LEBANON: SENATOR NELSON MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003860 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SENATOR NELSON MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER SINIORA Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. Reason: Sect ion 1.4 (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Visiting Senator Nelson praised Prime Minister Siniora's leadership and courage and said that he had instructed Syrian President Asad to stop interfering in Lebanon. The Senator reassured the PM that the United States would continue to support Lebanon regardless of difficulties or developments in the rest of the region. Siniora recounted for the Senator President Asad's past bullying behavior and stressed the importance of establishing the Hariri tribunal as one way to curb Syrian and Iranian influence in the region. The PM described his government's flexible and accommodating stance in negotiations with the opposition and appealed for USG diplomatic help in returning the Shebaa Farms and curbing Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Senator Bill Nelson and a delegation of three of his staffers plus a military escort visited Beirut December 14. They met with Prime Minister Siniora at the Grand Serail. Senator Nelson began by telling the Prime Minister "Thank you for standing up for what is right." He noted that he had visited SARG President Basha al-Asad the previous day and "made clear that the USG and I personally support you and your government and told him to keep his hands off Lebanon." This was the Senator's third visit with Asad, he noted, and he had gone over the same issues with the Syrian President twice before. Each time, he noted, Asad had lied. The Senator had visited Syria this time, he said, following the assessment of the recently-published Iraq Study Group report indicating that there might be some value in engaging Syria on the subject of Iraq; Asad told the Senator that he wants to cooperate with the U.S. and Iraqi militaries on control of the Iraq/Syria border. ¶3. (C) Senator Nelson continued that he had pressed Asad hard on the subject of the Hariri investigation and special tribunal. He noted that while Asad and his Foreign Minister Walid Muallem (who, the PM interjected, is an "implicit hawk" as opposed to his predecessor Farouq Sharaa, an "explicit hawk") had heard him out politely, but did not engage with him on this topic. Nelson told Siniora that he warned Asad of a looming problem with Iran, which is seeking to impose a new "Persian Empire" in Arab lands. Asad replied, the Senator recounted, with his standard talking points and then mentioned the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hizballah. Why, the Senator asked Asad, don't you use your influence with Hizballah to get them back? Asad countered that Israel is holding 20 Syrian prisoners. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that Asad had also called for new parliamentary elections in Lebanon, in a clear case of interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. The Senator added that Asad had told him outright that he opposes the Siniora government. The Senator's Deputy Chief of Staff noted that Asad had commented that Siniora had lost the confidence of his people and that the solution in such cases is to have early elections. The Senator's Legislative Assistant added that Asad claimed to the Senator that he had invited Siniora to visit Damascus three times. ¶5. (C) The Prime Minister responded that he had visited Damascus shortly after his election as Prime Minister, and that he had had a "good visit" in which he expressed his wish that Lebanon and Syria would enjoy good relations and solve all their outstanding issues. Siniora told Asad that while he did not want Lebanon to become a "center of any action against Syria," he could not censor Lebanese newspapers -- the world has changed. (Note: At the time of Siniora's visit to Damascus, the Syrian army had only recently withdrawn from Lebanon after a nearly 30-year stay and anti-Syrian feeling in Lebanon was high. End Note.) Even in Damascus there are TV satellite dishes everywhere, he continued. ¶6. (C) Siniora recounted his second meeting with Assad, on March 27 at the Arab Summit in Khartoum. He discussed with Asad all the topics then on the table of Lebanon's National BEIRUT 00003860 002 OF 004 Dialogue, such as the Shebaa Farms, the status of Palestinians in Lebanon, and delineation of the borders between Lebanon and Syria. Siniora also proposed in their Khartoum encounter that he visit Damascus, Asad agreed in principle, and requested that Siniora prepare a visit agenda. The PM sent Asad an agenda, he said, which included as its first item the discussion of confidence-building measures between the two states and ways to improve the atmosphere of their relations. ¶7. (C) Asad did not reply, Siniora told the Senator, until May 2006 when Siniora was on an official visit to the United Kingdom. The PM was contacted in London by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies Speaker, Nabih Berri, who told him that Asad was ready to see him -- immediately. Siniora sent word back that he could not break his official visit and could proceed to Damascus in a few days, and that furthermore he had heard nothing from Damascus about the proposed agenda. There was no response to this counter-offer, Siniora told Senator Nelson, and he explained Asad's perfunctory summons as a way to engineer a smiling "photo op" with Siniora on the day before the May 17 adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1680 (which called on Syria to take measures against movements of arms into Lebanon). ¶8. (C) A similar experience occurred later, Siniora recounted, when an invitation to Damascus was conveyed to Siniora by the Emir of Qatar. Siniora used an intermediary to approach Asad regarding a proposed visit agenda, and conveyed to Asad his flexibility regarding the agenda. An agenda was important in order to avoid returning from Damascus with "no results," which would "reflect badly on our relations." There was no response from Damascus, and Siniora concluded that again, Asad was merely seeking a "photo op." ¶9. (C) With regard to his popular support in Lebanon, Siniora noted to the Senator that he continued to enjoy the support of Sunnis, Druze and many Christians in Lebanon but that the opposition was exploiting Shia resentment against the rest of Lebanese society and turning that resentment against Siniora's government. He also noted that although far from all Shia support Hizballah, most Shia are intimidated against speaking out against the group. ¶10. (C) His government is still supported by a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, Siniora continued. While some say that the Parliament is not representative, the 2005 election was subject to international observation and scrutiny and its results have been accepted by the international community. As for the election law which has been criticized by the opposition as favoring the Sunni-dominated Mustaqbal Party, this law had been made in 2000 under Syrian influence. Why had no one spoken out about it until now? The extension of the presidential term of Emile Lahoud was also engineered by Syria. Even after the November assassination of Industry Minister and MP Pierre Gemayel, Siniora noted, his government still enjoys a 70 to 57 majority in Parliament -- "This is democracy!" The issue should not be one of which side can send more supporters into the street. ¶11. (C) Senator Nelson praised Siniora for being "very courageous" and asked whether the ongoing Arab League initiative to resolve Lebanon's political crisis will be helpful. Siniora said that Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa's work thus far had been helpful and that the GOL continued to be willing to discuss all the issues. The opposition, Siniora said, had claimed it wanted to "actively participate" in Lebanon's government. The PM responded to them that "every decision we have taken we have taken unanimously" with the agreement of the Shia ministers (two Hizballah and three Amal) except the recent decision to approve the Hariri tribunal, which was taken following the Shia ministers' resignation. (Note: The GOL's September decision to approve the creation of a maritime component of the expanded UNIFIL mission was also taken over the objection of the Hizballah ministers, although the Amal ministers approved. End Note.) ¶12. (C) Siniora noted that on another important matter -- the installation of surveillance equipment in the capital's streets -- he had acquiesced to the opposition's objections and refrained from moving forward. He wishes to proceed with BEIRUT 00003860 003 OF 004 consensus, he said, but does not wish to be subject to the "tyranny of the minority." The opposition wants a "blocking" one-third of the cabinet, which will give them "full control, obstruction, and the ability to collapse the government." ¶13. (C) Siniora noted that he had agreed to a series of proposed compromises, including a formula giving the opposition 9 ministers in a cabinet expanded to 30 members and including 19 "majority" ministers and two "independent" members who would join consensus votes only. The GOL even demonstrated its flexibility by agreeing to the opposition's request for a 19-10-1 formula. Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah engaged with Moussa on this issue but there has been no agreement yet. ¶14. (C) Among the issues under discussion in the Arab League initiative are: 1) the international tribunal, 2) a national unity government incorporating opposition ministers, 3) replacement of President Lahoud, 4) fulfillment of agreement from the National Dialogue on past issues, 5) resolution of the opposition "sit-in", 6) the Paris III debt and government financing conference, and 7) a new electoral law. "It is more or less agreed," Siniora said, "that election of a new president will have priority over a new electoral law or parliamentary elections." (Note: The opposition's statements indicate they would not agree with that analysis. End Note.) ¶15. (C) The consequences of the confrontation in Lebanon could be "deadly" throughout the Arab world, Siniora said. Syrian behavior vis-a-vis the tribunal suggests that Syria was the author of the crime. Syria, which is now indicating an interest in resolving the Golan Heights issue and in the peace process, was the "agent to control Lebanon for 30 years" and molded Lebanon, he continued. "Especially after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, the Syrian presence became much heavier. This was their place to practice all their adventures -- political, moral, economic." ¶16. (C) Relations with Syria could only be whispered about before the Cedar Revolution, he commented. Now they are on the table. While many of the important issues for Lebanon are greatly related to Israel -- such as "liberating" the Shebaa Farms, stopping Israeli overflights, and obtaining maps of Israeli-laid minefields and of cluster bomb drops -- delineation of the border with Syria is another important issue. The opposition's calls for waging war against the United States through conflict in Lebanon are not helpful, Siniora added, saying that the Lebanese do not want their country to be used as a battleground. ¶17. (C) The Shebaa Farms is definitely Lebanese territory, he insisted. The French were not careful in their survey of the area, and the Syrians have refused a "survey on the ground" although Siniora countered that surveys could be done via air or other means. The territory is definitely not Israeli, though -- "Let them leave and the UN come in and take custodianship." If that happens, the pretext for Hizballah's keeping heavy weapons will disappear. "I have told the President of the United States and the Secretary of State that keeping the Shebaa Farms occupied is the best present you can give to Hizballah. This 45 square kilometers is not strategic -- they can place their listening posts somewhere else!" ¶18. (C) Senator Nelson asked, "Is that where you want the United States to help you?" Siniora responded emphatically, "Yes! You now have Iran on the Mediterranean! If you want to stop them, return the Shebaa Farms. Iran has been hijacking most of the causes of this part of the world and taking them on as its own. Iran took over the issue of Salman Rushdie's book...of the cartoons insulting to the Prophet, and of Jerusalem. On the Shebaa Farms, thank you for your good words of support for me but that is not enough" and perhaps counterproductive, given the opposition's characterization of Siniora as an American stooge. He continued, "I need support for the Shebaa Farms, for the tribunal, and on overflights...I need support even if we have to market it as a resort to Chapter VII." ¶19. (C) Senator Nelson pledged to continue pushing for support for Prime Minister Siniora and his government. The BEIRUT 00003860 004 OF 004 PM concluded, "the tribunal is not just about the death of Rafiq Hariri; we'll use it to halt Iranian influence here. Also we need to restart the move toward a permanent solution in the Middle East; the current situation is an invitation to militant groups and desperate acts. This is how the U.S. government can help." The Senator thanked Siniora for his thoughts, concluding "bless you and your leadership." ¶20. (SBU) The CODEL has cleared this cable. MURRAY