MGLE01: A CRITICAL WEEK IN LEBANON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000387 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: A CRITICAL WEEK IN LEBANON Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Commencing with the inadvertent shooting of a Lebanese citizen by Israeli forces late last week and the resulting exchanges of fire across the Blue Line on February 3 (which were the most serious since late November),this past week in Lebanon has witnessed events which are causing a shift in political alliances and will probably affect the pace of reform, as well as support for the Siniora government. Following the IDF-Hizballah military confrontation last Friday, February 3, and the troubling violence in Damascus on February 4, Lebanon's Sunni community, with the rumored support of Saad Hariri's Future Movement, staged a badly mismanaged protest that turned violent, not only damaging the building housing the Danish consulate in Beirut, but also straining relations with the Hariri group's political allies in the Christian community. Seizing an opportunity to appear "presidential," Michel Aoun met, for the first time, and openly, with Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah on February 6 and -- while both beamed for the cameras -- issued a joint communique that contained language which undermines both UNSCR 1559 and the Siniora government. On February 9, by a quirk of the respective ecclesiastical calendars, both the Shia and Maronite communities honored founding leaders, and at least in the Shia's Ashoura speeches, continued harsh criticism of the Siniora government. In the wake of these changing developments, Sunni and Christian leaders are now deeply engaged in discussions on how to handle next Tuesday's first anniversary of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. The political deck has definitely been reshuffled, and not to the advantage of the March 14 coalition. End summary. AN INCIDENT ON THE BLUE LINE -------------- ¶2. (C) The rapid sequence of events in Lebanon over the past eight days has increased communal tensions, undermined the Siniora government, created a new political dynamic with the public embrace between Aoun and Nasrallah, and cast doubt on the strength of the March 14 coalition. The sequence began with the February 1 inadvertent shooting of an apparent Lebanese shepherd by IDF soldiers along the Blue Line. Despite the ambiguity of the situation (the victim may have crossed south of the line once or twice),the fact that the young man (15 or 17 years old) was shot on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line and was apparently not armed for a terrorist operation resulted in a rapid escalation of Hizballah (and GOL) rhetoric. This culminated in a protracted firefight and artillery/mortar exchange on February 3 -- initiated by Hizballah -- of a scale not seen since last November 21's Hizballah attack on Israeli positions in the Blue Line town of Ghajjar. ¶3. (C) Just one day after those hostilities died down, what was clearly a regime-orchestrated violent demonstration took place in Damascus. In hindsight, the attack on the Danish and Norwegian missions in Damascus, taking place during a period of heightened Muslim sensitivity, helped to create an environment that likely contributed to the awakening of a Lebanese Sunni fundamentalist element, just as the moderate Sunni leadership in Lebanon was planning a protest for February 5 in the vicinity of the Danish consulate in downtown Beirut. These fundamentalist elements, in addition to fairly well-documented participation by Syrian and Palestinian agitators, morphed the protest into a short, but destructive impulse against, not only the Danish consulate (which, ironically, emerged unscathed, although the building in which it was housed suffered considerable damage),but more importantly, against Christian interests in Beirut. In a country still sensitive to the considerable sectarian strife of 1975-1990, these attacks by Sunni fundamentalists raised communal tensions to dangerous levels. In a city where arms are still widely held, but hidden from view, these attacks could easily have had a cascade effect. Fortunately, the violence was contained. But public trust in government and the Lebanese sense of security had been shaken. AN UNEXPECTED GIFT FROM THE GOVERMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Michel Aoun, seizing a seemingly unexpected opportunity (however, at least one Sunni leader opined that events were being carefully orchestrated all along by the Asad regime),put the capstone on a long-running dialogue BEIRUT 00000387 002 OF 002 with the Hizballah terrorist organization, by appearing at a press conference on February 6 with the organization's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and issuing a joint statement that detailed their proposals for Lebanon's transition. ¶5. (C) The next two days witnessed a well-coordinated public relations campaign by Aounists and Shia figures alike extolling the "justice and comprehensiveness" of the joint communique -- and relentlessly comparing it to the alleged "silence" and opaqueness of the Siniora government. Unfortunately, the Siniora government was occupied with communal damage control and the responsibilities of everyday governance and was not able to effectively counter the new Aounist/Hizballah "cooperative alliance." ¶6. (C) Thursday, February 9, presented the Lebanese people with new images of political significance: the powerful (and now aggrieved) Maronite community celebrating the sacred founder of their sect on the feast day of St. Maroun, and the Shia community demonstrating their considerable strength with marches across the country, including a mass rally of 250,000 followers in south Beirut, listening ardently to a fiery Hassan Nasrallah declaring on the day of Ashoura that the Shia "will never back down" from a defense of their faith. FEBRUARY 14 -- WILL SAAD RETURN? -------------- ¶7. (C) As political leaders across Lebanon's political spectrum discuss and decide how to proceed, Lebanon is faced with the question of the fast-approaching February 14 commemoration of the Hariri assassination. More than a few advisors to Saad Hariri and the Future Movement are urging caution and moderation for events on the 14th. Some Maronite leaders, such as Michel Aoun, are loudly stating their intention to ignore the event intended primarily to honor the fallen Sunni leader. Others, such as Lebanese Forces Samir Ja'ja' are supportive, but will be able to muster far fewer supporters than would be the case if the Christian community were united. One Sunni MP hinted that the long-absent Saad Hariri understands the sudden erosion of support for the March 14 Coalition and intends to return to Beirut to make a brief appearance at the memorial service. The greatest concern following last Sunday's violence, however, is whether the moderate Sunni leadership is able to place the cork back into the bottle of Sunni fundamentalism. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) PM Fouad Siniora has a considerable task in the weeks ahead to restore government confidence in his government, not only in security matters, but also in whether he can indeed deliver a reform program that can pass muster in Lebanon's unforgiving system of consensual politics. Much depends on whether Aoun is genuine in his offer for national consensus, or whether he is merely using it as a ruse to cover a plan to politically destroy both Siniora and Hariri. End comment. FELTMAN