LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS SEE PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIRUT 003895 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EFIN LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS SEE PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN ESCALATING BEIRUT 00003895 001.3 OF 007 Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Fouad Siniora, Marwan Hamadeh, and Saad Hariri report that the March 8-Aoun opposition forces are hardening their positions and that street demonstrations, despite the holiday lull, are not going away. Despite Vladimir Putin's vocal support for Lebanon and apparent warnings to Bashar Asad, they believe that Syrian determination to stop the Hariri tribunal remains as strong as ever and, coupled with Damascus' tactic of using Lebanon as a bargaining chip with Riyadh and the USG, could lead to further violence in Lebanon's political crisis. Meanwhile, March 8-Aoun forces continue to reject generous and elaborate compromise proposals proffered by the GOL in conjunction with the Arab League, and they threaten escalation in the near term including possible road blockages and an airport shutdown. Demonstrators in downtown Beirut are reportedly receiving a minimum of $20 for each day they camp in the opposition's tent city, but sanitary and social conditions there are deteriorating. The rump cabinet is examining the possibility of enacting the tribunal statute by cabinet decree, and is considering other ways to cope with a government effectively missing two branches: a parliament which has barely convened in its now-expiring regular session and a president who represents no one but Damascus. The cabinet has asked UNIIIC to aid with investigations not only of the November 21 assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel but also of the recent arrest-suicide of an Al-Qaeda leader at Beirut International Airport and the seizure of explosives and weapons in the hands of a pro-Syrian group that may have ties to Gemayel's assassination. Saad Hariri and Justice Minister Charles Rizk are actively engaging with Hizballah representatives to attempt to arrive at a tribunal statute that Hizballah can live with, but it remains unclear whether Hizballah is negotiating in good faith or merely putting up the appearance of accepting the tribunal. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and Polchief called on four of Lebanon's top government leaders -- Prime Minister Siniora, Communications Minister Hamadeh, Justice Minister Rizk, and Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri -- on December 23, the Ambassador's first full day back in Lebanon since the Chiefs of Mission conference. Despite the current relative lull in Lebanon's political activity, none of our interlocutors were optimistic. While unsure what opposition leaders' next moves may be, they believe their positions are hardening and that they are far from giving up and going home. Violence, our contacts suggest, is more rather than less likely after the New Year. SINIORA SATISFIED WITH RUSSIA TRIP -------------- ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister offered a readout of his Moscow meetings and his followup conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. Siniora, who traveled to Moscow with Justice Minister Charles Rizk, Information Minister Ghazi Aridi and Culture Minister Tarek Mitri, told us with satisfaction that he had been received "as a head of state." He came away from his meeting with Putin pleased, convinced he had "left an impression on him" and that the Russian President had offered a lot of "eye contact." On the other hand, Putin made clear to Siniora that his ability to influence events in the region -- in particular Syria's behavior -- was limited. He said he did not want to "make Russia's Lebanon policy through Syria" and expressed his full support for the tribunal. (According to Rizk, Putin added a caution that the tribunal should not be used to attempt to destroy the Damascus regime.) ¶4. (C) Putin joined Siniora in deriding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's declaration that Iran would "defeat the United States in Lebanon" and expressed general irritation with Iran. Siniora assured Putin that he did not intend to forcibly disarm Hizballah, and Putin condemned assassinations in Lebanon. The PM then had a 20-minute one-on-one with Putin in which, among other things, Putin told Siniora that he "respects American interests in the Middle East." (Note: BEIRUT 00003895 002.3 OF 007 It is not entirely clear what Putin was trying to tell Siniora by this comment, although he may have been hinting either at an increased GOR alignment with USG interests or winking at the Lebanese opposition's characterization of Siniora as an American ally or puppet. We asked Siniora for his interpretation of this remark, which the PM clearly found significant. Siniora shrugged and smiled ambiguously. End Note.) ¶5. (C) Following Syrian President Asad's visit to Moscow December 20, Lavrov phoned Siniora to tell him that Putin had emphasized Lebanon's independence to Asad and urged him to "play a constructive role in Lebanon." Asad had "played the same old broken record" in Moscow, Lavrov told Siniora. Later, Lavrov would hold a press conference to declare that Russia would not take sides in Lebanon's political dispute, that the tribunal should not be "politicized," and that Syria should open an embassy in Beirut forthwith. For his part, after his return from Moscow Asad publicly acknowledged that he had received "advice" from Putin and commented that "advice is different from orders." BUT AFTER ASAD SEES PUTIN, HIZBALLAH'S POSITION HARDENS -------------- ¶6. (C) Siniora commented that, according to Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, who had just returned to Beirut SIPDIS from Damascus, Asad's positions on the tribunal and on Lebanon had "hardened" since his Moscow visit. Similarly, Siniora claimed that Sudanese envoy Mustapha Osman Ismail had told him that Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah's position was also getting tougher. Nasrallah now demands to be the one to choose the "independent" minister in the Arab League's proposed 19 10 1 formula for an expanded cabinet (in essence turning the formula into a 19-11 proposal, which would not be acceptable to March 14),and also seeks reapproval of the tribunal by an expanded cabinet, Siniora found out from Ismail. The Ambassador noted the strange chronology of the past week: Siniora has a positive visit to Moscow, Asad has a reportedly negative visit, and then both Asad's and Nasrallah's positions on key questions in Lebanon harden. Siniora added that Moussa told him only a Saudi-Syrian deal could bring resolution in Lebanon. ¶7. (C) Siniora told Moussa that his approach to the political crisis rested on two principles: 1) that neither side should come out of it either completely victorious or completely defeated; and 2) that all steps in any eventual bargain should be taken simultaneously, so that neither side would suspect it is being deceived. Earlier in the week, he and Moussa had discussed a solution in three phases. In Phase One, the cabinet's earlier approval of the tribunal would be withdrawn, an extraordinary session of Parliament would be declared to discuss the tribunal, a group of six (including two neutral jurists and two representatives from each political camp) would convene to address the tribunal's legal aspects, and demonstrators would be asked to leave the streets. In Phase Two, the independent minister and new opposition ministers would be chosen and the cabinet (either the existing cabinet or the expanded cabinet) would address the tribunal again. In the third and final Phase, Parliament would vote on the tribunal and the PM would sign the decree to expand the cabinet (unless that had already taken place in Phase Two). ¶8. (C) Siniora noted that the pro-Syrian/Aounist opposition had already rejected this proposed solution and he cast doubt on its interest in accepting a solution or a tribunal. The opposition is pushing things toward further deterioration and doing all it can to tarnish the reputation of the Prime Minister and other March 14 leaders, including the spreading of vicious (and sometimes risible) rumors about collaboration with Israel and involvement in assassination of their own members. On the other hand, the opposition's options are narrowing; any escalation in tactics, including blocking roads or shutting down the airport, will bring them in direct confrontation with the Army. Meanwhile, Free Patriotic Movement Leader Michel Aoun is losing support among Christians and becoming more desperate. REPORTED MUALLEM THREAT BEIRUT 00003895 003.3 OF 007 AGAINST LEBANON AND IRAQ -------------- ¶9. (C) "The country is being hijacked" Siniora said, despite his and his government colleagues' having acted in good faith and shown extraordinary flexibility, and the fault lies with Damascus. Siniora related to us that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem had told a group of Emiratis that "if there is a tribunal we'll close our border with Lebanon and open our border with Iraq," wreaking havoc on the economy of the first and the security of the second. Even aside from the tribunal issue, Damascus wants to use Lebanon as "bait" or a bargaining chip to obtain whatever benefits it might obtain from Saudi Arabia and other countries. Furthermore, Siniora's advisor (and former Washington Ambassador) Mohammed Chattah speculated that should the USG embark on an effort to aid Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in his conflict with Hamas, Iran and Syria will strike at Lebanon as a way to retaliate against the USG. Syria will likely respect some limits in Iraq, he noted, but Lebanon remains a soft target. BUT GOL MOVING FORWARD ON TRIBUNAL; REQUESTS UNIIIC HELP ON OTHER CASES -------------- ¶10. (C) Siniora noted that the GOL is pushing forward with the tribunal anyway. Its 70 MPs have signed a petition demanding that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri convene an extraordinary session to vote on the tribunal. Meanwhile, government lawyers are exploring options to make the tribunal law without resort to the Parliament -- according to Siniora, the Lebanese constitution allows the cabinet to make law as long as no fiscal or multi-year implications are involved, and if the financing and duration elements of the tribunal can be smoothed, the tribunal might be passed by the rump cabinet alone. Finally, the PM has asked the United Nations International Independent Investigating Commission (UNIIIC) to give its assistance not only in investigating the assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel but also in the investigation of two more recent developments: the suicide of an Al-Qaeda leader by cyanide while attempting to leave Lebanon through the Beirut International Airport and the December 21 seizure of a cache of weapons and explosives belonging to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in Koura. ¶11. (C) Similarly, the PM concluded, the government is pushing forward with its preparations for the proposed January 25 Paris III donors conference, and has shared its economic reform paper with Treasury, the International Financial Institutions, and with other donors. The GOL has also continued its reconstruction efforts, the PM added, disbursing funds for the reconstruction of several villages a day on average. HAMADEH SEEKING TO RELY ON CABINET, NOT PARLIAMENT, TO ADOPT TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶12. (C) Druze Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh amplified the PM's gloomy outlook and determination to find creative ways for the GOL to survive. Hamadeh, who asked his "Liqa Demokrati" (Democratic Gathering) bloc's lawyers to examine the PM's proposed enactment of the tribunal by cabinet decree, opened his copy of the Lebanese constitution with us and read the relevant passages. Hamadeh acknowledged that the Chamber of Deputies would eventually have to pass the tribunal, in particular to deal with elements including the death penalty and financing. He seemed confident, however, that the cabinet could find the authority to enact the tribunal at least on a year-by-year basis. HAMADEH REMAINS OPPOSED TO GIVING BLOCKING MINORITY TO PR0-SYRIANS, AOUN -------------- ¶13. (C) Hamadeh previewed for us that the next cabinet session would address three important issues: 1) a bonus for the Army, which has been stretched to the breaking point by its deployments to the south and to downtown Beirut; 2) the BEIRUT 00003895 004.3 OF 007 long-overdue telecommunications reform, by appointing a telecommunications regulatory board Emile Lahoud had long opposed; and 3) the Paris III economic reform package. Apart from conducting such normal business and avoiding its own dissolution, Hamadeh noted, there is another reason the cabinet must avoid at all costs granting the opposition a blocking one-third-plus-one share. With his copy of the constitution still open, Hamadeh showed us that a two-thirds cabinet vote would be needed to dissolve the Parliament in the event it fails to meet during its normal session. As the Parliament has met only twice during its (now-expiring) session and as the Speaker may be reluctant to convene the body when its next session begins in mid-March, that is a step the cabinet might eventually see fit to take. The one-third-plus one is not just a blocking minority, Hamadeh said, but also a "toppling minority." ¶14. (C) Hamadeh hailed the LAF's seizure of the SSNP weapons cache, and noted that two Druze arrested in the raid -- one a known contract killer -- may have been implicated in Pierre Gemayel's assassination. On the regional implications of the crisis, Hamadeh accused the opposition -- Hizballah, Iran, and Syria -- of plotting the downfall of the Lebanese way of life and of the West's vision for the Middle East in general. Although for now the Saudis are for now satisfied that they have blocked the opposition's advance in Lebanon, Iran is approaching Riyadh with deceitful proposals regarding its proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere. Meanwhile the Saudis are trying to find out Hizballah's and Syria's bottom line on the tribunal -- in particular, whether it is the tribunal's connection of 14 (now 15, with Gemayel's murder) crimes which represents a problem for them, or whether it is the statute's provision making superiors culpable for the crimes of their subordinates. ¶15. (C) Finally, Hamadeh condemned Marada Party leader and ex-Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh's December 22 statement to the press that the opposition might begin blocking roads and closing the airport. Hamadeh sent word to Franjieh that if he took such actions he would only block his own constituents' movement and disrupt the economic life of the country, with terrible "boomerang" effects on his north Lebanon region as well as on the south and the Beqaa. Hamadeh added that an essential element of the government's strategy must be to split Michel Aoun, or a substantial number of his followers, off from Hizballah. HARIRI ARGUES THAT IRAN DOESN'T MIND THE TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶16. (C) Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri and his ally, former MP Ghattas Khoury, struck a defiant tone in their meeting with us. Hariri differentiated between the Syrian and Iranian interests in Lebanon and their backers. The Iranians have no concern regarding the tribunal, he speculated, and noted (as Hamadeh had hinted) that Tehran was talking to Riyadh about the subject. Iran is eager to avoid the perception that it is responsible for stirring up Shia-Sunni tensions in Lebanon, Hariri said, and for that reason the opposition has been speaking almost entirely through Christian leaders such as Michel Aoun and Suleiman Franjieh lately. ¶17. (C) Despite this, the Christian community has become increasingly aware and alarmed about the Iranian "project" in Lebanon, and only a reluctance to embrace Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has kept Aoun's support as strong as it is. Meanwhile March 14 leaders have agreed that in their public statements they would largely refrain from taking opposition leaders on directly, referring instead to the Iranian-Syrian plot toward Lebanon. The Sunni community in Lebanon is more united than ever, Hariri claimed. DISMISSING BERRI, PRAISING MOUSSA -------------- ¶18. (C) Hariri dismissed Speaker Berri: "There is no longer a Nabih Berri -- he is a section, not even a branch, of Hizballah." Berri's rejections on Hizballah's behalf are what has scuttled Amr Moussa's initiative. Despite this, Moussa's intervention has been helpful. His statement that BEIRUT 00003895 005.3 OF 007 Lahoud should serve out the remainder of his presidential term was clever, Hariri believes; Moussa maintains that presidential elections should precede parliamentary elections, and that proposed sequencing would virtually rule out parliamentary elections before the end of 2007. DEBATING MERITS OF USING PARLIAMENT TO APPROVAL SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶19. (C) On the tribunal, Hariri floated the idea of convening a parliamentary session to address the issue. With Berri wanting nothing to do with the tribunal, the session would be led by Deputy Speaker Farid Makari and consisting of March 14's 70 MPs (all of whom have already signed a petition to Berri seeking such a session). Parliamentary ratification of the tribunal is important, Hariri maintained, because international treaties supersede national law under the Lebanese constitution. Nevertheless if the tribunal is enacted by the cabinet alone, it can receive state funding as long as it is not multi-year funding, Khoury claimed, and yearly renewal of the tribunal would require no more than a simple majority of the cabinet. ¶20. (C) Hariri told us that Hizballah had sent him a message to the effect that the linkage of the 15 crimes was not a problem for them. He hinted at ongoing negotiation with Hizballah on the tribunal, saying that the next few days represented a "window of opportunity to find a solution based on what we want and what they want." Hizballah is concerned the text is too broad and could eventually be used to pursue Hizballah for attacks not related to the 15 recent cases. URGING THAT SYRIA UNDERSTAND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MISBEHAVIOR -------------- ¶21. (C) Despite the ongoing engagement with Hizballah on the tribunal it remains a target for them, along with the implementation of Resolution 1701, because Hizballah resents losing control of south Lebanon, Hariri believes. In order to implement both the tribunal and the resolution the international community needs to put much more pressure on Damascus. Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 because Asad feared for the survival of his regime, but he does not feel that fear anymore. Repeating his frequent refrain that the Syrians need to understand the consequences of potential misbehavior, Hariri proposed to us that the USG should meet back-channel with Asad and share with him a list of specific Syrian military and infrastructure targets that would be subjected to a military strike in the event Asad continues to frustrate the implementation of the tribunal and Resolution ¶1701. ¶22. (C) On engagement with Syria, Hariri indicated he understood that USG policy was unlikely to reverse in the near future. He told us that Paris had obtained EU agreement that any approaches to Syria would be undertaken by EU Foreign Minister Javier Solana, and that the EU member states would exercise more discipline in dealing with Damascus to avoid the exploitation of any differences in their policies. Finally, he mentioned to the Ambassador that he had told Senators Dodd and Kerry during their December 18 visit that engaging with Syria is the moral equivalent of engaging with Al-Qaeda. SUBSIDIZED STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, POSSIBLE PARLIAMENTARY DEFECTIONS -------------- ¶23. (C) On street action, Hariri conveyed to Speaker Berri that March 14 leaders are not afraid of the opposition's threat to escalate their activities. Khoury told us that the opposition demonstrators are receiving $20 each for spending the day in Riad al-Solh Square, and slightly more than that for each night they spend, along with a stipend for each tent. March 14 can also send supporters into the street, he informed Berri. Hariri told us, though, that March 14 would not demonstrate against the Speaker's Ain al-Tine headquarters for fear that such a move could inflame Shia resentment and suspicion, but demonstrations targeting President Lahoud in Baabda could "hit them where it hurts," BEIRUT 00003895 006.4 OF 007 he judged. ¶24. (C) Recent Sunni pro-government demonstrations in the Beqaa might help to calve Zahle MP Ily Skaff off from the Aoun-Hizballah axis. (Note: Skaff controls four seats out of seven "Aoun allies" in Parliament, and their defection would reduce Aoun's bloc from 21 to 17, removing his justification for demanding one-sixth of the cabinet seats. Should the Armenian "Tashnaq" party, which has with only one day's exception notably absent from March 8 demonstrations, also take its two seats out of the bloc, Aoun's count could drop from second-largest in the Parliament to fifth place. End Note.) Finally, Hariri and Khoury told us that March 14 leaders intend to plan "something big" on February 14, 2007 to mark the second anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's assassination. RIZK, PESSIMISTIC, SEES TIME 0N THE SIDE OF THE PRO-SYRIANS -------------- ¶25. (C) Finally, Ambassador and Polchief lunched with Justice Minister Charles Rizk at his home. Rizk, for security reasons, has been working since the beginning of the crisis mostly from his apartment in the multi-story apartment block his family owns. He had installed several security upgrades in the past few weeks, including a guard shack at the entrance to the building's small parking lot and a metal roof over the lot to prevent observers from noting his movements into and out of the building. Polchief believed Rizk looked tired and grey compared with the last time he had seen him, in mid-November. ¶26. (C) Rizk was clearly depressed and pessimistic on the subject of the demonstrations. He felt that the opposition was capable of keeping its supporters in the square indefinitely, pressuring and slandering the government and ruining Beirut's business district, and that eventually something would have to give. He decried sanitary conditions in the tent city as deplorable, and noted that the demonstrators had intentionally defiled parts of the Solidere area because of the project's image as part of Rafiq Hariri's legacy. (Note: A member of Solidere's Board told Polchief two days earlier that Solidere's stock price had fallen by 10% since the demonstrations began, and that the outlook was very negative. End Note.) The demonstrators have the advantage over the government in terms of motivation and stamina, Rizk believes. TRYING TO GET HIZBALLAH ON BOARD FOR TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶27. (C) Rizk showed us official, ready-to-sign copies of the tribunal agreement on UN stationery, but told us he would be meeting with Hizballah representatives later that evening to discuss modifications. Rizk could not tell whether Hizballah would accept the tribunal text at all, regardless of how it might be edited, but told us there was no alternative but to try. Rizk told us that Hizballah's apparent main concern about the tribunal's eventual ability to reach back in time to prosecute their operations in the 1980's and 1990's was completely unfounded. The tribunal text clearly delineates the scope of its authority as beginning with the October 2004 assassination attempt on Minister Hamadeh, and he planned to make that argument clearly with them. If, as Hizballah claims and as Rizk believes, Hizballah had nothing to do with the wave of attacks that began with the Hamadeh attack, they have nothing to fear from the tribunal. ¶28. (C) Rizk shared the PM's assessment (as had all our interlocutors) that the two remaining tribunal elements that may be problematic for Hizballah or for their Syrian allies are the linkage of the 15 crimes (which would imply a Syrian campaign against Lebanon's political leaders) and the tribunal's authority to try superiors for the actions of their subordinates. Rizk's approach to Hizballah is intended to explore which of these elements, if not both, represents a red line for them and Damascus. ¶29. (C) Rizk hinted at flexibility on both elements, but insisted that the tribunal must remain meaningful. Finally, BEIRUT 00003895 007.3 OF 007 the Minister expressed weariness, frustration and disappointment with Prime Minister Siniora's leadership. He feared the PM would dither on his suggested modifications for the tribunal instead of moving quickly to signature with the UN. He described a PM who is more a technical mind than a born politician, and said that Siniora has remained far too inflexible during the crisis. Siniora needs to find a way to bend more to opposition demands without breaking on crucial issues. FELTMAN