storm posture, Central Bank of Lebanon (CBL) Governor Riad Salameh has sounded the alarm bells -- albeit private alarm bells -- on Lebanon's financial and fiscal position. In a 12/29 meeting with the Ambassador, Salameh spoke with unprecedented candor, saying that the GOL is down to its last USD 300 million in cash and is relying on unsecured CBL letters of credit and overdrafts to pay energy costs. Financial markets are no longer interested in lending to the GOL, Salameh said, and will do so only at higher costs. Salameh argued that the GOL will need USD 2-3 billion up front at Paris III in order to maintain credibility vis-a-vis the financial markets in ¶2007. Crunch time starts in February, Salameh said, when a USD 1 billion bond issue matures. With mushrooming budget deficits plaguing the GOL, Salameh predicted that the GOL will need over USD 10 billion in financing in 2007, most of which can be raised locally -- if Paris III is successful. While saying that he was open to all ideas, he downplayed the possibility of an IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance program, saying that the financial advantages were minimal and the political costs high. Given the political realities of Lebanon today, Salameh stated a preference for an IMF-monitored reform program until a credible Lebanese president is in place who will facilitate rather than block reforms. Salameh also expressed deep concern about how Paris III is marketed, arguing that the international community should be seen as embracing Lebanon, not PM Siniora, especially as Siniora will benefit in any case from a successful conference. End summary. GOL DOWN TO LAST $300 MILLION (IN LEBANESE POUNDS) -------------- ¶2. (S) Salameh opened the 12/29 meeting with the Ambassador by announcing that, while the foreign reserves of the CBL itself remain strong, the GOL "doesn't have a single dollar at the Central Bank." The GOL has only a USD 300 million credit balance in Lebanese currency in the CBL, and that is "shrinking quickly." The GOL (which is already about USD 9 billion in debt to the CBL) is repaying maturing treasury 
bills in Lebanese currency "because the market isn't interested in renewing Lebanese bills." The commercial banks are then using the Lebanese currency to buy dollars, because "everyone is scared of the situation." The banks also know "the real position of the government," which increases their reluctance to roll over treasury bills. Salameh described the fact that "we have been able to keep the exchange markets and the banking sector quiet" as "something almost miraculous," given the political crisis provoked by the March 8-Aoun attempts to destabilize the government. BUYING FUEL BY BORROWING, POSTPONING PAYMENT -------------- ¶3. (S) Salameh said that the CBL itself becomes "vulnerable" when the GOL asks for Lebanese pounds in order to buy dollars to pay its commitments, including Eurobond principal and interest and fuel for Electricite du Liban (EDL). "You notice the increasing problems," Salameh said, referring to a recent upsurge in rolling brownouts. "It's going to get a lot worse in February, just when people need heat." So far, Salameh said, the GOL has been able to continue its fuel purchases by postponing payments to Algeria and Kuwait, due to letters of credit that permit a six-month delay. The GOL is already using the CBL to issue more l/c's for fuel purchases, even though the treasury has reached the legislative limit of how many treasury bills it could issue. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri is in no mood to open the parliament in order to lift the GOL's debt ceiling, Salameh said. GOL NEEDS OVER USD 10 MILLION IN 2007; FINANCIAL CRUNCH BEGINS IN FEBRUARY -------------- ¶4. (S) Ticking numbers off from his head, Salameh said that the GOL will need in 2007 about USD 3.4 billion in foreign BEIRUT 00003914 002 OF 004 currency for debt and debt service. Assuming steady or slightly declining energy costs, the GOL will need an additional USD 700 million in foreign currency to cover the letters of credit in the energy sector. In addition, there is about USD 4 billion in local bonds that will need to be rolled over. Given that the 2006 budget deficit is now approaching USD 3 billion because of the ongoing political crisis and the war, one must assume that the 2007 budget deficit will be of similar size. Add to that, Salameh said, about USD 1 billion in anticipated EDL deficits, and the GOL will needs over USD 10 billion in financing in 2007 alone, of which more than USD 4 billion will need to be in foreign currency. The crunch begins in February, when a USD 1 billion Eurobond issue matures. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador noted that the Governor had previously cited approximately USD 9 billion in financing needs for 2007 -- roughly USD 7 billion to roll over existing debt and an additional USD 2 billion in GOL and EDL deficits. Yes, Salameh nodded, but the "situation has deteriorated considerably" since the March 8-Aoun insistence on changing the GOL. And, because of the uncertainty caused by the March 8-Aoun demonstrations, bankers will insist on much higher interest rates, worsening the situation over the long term. The Ambassador noted that local banks have little choice but to continue the financial engineering, lest a GOL default lead to commercial bank defaults. Salameh agreed but said that "the costs will be very high for us and there's only so much we can pressure them (the banks) to do." ARGUING FOR UPFRONT CONTRIBUTIONS -- OF $3 BILLION -- NEEDED AT PARIS III -------------- ¶6. (S) Paris III, Salameh said, is "the only way out." But if GOL officials return from Paris without sizable amounts of cash upfront, "the monetary situation will be weakened considerably. Everybody is waiting to see what happens at Paris III." Given current realities, Salameh insisted that it will not be good enough to have commitments that will be disbursed upon performance. Given the political situation, "no one" will trust that the reforms will be forthcoming. So promises of cash based on reform will lead to a loss of confidence in the financial markets. Instead, cash upfront will stabilize the situation and lead to the ability of the GOL to promote the reforms. The Ambassador used the example of Paris II to express skepticism that cash upfront will lead to reform. Salameh countered that, if the USG and others really mean to support Lebanon, "you have no other choice." It is certain that a financial and monetary collapse will lead to greater instability, he said, and "we will all be in worse shape." ¶7. (S) Salameh expressed hope for USD 3 billion in grant assistance and concessional loans to be given to Lebanon upfront at Paris III. The Ambassador expressed skepticism that the international community would risk that much money without better assurances of movement on credible reforms. Then USD 2 billion, Salameh countered, "even 1.5 billion, but not less." Such a sum would calm the financial markets and "allow us to maintain the current interest rates." Salameh shook his head sorrowfully in recalling that Paris II resulted in greatly lowered interest rates, "and now we'll be lucky to continue paying the same," even with what he anticipated to be lowered interest rates in the United States in 2007. Already, he said, rating agencies are giving Lebanon negative ratings, and higher interest rates exacerbate financial problems for Lebanon over the long term. Paris III can reverse this worrying trend and "create a positive shock for the market." Given his view that the GOL needs about USD 9 billion over the next four years in order to bring debt levels down to a sustainable level, Salameh argued that significant room remains to provide incentives and conditions for reforms, even after the upfront payments. STILL SKEPTICAL ABOUT A FORMAL IMF PROGRAM -------------- ¶8. (S) The Ambassador asked Salameh for his views regarding an IMF program. Claiming that he himself hadn't made up his mind as to what was best, Salameh said that he looked forward to further discussions with Core Group members on this topic. Acknowledging the Ambassador's point that he had not been BEIRUT 00003914 003 OF 004 enthusiastic about an IMF program, the Governor conceded that, "given our history," many countries will "feel more comfortable" with an IMF program. Some countries may need an IMF program in order to justify politically or even legally a contribution to Lebanon. "Some parliaments require it," he said. Nevertheless, he said that he did not believe that the current political situation in Lebanon would permit the reform package that would qualify Lebanon for a Standby Arrangement (SBA). As for an IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA),Salameh claimed that, because amounts are linked to a country's quota, Lebanon would only gain about USD 300 million in IMF resources, an amount too small to justify the political costs an EPCA could entail. ¶9. (S) While admitting that he was far from being an expert, the Ambassador responded that he understood an EPCA to include relatively soft conditions. Salameh said that the EPCA will move "automatically" to a SBA after a relatively brief period, and that the fiscal requirements of an SBA remain politically impossible. After much fairly predictable back-and-forth over the need for Lebanon sooner rather than later to come to grips with the need for real reform, Salameh said -- as he has before -- that he preferred a reform program monitored by Fund staff. Salameh said that he has had two recent phone conversations with the IMF Middle East and Central Asia Director Mohsen Khan. Khan, Salameh said, "seems to have hardened his position, perhaps under the influence of you and the French." USING POLITICS TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT (AGAIN) FOR GENEROUS UPFRONT PARIS III CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶10. (S) Returning to what he attributed as USG political goals in Lebanon, Salameh said that he didn't understand why the USG would want a "contradiction" between, on the one hand, being tough and stingy at Paris III (by conditioning all assistance on reforms) and, on the other hand, wanting to protect Lebanon during a time of real political and financial peril. After all, Salameh said (jabbing his finger toward the official portrait of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud), "you know, and I know, that we can't talk about real reform until he is gone." A credible Lebanese president will support reform, while Lahoud will continue to block reform "until his last day in office." If the international community withholds financial support from Lebanon until Lahoud vacates Baabda Palace because Lahoud won't support reform, "then we are punished three times" -- first, by not getting needed financial resources "to keep going"; second, by having to put up with the unpalatable Lahoud; third, by not having reforms. MARKETING PARIS III AS SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, NOT SINIORA -------------- ¶11. (S) Salameh said that he recognizes and welcomes the fact that the support of many countries at Paris III will derive from the political imperative to support the Siniora government during a time of crisis, not because the donors are particularly confident about the ability of the Siniora government to implement the reform package. Siniora's credibility internationally is "a tremendous asset for us, and we should use it." Nevertheless, he cautioned, the donors should not sell Paris III as support for the Siniora cabinet per se. Paris III must be seen as being good for all Lebanon, he said. "Don't look as though you are bailing out your friend Fouad Siniora to protect him from Hizballah," for that will discredit the conference and further complicate the ability to get a reform program implemented. After all, if Paris III is successful, then Siniora and his cabinet will be strengthened. But let that be the natural result of Paris III, Salameh urged, rather than the stated purpose of Paris III. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (S) Salameh, of course, has been a master of financial engineering during his long tenure at the CBL. He is not always transparent -- as we understand it, not even the IMF knows the real net balance of the foreign currency reserves at the CBL -- but he has been remarkably successful in calming the financial markets even during times of severe BEIRUT 00003914 004 OF 004 crisis such as Rafiq Hariri's murder and the Hizballah-Israeli war. The recipient of various international banking awards and praise, Salameh postures himself as professional, calm, even bland. That is why his rather alarmist presentation to the Ambassador today was so striking. A presidential aspirant, he certainly does not want to see Lebanon go belly up financially on his watch, but we do not believe that he would be sounding these alarm bells with us if he saw other solutions. We will meeting Finance Minister Jihad Azour next week to hear his views, which we expect to be both rosier and less detailed. FELTMAN