MGLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH TRYING TO HEAD OFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000386 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958:DECL: 02/11/2016 TAGS: PREL KDEM PTER KISL ASEC LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH TRYING TO HEAD OFF FEBRUARY 14 FIASCO BEIRUT 00000386 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a 2/9 meeting with the Ambassador, the two Druze pillars of the "March 14" camp, Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh, were receptive to arguments that a large rally marking the one-year anniversary of former Prime Minister Hariri's would carry serious risks. They agreed that creative alternatives were worth examining, but said only Sa'ad Hariri (who is convinced of his own ability to pull off a mass public display of support) could make the final decision. Hamadeh suggested that Sa'ad Hariri must be planning to return to Lebanon, finally, before 2/14. If so, he needed to "appease" Christians. Hamadeh suggested that the recent agreement between Aoun and Nasrallah might die a quiet death because of Christian reservations. Jumblatt held out hope that a clash between "March 14" forces and Aounists in a coming by-election could be avoided. With Syria's Lebanese allies on an "insult campaign" offensive, Jumblatt and Hamadeh said that Arab mediation efforts needed to be re-worked (Jumblatt may go to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to try to do so) and the UN investigation into Rafiq Hariri's assassination needs to "move." End summary. PLANNING FOR FEBRUARY 14 -------------- ¶2. (C) During a February 9 call on Jumblatt, the Ambassador and emboff suggested to Jumblatt that, given the atmosphere following the February 5 riots in Ashrafieh and this week's Aoun-Nasrallah compact, it might be worth thinking about the implications of organizing a mass demonstration to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's death on February 14. The fact that Hizballah and its allies will probably try to use trade unions to stage large, disruptive anti-government rallies in the near future was another reason to consider a different approach. ¶3. (C) Jumblatt said it would be "absolutely right" to consider a different approach. In the current situation, it would be impossible to recreate the massive, peaceful, and confessionally mixed (mainly Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Druze) crowd that assembled on Beirut's Martyrs' Square on ;the one-month anniversary of Hariri's death. A decision to do something different could only come from Sa'ad Hariri, however. ¶4. (C) Jumblatt explained that Sa'ad Hariri wanted a massive rally. (Comment: Hariri, in a secure telephone conversation with the Ambassador prior to this meeting, directly expressed his intent to do so.) This was easier said that done without the participation of Christians, whose enthusiasm for rallying together with Sunni compatriots considerably diminished after Sunni mobs ransacked the Christian district of Ashrafieh -- which adjoins Martyrs' Square -- on February ¶5. The Ashrafieh incident had been a "big setback," Jumblatt said. ¶5. (C) The Hariri-led "March 14" forces had not exactly helped themselves the next day with the statement its leadership issued from Jumblatt's Beirut residence, sans Jumblatt (who, out of security concerns, continues to confine himself to his increasingly heavily fortified ancestral home in the Chouf Mountains). It was a "ridiculous" statement, Jumblatt said, appearing somewhat irked that it had been issued from his house. Trying to explain the statement's over-the-top assertions, Jumblatt explained that, "when you stay in Qortaba" -- the Mount Lebanon village in which March 14 leaders Fares Soueid and Samir Franjieh, the statement's principal authors, have confined themselves for security reasons -- "you get strange ideas." ¶6. (C) As for the plans for this February 14, Jumblatt said, "we'll work on it, Marwan and I." (Telecommunications Minister and fellow Druze political ally Marwan Hamadeh, together with MP Na'ameh Tomeh, had by this time arrived at Jumblatt's mountain fortress to join the meeting.) He was particularly concerned about the danger of February 5-style provocations in the event of a large rally, and not only on Martyrs' Square. Participants heading to a large rally from the Chouf area, for example (comment: presumably mostly BEIRUT 00000386 002.2 OF 003 Druze, with some Sunnis) would have to cross predominantly Shi'a areas on their way to central Beirut, so there would be multiple potential trouble spots on the way. IS SA'AD HARIRI ON HIS WAY BACK? -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador said that Sa'ad Hariri -- who, also for security reasons, has remained outside Lebanon for months -- had conveyed unshakeable confidence in his own ability to organize a massive rally on February 14. "That means he's coming" (back to Lebanon),Hamadeh replied. He explained, "to deliver, you have to be on the ground." He predicted that Hariri's return would draw masses of people to his residence in Beirut's Qoraytem neighborhood. Potentially, this crowd would filter from Qoraytem to the site of the explosion that killed Hariri's father -- which will be reopened finally on February 14 -- turning it into a place of "pilgrimage." ¶8. (C) Hamadeh and Jumblatt agreed that a smaller-scale commemoration focused on the site of Hariri's death -- one in which the "March 14" forces did not try to compete with their performance last year -- had much to argue for it. They agreed to try to make the case to Sa'ad Hariri in a secure telephone call. CALL ON PATRIACH, APPEASE THE CHRISTIANS -------------- ¶9. (C) Assuming Sa'ad Hariri really does return to Lebanon in time for February 14, all agreed that it would be important for him to call on the Maronite Patriarch. This would provide incentive for Christians to join pro-Hariri Sunnis and others in a rally that might otherwise see only the hard core of the Lebanese Forces representing the Christian community. Hariri needed to "appease" the Christian community after what had happened in Ashrafieh, Hamadeh said. ¶10. (C) Hamadeh reflected on the alternative of banning large rallies altogether and having the March 14 forces come up with another, more creative way of commemorating Rafiq Hariri's death, one that would avoid the risks inherent in a large rally. The government would need to base any decision to ban large rallies on the findings of acting Interior Minister Fatfat's investigation of the events of February 5. Otherwise, the government would just be seen as conceding that its supporters cannot gather a large enough crowd. "We have to succeed in this operation, no matter how big or small it is," Hamadeh said, "we can't afford a defeat." READING THE AOUN-NASRALLAH DEAL -------------- ¶11. (C) Hamadeh said that the Aoun-Nasrallah deal "should be enough for Christians to put question marks" over Aoun, who had wound up giving Hizballah "more than what (Prime Minister) Siniora was ready to give." Confronting the Aoun-Nasrallah deal directly might backfire; it was better simply to let Christians "ask questions about what it includes." While the potential failure of the deal would do nothing to bring Shi'a Muslims into the "March 14" camp, it at least offered the possibility that "March 14" would stop hemorrhaging its Christian support. Some "hints from outside" might help in this regard, Hamadeh said, nothing that Lebanon's Christians have historically been more open to the West. ¶12. (C) Hamadeh said he expected Aoun, as a next step, to attempt to get the "March 14 forces" on board with the same agreement. He also questioned the political acumen of Prime Minister Siniora's advisors. (Comment: Since this meeting, we have heard credible reports of back-channel negotiations between Siniora's chief of staff, Mohamad Chatah, and Aoun's son-in-law and advisor, Gebran Bassil. Hamadeh's two comments here make more sense in light of this. End comment.) BA'ABDA-ALEY RACE: NO COMPROMISE YET -------------- ¶13. (C) While he was skeptical of recent polls indicating that Aoun's supporters would soundly defeat the "March 14 BEIRUT 00000386 003.2 OF 003 forces" in the upcoming by-election in the Ba'abda-Aley district, Jumblatt repeated his conviction that it was better to avoid a confrontation. Whether a compromise candidate could be found depended on Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja'. He was not certain of the status of the efforts to reach a compromise, but expected an update from two Aoun bloc MPs coming to brief him on the Aoun-Nasrallah agreement. ARAB MEDIATION NEEDS IMPROVEMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Referring to last month's ill-fated, ill-received "Saudi initiative" to mediate between the SARG and the GOL, Jumblatt said that "we need an Arab context" for a solution of Lebanon's current problems. However, the "Saudi initiative" would do nothing to restrain the SARG. It was "a trap." "We have to work again on the Saudis," said Jumblatt, who hinted that he might travel to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the near future. UNIIIC NEEDS "TO MOVE" -------------- ¶15. (C) "We'll work on the Saudis," Hamadeh said, "but we also need the UN investigation to move." Doing so could boost the "March 14" forces. "We need just one warrant against one Syrian" issued by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),even if it does not lead to an arrest, in order to shift the momentum that has been going in the direction of the SARG and its allies in Lebanon. The Ambassador urged that Sa'ad Hariri agree to meet UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz in Europe. (Hamadeh mentioned that he had had a one-and-a-half hour interview with Brammertz, and came away impressed that Brammertz "is after winning this case.") THE "INSULT CAMPAIGN" -- WHERE'S WAHHAB? -------------- ¶16. (C) Describing how the SARG's allies in Lebanon were on a multi-front offensive, Jumblatt said that "the insult campaign" against the "March 14" forces continues. We asked about the now-ubiquitous former "loyalist" minister and "renegade Druze," Wi'am Wahhab. He seemed to be everywhere, we noted. "Especially Damascus," replied Hamadeh. Wahhab appeared to be "involved in all the plots," added Jumblatt. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) Following the meeting, Hamadeh contacted the Ambassador. He had attempted to make a case to Sa'ad Hariri, along the lines described above, to reconsider plans for February 14. However, Hariri remained unshakeable in his faith in his own ability to pull off a massive, peaceful rally. Hamadeh recounted Hariri describing a plan to have the crowd flow from the site of the explosion to the Hariri grave in central Beirut, but steering clear of the Christian neighborhoods on the far side of Martyrs' Square so as to avoid any provocations. We wish we were as optimistic as Hariri as to the success of the rally. FELTMAN