JUMBLATT ON CURRENT SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003826

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: JUMBLATT ON CURRENT SITUATION


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Walid Jumblatt told the Ambassador on 12/12 that the
Siniora cabinet and March 14 should be credited for three
major accomplishments during the current political crisis:
1) Standing firm, remaining united and in office. 2)
Approving the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 3) Bringing
Nasrallah "down to earth." But, despite general satisfaction
with the March 14 performance, Jumblatt did not see a quick
or easy end to the current crisis, accusing Syria of
preferring chaos in Lebanon to the success of the Siniora
government. He did not offer new ideas for moving ahead but
said that he concurred with the general sense among the March
14 leaders that a March 14 concession regarding the cabinet
-- whether brokered by Amr Moussa or others -- should be
matched by an acceptable replacement for Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud. For the first time, Jumblatt spoke about
partition of Lebanon. While he touched on this subject only
momentarily, his words suggested he has given partition much
thought. On the tribunal, he balanced the pluses and minuses
of delaying parliamentary action to meet a request by Nabih
Berri but did not come to a conclusion. End summary.

RELIEF: 12/12 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
DID NOT MATERIALIZE
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2. (C) Jumblatt hosted a dinner on 12/12 for the
Ambassador, MP Faysal Sayegh (Druse, Jumblatt bloc),and
former MP (and advisor to Saad Hariri) Ghattas Khoury.
Jumblatt expressed relief and satisfaction with how events
had unfolded that day: large numbers of Sunni and Druse
supporters of March 14 had come out to join the Christian
crowds for the memorial mass for MP Gibran Tueni
(assassinated a year ago),and the LAF had provided good
security for the cabinet meeting, in which the 17 remaining
cabinet members approved the documents for the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. Jumblatt also was pleased that the
March 8 Sunni cleric Fathi Yaqin had visited Michel Aoun
earlier in the day and -- citing Sunni sensitivities --
publicly distanced himself from Aoun's suggestion of storming
the Grand Serail and yanking Fouad Siniora from office.
"Even the Sunnis with Syria are embarrassed by what is going
on," Jumblatt said. He commenting that former PM Omar Karami
had been scheduled to speak at the Sunday Hizballah-Aoun
rally but had been prevented from doing so by his horrified
family, hoping to preserve some Karami political influence in
Tripoli. Khoury agreed with Jumblatt that the
"Lebanonization" of Tripoli, once a stronghold of pro-Syrian
sentiments, is one unexpected positive outcome of the current
political crisis.

FIRST ACCOMPLISHMENT: STAYING PUT
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3. (C) Tilting at an angle back in his chair, Jumblatt told
his guests that, in general, the Siniora cabinet and March 14
leaders had performed well during the crisis that began with
the 11/11 resignation by the Shia ministers. "Look at what's
happened," Jumblatt said, ticking off attacks that included
the 11/21 murder of Minister Pierre Gemayel, demonstrations,
bellicose declarations of cabinet illegitimacy, reports of
Palestinian and al-Qaida terrorists infiltrating into
Lebanon, and so forth. But the cabinet has not crumbled.
Not even those ministers whose loyalties are sometimes
suspect -- Charles Rizk, Elias Murr, and Mohamed Safadi (who
is often thought to be conniving with Aoun to become premier
under an Aoun presidency) -- have succumbed to the pressure.
Just staying in office and projecting the image of a
legitimate, constitutional cabinet is an accomplishment,
Jumblatt said. The unity and sense of purpose also applied
to March 14 leaders and supporters more broadly, Jumblatt
said, as people stuck together rather than split apart under
the Hizballah-Aoun pressure.

SECOND ACCOMPLISHMENT:
PASSAGE OF THE TRIBUNAL
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4. (C) In what he described as a second impressive
accomplishment, Jumblatt cited the cabinet's successful
passage of the documents setting up the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. He expressed worry that Syria will answer the
cabinet's reaffirmation of its approval (which overrides the

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objections of President Lahoud) with "more killing," just as
Syria (presumably) responded to the 11/13 cabinet decision to
pass the tribunal the first time by murdering Pierre Gemayel
on 11/21. But, nevertheless, the cabinet decision
illustrated to Syria and its Lebanese allies that the
tribunal "will happen, no matter what they do." The
Ambassador commented that we are starting to pick up some
hesitations from March 14 supporters that perhaps it is time
to back off on pushing the tribunal, that the price being
paid in terms of Lebanon's stability is too high. Some
people are recommending putting the tribunal aside and
picking it later, when the political atmosphere improves.
Jumblatt disagreed, saying that March 14 leaders remain
united that the tribunal is "our best weapon against the
Syrians. We need to push it now, before we're all killed."

THIRD ACCOMPLISHMENT: CRITICIZING
NASRALLAH IS NO LONGER OFF-LIMITS
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5. (C) The third significant GOL-March 14 accomplishment
over the last month, Jumblatt said, was to "bring Hassan
Nasrallah down to earth." For too long, Jumblatt said, it
was a taboo to criticize Nasrallah. "He was a saint,
untouchable." Six months ago it would have been
inconceivable to have a point-by-point rebuttal of
Nasrallah's speech, such as Fouad Siniora delivered on
national television on Friday. While acknowledging that he
was in the vanguard of this trend, Jumblatt ticked off a list
of national figures now on record as criticizing Nasrallah
openly. His most recent example Greek Orthodox Archbishop
Elias Audi, who delivered a sermon at the Gibran Tueni
memorial sharply critical of Nasrallah's pretensions to speak
for Lebanon and the Hizballah-Aoun tactics to topple
Siniora's cabinet. While Nasrallah's followers are still
"drunk" and may be in large part unsalvageable, Jumblatt
thought that in general the rest of Lebanon now saw Nasrallah
as yet another flawed Lebanese politician. Jumblatt also
argued that Nasrallah's stature in the Arab world has sharply
eroded, given the image of a Shia movement attacking
Lebanon's Sunni PM.

TOYING WITH BERRI'S REQUEST TO DELAY
PARLIAMENTARY ACTION ON THE TRIBUNAL
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6. (C) Returning to the tribunal, the Ambassador shared
with Jumblatt a message that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
had passed via his foreign policy advisor Ali Hamdan just
prior to Jumblatt's dinner: Berri asked the Ambassador's
help in getting March 14 leaders, savoring their cabinet
victory regarding the tribunal, to now "put the agreement in
a drawer for a while" rather than attempt to force
parliamentary ratification now. Hamdan hinted that Berri
wanted to save the parliament (presumably from Shia and
Aounist mass resignations),which he would not be able to do
if March 14 pushed for parliamentary action now. Jumblatt
toyed with the idea, orally listing advantages and
disadvantages to insisting upon parliamentary action now
versus giving Berri the delay he wanted.


7. (C) Khoury played his characteristic zealot role, saying
that the 70 surviving March 14 MPs should force a showdown
with Berri to get the tribunal approved now; after all,
Khoury said, the tribunal will have the power to hand out the
sorts of indictments that will at last "scare the Syrians
into behaving." Jumblatt said that, before making up his
mind, he would at least acknowledge Berri's request by either
meeting with Berri or sending him a messenger. "I also need
to consult with Saad (Hariri) and Samir (Ja'ja'). (On 12/13,
the Ambassador met separately with Minister of Social Affairs
Nayla Mouawad and Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and raised
Berri's request. Rizk was amenable to acceding to Berri's
request: "What difference does it make if we give it to
parliament now or later? We aren't going to activate the
tribunal tomorrow anyway." Mouawad, however, took the
opposite view. She argued that laying the tribunal aside
would allow Syria and its allies to take numerous steps to
make sure that the tribunal is never activated. If
parliamentary action is to be postponed, she argued, then it
should be replaced by a Chapter VII resolution by the UNSC in
order to establish the tribunal quickly.)

SYRIA NOT CONCERNED ABOUT CHAOS, CIVIL WAR
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8. (C) The Ambassador asked Jumblatt about the next steps.

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Jumblatt said that he did not know but that he did not expect
Nasrallah and Aoun to back down. "How can they?" The
Ambassador noted that Nasrallah has a knack for convincing
his followers that a defeat is a victory (i.e., a "divine
victory" in the summer consisted of Hizballah installations
being destroyed, Shia houses and villages damaged
extensively, and Hizballah losing its freedom of action in
south Lebanon); would Nasrallah agree to less than his
demands but sell it to his followers to end the crisis?
Jumblatt said that he expected Syria would not let Nasrallah
back down, any more than Syria would permit Nabih Berri some
freedom of maneuver. Syria does not care if Lebanon erupts
into chaos or a Sunni-Shia civil war. The Ambassador asked
whether the Syrian regime wouldn't be worried that, if
Hizballah overplays its cards, there could be Sunni
unhappiness in Syria. Shrugging, Jumblatt said that, "if you
don't get rid of them (the Asads),you at least need to find
a way to pressure them before they get rid of all of us."
Jumblatt had no new ideas for moving ahead.

WORRIED THAT MOUSSA WILL
SIDE WITH MARCH 8-AOUN
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9. (C) Asked about the Amr Moussa initiative, Jumblatt said
that he remained open-minded, based on one principle: a loss
of March 14 weight in the cabinet had to be balanced by a
loss of March 8 weight in the presidency. "Trade the cabinet
expansion for the President," Jumblatt said, saying that
March 14 leaders were united on that point and looked at all
diplomatic initiatives in that context. Jumblatt worried
that Moussa would be too eager for a deal and thus would end
up pressuring the "softer," more reasonable side -- March 14
and the Siniora cabinet -- into making damaging concessions.
There is a real danger that Moussa will see that Hizballah,
Berri, and Aoun aren't going to adjust their positions,
especially since Hizballah and Berri probably have limited
flexibility from Syria. But rather than admit failure,
Moussa will then try to disguise the Hizballah-Aoun positions
in "fancy words and fancy little things that don't matter."
March 8 and Aoun forces will accept the repackaged version of
their own demands, and March 14 will look intransigent. "We
need the presidency," Jumblatt argued, also expressing worry
about how the one "neutral" minister in a 19-10-1 split
cabinet would be selected.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Jumblatt (backed up by Marwan Hamadeh) is the most
wily and experienced of the major political leaders on the
side of March 14. Saad Hariri is new to the game and often
naive; Foaud Siniora's technocratic background sometimes
(although increasingly less frequently) makes him too ready
for a deal; Ja'ja' has been too isolated first in prison and
now in the Cedars to be involved in day-to-day give-and-take.
So Jumblatt is the most likely of the March 14 crowd to spot
a trap in any initiative Amr Moussa tries to promote, and we
look forward to his reactions of Moussa's ideas. Over lunch
with the Ambassador and emboff on 12/13, UN envoy Geir
Pedersen told us that he sees no sign of Hizballah backing
down from its insistence on a blocking minority within the
cabinet as the essential first step to any comprehensive
deal. Jumblatt believes such a step, unless preceded by or
combined with a new president, would be capitulation, with
March 8-Aoun then able to control the agenda, including the
presidential electoral outcome. We agree. But in terms of
pushing for a new presidency now as compensation for whatever
cabinet deal Moussa promotes, we see no signs that any real
progress has been made.
FELTMAN