LEBANON: STAFFDEL TALWAR MEETS MARCH 14 LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003829 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV KCRM PREL PTER SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: STAFFDEL TALWAR MEETS MARCH 14 LEADERS AND AOUN Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member Puneet Talwar in late November met for two days with March 14 politicians, government figures, NGO leaders, and FPM leader General Michel Aoun. March 14 leaders envisioned an eventual political compromise would follow demonstrations, but wondered if the military could face a range of challenges. They remained eager to pass the special tribunal to strengthen their position, and they and NGO leaders viewed Hizballah as a foreign proxy trying to alter the confessional distribution of power. They strategized about ways to weaken the opposition by splitting some Shia and Aoun from Hizballah. Many of Talwar's interlocutors had questions about U.S. policy toward Iran and Syria. Finally, politicians admitted that the government has not performed adequately, including on reconstruction. End Summary. OUTLOOK -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member Puneet Talwar met with March 14 coalition members Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr, Advisor to the Prime Minister Mohammad Chattah, Acting Interior Minister Ahmed Fatfat, Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, Kata'eb Party leader Amine Gemayel, Members of Parliament (MPs) Edde, de Freige, Harb, Franjieh, Saad Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt in late November. Talwar also met with NGO leaders Fadi Riachi and Lokman Slim, and with Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and MP General Michel Aoun. ¶3. (C) Most March 14 figures envisioned an eventual political compromise; Gemayel expected some change in government, a new presidential election, and guarantees on the special tribunal. All predicted that Hizballah would orchestrate demonstrations and strikes. They also suspected the opposition would ask Parliament to begin consultations on a new cabinet, and call for the resignation of civil servants. Murr anticipated an end to the crisis by January, either in unpredictable street demonstrations, or in a unilateral withdrawal from government that leaves March 14 still in control. Mohammad Chattah criticized the opposition for demanding a new government without discussing any agreed policy or program. Relations between the majority and Speaker Berri are strained but dialogue continues. ¶4. (C) Murr and Fatfat expressed confidence in their troops amidst concern that they face domestic stability and terrorism challenges at the same time. Murr predicted that only the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would emerge from the crisis without damage, and described his orders to them to respect demonstrators' right to protest, as well as to protect private property and government entities. Gemayel worried that Syria retains an influence over the military gained through its control of military recruitment for 30 years. Acting Interior Minister Fatfat described the limitations of the Internal Security forces (ISF),such as an inability to enter Shia neighborhoods. Murr, Fatfat, and others worried that Syrian-sponsored Sunni extremists are creating instability in Lebanon. Hariri and Jumblatt anticipated that such extremists would target UNIFIL in an attempt to force its exit. TRIBUNAL AND OTHER MARCH 14 TOOLS -------------- ¶5. (C) March 14 politicians were fixated on establishing the special tribunal as a way to strengthen their hand. They described it as essential to demonstrate accountability, to build a credible justice system, and to limit intimidation. They suggested that the tribunal be placed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Jumblatt identified improving implementation of UNSCR 1701 to restrict Hizballah's movement and regaining the presidency as two other key March 14 objectives. WHAT DOES HIZBALLAH WANT? -------------- ¶6. (C) March 14 politicians view Hizballah as a foreign proxy trying to alter the confessional distribution of power in BEIRUT 00003829 002 OF 003 Lebanon. Chattah believed Hizballah is carrying out an Iranian decision to fundamentally change the political situation in Lebanon. Jumblatt reported that Nabih Berri told him that Nasrallah was simply following orders from Tehran and Damascus. MP De Freige believes Hizballah's call for a "new national pact" alludes to a plan to alter the Taif Accord to reduce the Christian share of senior government positions to just one-third, rather than the current one-half, and redistribute the remaining two-thirds among Shia, Sunni, and Druze. Harb believes that Nasrallah's objective is policy control through the blocking minority, and his alternate plan is new parliamentary elections. Christian MPs described Hizballah's goals as obstructing the special tribunal, avoiding peace in the south, and holding new parliamentary elections in order to select a president it can control. ¶7. (C) Leaders worried that Hizballah is more prepared for early parliamentary elections; Fatfat commented that the "resigned" ministers are still working from home on their pet projects, building constituencies before the next election. (Note: In a separate meeting Finance Minister Azour told us that he is still paying the salaries of the six ministers. End Note.) Lokman Slim noted that Hizballah's cooperation with leftist parties and media outreach are impressive; in mid-November it held an anti-globalization conference in Beirut in which "revolutionary Islam met anti-imperialism." STATE OF THE SHIA -------------- ¶8. (C) March 14 politicians strategized about ways to weaken the opposition and split the Shia community's alliances from Hizballah. Harb cited Hizballah's ideology as harder for March 14 to challenge than its cash and social services; Hizballah makes the Shia feel strong despite their history as the underclass. Harb suggested March 14 could disconnect Berri and embolden some Shia clerics against Hizballah to help independent Shia face them. Gemayel estimates that Hizballah controls 80 percent of the Shia, and the rest are intimidated. The Shia elite is educated, dedicated, not pro-Hizballah but intimidated and without the means to organize. Jumblatt believes there is no way to split Hizballah. Hizballah has confessional limits but what makes them strong is their alliance with Aoun. NGO leaders Fadi Riachi and Lokman Slim estimate that less than 50 percent of the south is pro-Hizballah; at least 15 percent of the population worked with the Israelis during the occupation and could be co-opted by March 14. Riachi and Slim criticized March 14 for excluding independent Shia and working exclusively with Berri. Such people are too intimidated by Hizballah to join March 14 now. ¶9. (C) Riachi and Slim noted rising Sunni-Shia tensions and persistent rumors that the Sunnis are rearming. Jumblatt and Slim noted that Nasrallah's efforts to increase representation for the Shia community resonates; they are more than a third of the population, they feel persecuted, and think March 14 are their persecutors. WHAT IS AOUN THINKING? -------------- ¶10. (C) March 14 politicians speculated about ways to split Aoun from the opposition. Jumblatt thought Aoun could be "peeled off" by promising him the presidency, but worried that his supporters would clash with those of Samir Ja'Ja'. Murr thought Aoun would be willing to accept an expanded cabinet without a blocking minority, but saw Syrian pressure on him not to accept such a deal. Harb estimated that less than 40 percent of Christians are with Aoun. Christian leaders accused Aoun of profiting from Iranian money through his TV station, a monthly salary, and cash distributions in Christian villages in the south. ¶11. (C) Aoun denied to Talwar that he opposes the special tribunal, but refused to give a reason why he and Hizballah had chosen this moment to try to topple the government. The withdrawal from government has been planned since the end of the war. Other politicians are unreliable, and that is the sole reason they have not defected from the March 14 coalition and joined him as he predicted two months ago, Aoun told Talwar. Aoun says he is the first to say Lebanon needs a tribunal, but must be consulted on the draft. The government is secretive, not to be trusted, and is planning counter demonstrations backed by Ministry of Interior forces, BEIRUT 00003829 003 OF 003 but this is not a Sunni-Shia conflict. Aoun reiterated Hizballah's promise that in exchange for the return of Shebaa farms and Lebanese prisoners in Israel, Hizballah would not use its arms against Israel and would reintegrate its arms into a Lebanese defense strategy. ¶12. (C) Aoun also denied that he or Hizballah would ever allow Lebanon to "be obedient to" Syria or Iran, but suggested that those sponsors were more benevolent than the U.S. expected. Aoun claimed that the Iranian ambassador recently told him that Khamenei issued a fatwa against WMD development and that Tehran's nuclear energy plan includes U.S. and EU monitoring of uranium enrichment and respect for all international treaties. ROLE OF SYRIA AND IRAN -------------- ¶13. (C) Leaders had many thoughts about how U.S. policy toward Iran and Syria might affect Lebanon. NGO leaders noted a fear that U.S. dialogue with Syria or Iran would diminish support for Lebanon; Syria would promise the U.S. it could control Hizballah but could not deliver, since Iranian control over the group is greater than Syrian. Hariri described Bashar al-Asad as an unreliable partner. Gemayel requested consistent support to Lebanon to resist Syrian pressure, and help with UN adoption of the special tribunal under Chapter VII. Saad Hariri saw the crisis as an Iranian attempt to maintain instability to force the international community to negotiate with it and Lebanon as the first in Iran's chain of influence. Harb hoped that a comprehensive strategy to address problems in the Middle East could change Muslim world opinion of the United States. He suggested that since Syria is afraid that the U.S. wants to topple its regime, dialogue could reduce tension. Chattah said the Prime Minister is one of the few who supports U.S. engagement with Syria. ¶14. (C) March 14 leaders asked that the U.S. continue to support Lebanon by urging Arab allies to be involved, clarifying authorization for UNIFIL to respond to provocation, and providing more equipment to strengthen the LAF. NGO leaders and Chattah suggested that settling the Shebaa Farms and Golan disputes would help Lebanon. MARCH 14 LEADERS ADMIT WEAK GOL PERFORMANCE -------------- ¶15. (C) NGO leaders and March 14 politicians admitted that the government has not performed adequately. Harb criticized the state as not responsive to people's needs, some ministers as unimpressive, and the government presence in the south as insufficient. Riachi and Slim cited the narrow March 14 victory in recent student elections as evidence that many feel betrayed by March 14, which did not take enough action before or after the war and is too provocative of the Shia. "It is hopeless to defend this government as it is," Slim told us, because March 14 is doing little to mobilize support, and has no agenda to rally around. The GOL needs to reduce corruption and incompetence. March 14 does not use its resources wisely. ¶16. (C) Chattah described the GOL as small and inefficient, guilty of delays, shortfalls, and weak public relations for reconstruction, but claimed the GOL is disbursing housing payments for 3-4 villages a day. Chattah cited the GOL's goal of debt reduction at Paris III to 120 percent of GDP and cooperation with the IMF at multiple levels as evidence that the GOL is planning adequately for reconstruction. Riachi, who was involved in surveying and relief in the south, noted a lack of GOL presence there; locals can choose aid from Hizballah or no aid at all, he commented. ¶17. (U) Senate Staff member Talwar has cleared this message. FELTMAN