LEBANON: MURR PRAISES HIS ARMED FORCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003893

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING, STATE FOR NEA/ELA,
NEA/FO: ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MURR PRAISES HIS ARMED FORCES

Classified By: DCM Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Defense Minister Elias Murr explained to Senators Dodd
and Kerry that stability in Lebanon, and in the region, rests
on holding Syria responsible for its behavior. A key element
of this is halting Syrian interference in Lebanon's internal
political situation. Syria should be required to secure its
border with Iraq and cease its support for Hizballah and
Islamic militants in the Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon, before gaining any dialogue from the USG. Murr
stressed the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the
most dependable institution in the country. The LAF was the
one institution that could rise above confessional lines and
provide security against sectarian violence as well as assure
stability within Lebanon. Murr also emphasized progress made
in rebuilding the LAF. He asked for continued Congressional
support in obtaining U.S. assistance to further enhance the
Lebanese military. End Summary.

LAF MODERNIZATION, FURTHER U.S.
SUPPORT REQUIRED
--------------


2. (C) Senators Christopher Dodd and John Kerry, accompanied
by staff, Charge d'Affaires and Emboffs, met with Deputy
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr at his
residence on December 18. Murr said that one of the best
ways to promote stability in Lebanon is additional U.S.
equipment and training for the LAF. The LAF,s discipline
has shown itself as the Army provided security in the streets
of downtown Beirut during the recent demonstrations. In
essence, the LAF has demonstrated that it is the most
dependable institution in the country. During the
politically-charged demonstrations, the LAF did not break
down along sectarian lines. This cohesion came from Murr,s
policy of recruiting "new people" and creating "new values"
inside the armed forces. Murr explained that broadening
recruitment to increase the non-Shia component of the LAF has
contributed to a more cohesive force. Murr asked for more
U.S. military assistance, stating that he would rather deal
with the U.S than Europe, due to the fact that most equipment
in the LAF inventory was of U.S. origin. He pointed to the
expected delivery of 300 HMMVMs as an example of the
continued USG-Lebanon partnership.

SYRIA CANNOT AFFORD TO CHANGE
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3. (C) Syria is the main threat to political stability in the
region, Murr said. While Murr understood the USG search for
"options" in Iraq, requesting assistance from the Syrians
should not be one of them. He pointed out that Syria was
responsible for training and allowing Syrian-Sunni insurgents
to enter into Iraq via Syria,s borders. Asked by Senator
Dodd why an Alawite regime in Syria would support an
extremist Sunni insurgency in Iraq, Murr responded that
President Bashar al-Asad is thinking short term. Iraq is a
safety valve, and allowing Syrian Sunni extremists to go to
Iraq reduces the pressure on his regime in Damascus.

4 (C) The Syrian regime is not in a position to change its
behavior, nor will it become a partner for stability in the
region. Syria and Asad have too much to lose to go down this
path. Murr counted off several challenges facing Asad. One
is the mounting economic problems the country faces. Syria's
state-run economy cannot be opened up without causing
economic hardship to its people, which would eventually lead
to the regime losing its control. Also, the political
demographics are stacked against the Alawite regime. The
Sunni majority are pushing for change. The regime must
continue its behavior in the region just to maintain its hold
on power. For now, Asad,s Alawite regime is simply playing
for time as a way of surviving.


5. (C) Murr stated that President Asad has his own agenda and
interests when it comes to Lebanon. Asad is using the "Shia
card" by backing Hizballah. He hopes that Syria can regain
its political position within the Lebanese power structure by
allying with a disenfranchised Shia community that is in turn
striving to flex its political muscle. Asad will continue to
support the militant Islamic groups in the Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon. He needs an instrument of terror

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to frighten the Lebanese and remind them that he is still a
strongman who demands to be respected.

BEFORE U.S./SYRIA DIALOGUE,
SYRIA NEEDS TO DELIVER
--------------


6. (C) Murr was frank about prospects for the U.S. engaging
with the Syrian regime as a partner for regional security.
While he reluctantly admitted that the U.S. should be able to
talk to Syria to discern its positions, he cautioned that
before the U.S. opens a full dialogue with Syria, it must
first make sure that the Syrians deliver on benchmarks:
closing the Syrian/Iraq borders to Sunni insurgents, not
interfering in Lebanon,s internal politics, and stopping the
support of Islamic militants in the Palestinian camps.


7. (C) Senator Kerry asked if there was any U.S. leverage
that could be used on Asad. Murr quickly responded, "No."
He indicated that no amount of U.S. leverage could alter the
direction of the Syrian regime, and especially the behavior
of its president. Asad seeks to maintain his power at any
cost. Asad sees his true political lifeline in Iran and
supporting Hizballah in Lebanon, not by gaining recognition
as a partner of the U.S. Murr ended the discussion of Syria
by saying that the Asad regime is completely dependent on
Iran. In the long run, Syrian cooperation with the U.S.,
especially in Iraq, is not going to happen. The U.S. is more
likely to get assistance from Iran than from Syria.


8. (C) Senator Dodd wondered that if the Syrians are not the
"right guys," then who would be the people to engage for
regional security. Murr indicated Saudis would be the best.
The Saudis have the most economic influence in the region,
they usually seek consensus and like to negotiate rather than
look for confrontation, and most important, they have the
most to lose if the region goes up in flames.

AOUN WILL EVENTUALLY COME BACK
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9. (C) Murr changed the discussion to Lebanon's internal
politics. He thought it unlikely that General Michel Aoun
would become president in 2007. Murr's prediction was that
Hizballah would never allow or accept Aoun as president.
Also, the Christian electorate is split on Aoun; they do not
all like his marriage of convenience with Hizballah and his
switch away from the anti-Syrian March 14 movement. Murr
reasoned that once Aoun understood that the Presidency was
out of his reach, and he had no where else to turn, he would
then come back to the March 14 side.

POLITICAL OUTLOOK
--------------


10. (C) In concluding the meeting, Murr indicated that the
political outlook for Lebanon is hazy. He cautiously said
that political compromise is possible in Lebanon, but it will
take time. The best way the U.S. can promote its own
security, and not just that of Lebanon, would be to push its
values of democracy, rather than use of military force.


11. (U) This message has not been cleared by CODEL Dodd.
FELTMAN