HINTS OF A DEAL IN THE AIR, BUT MARCH 14 LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003810 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: HINTS OF A DEAL IN THE AIR, BUT MARCH 14 LEADERS DOWNPLAY POSSIBILITY Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Marwan Hamadeh told us today (12/11) that the rumors circulating in Beirut about an imminent Sudan or Arab League-brokered deal between March 14 and March 8-Aoun have no basis in fact. While March 14 leaders will try to work with Amr Moussa on an initiative, they do not believe that Hizballah and Michel Aoun are serious about wanting a negotiated compromise. The March 14 strategy is to offer a 19-10-1 cabinet expansion in return for Emile Lahoud's ouster. As the National Dialogue unanimously approved the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on March 2, March 14 is not willing to offer deals to see the tribunal implemented. Hamadeh confirmed that the cabinet will meet tomorrow (12/12) to approve the tribunal documents -- exactly one year after the cabinet first asked the UN to set up a special tribunal, and the anniversary of the murder of Hamadeh's nephew Gibran Tueni. According to Hamadeh, if the cabinet approves the tribunal documents (with the only obstacle he sees being the potential assassination of cabinet ministers between now and tomorrow),then the GOL will send someone to New York immediately to sign the documents with the UN, at which point the GOL will submit them to parliament for the ratification process. End summary. CONTRASTING RUMORS: IMMINENT ESCALATION OR IMMINENT DEAL -------------- ¶2. (C) The rumors and political conspiracy theories circulating in Beirut in the aftermath of the massive 12/10 Hizballah-Aoun rally fall into two, entirely contradictory categories. One category offers speculation on what the escalation hinted at by Michel Aoun and others in the 12/10 speeches will include, when it will start, and how the Siniora cabinet will react. The second category focuses on the return of Arab League and Sudanese emissaries, with hints that there is a "deal" in the air that includes some or all of the following elements, in varying order: cabinet expansion (with various formulas),acceptance of the special tribunal for Lebanon, change in the presidency, unified Lebanese position for Paris III, new legislative election law, and early legislative elections. Some say that Salim Hoss will be again dusted off to be the compromise PM in a deal about to be struck. SUDANESE COOKING NOT WORKING -------------- ¶3. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador on December 11, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh rejected the rumors of a breakthrough, insisting instead that there is no imminent deal. Sudanese mediation, Hamadeh said, has been particularly bad: "bits from Amr Moussa, bits from Bkirke (i.e., the Patriarch's statement),bits picked up from Michel Aoun and Hizballah, all mixed up together and cooked with Sudanese spice. It's a mess. We all say, 'yes, yes, yes, umm, it's good' but we know no one can eat the stew. Not us, not them (Hizballah and Aoun)." As for Amr Moussa's return, Hamadeh said that March 14 was not expecting much, although he acknowledged that it was useful to keep hope alive regarding Moussa's initiative. "We will work with Moussa." And Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja's hyperactive shuttle diplomacy? "Crisis management," Hamadeh responded; "nothing new." MARCH 14 STRATEGY: TRADE PRESIDENCY FOR EXPANDED CABINET -------------- ¶4. (C) Both Hamadeh and MP Boutros Harb, meeting later with the Ambassador, said that March 14's strategy has crystallized in recent days: no one is willing to trade acceptance of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the blocking minority in the hands of Hizballah and Aoun. The March 14 position is that the Special Tribunal has already been accepted unanimously in the March 2, 2006 inaugural session of the National Dialogue chaired by Nabih Berri. So March 14 leaders argue that decision merely needs to be made operational and should not require a compensatory trade from March 14 to happen. ¶5. (C) March 14, however, is willing to give Hizballah-Aoun BEIRUT 00003810 002 OF 003 ten ministers in a 30-member cabinet (with 19 for March 14 and one neutral) in return for a new, credible president. The essential deal that can resolve this crisis, Hamadeh said, is a trade between a new president in March 14's favor (compared to the incumbent) and cabinet expansion in the favor of Hizballah-Aoun (compared to the present cabinet). Harb argued that the one "neutral" minister in the 19-10-1 cabinet breakdown should be picked by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir (vice Moussa's proposal that Nabih Berri selected and Fouad Siniora approve),because neither Hizballah nor Michel Aoun could easily reject the Patriarch's choice. But Hamadeh and Harb both agreed that Hizballah and Michel Aoun show no signs of wanting to enter into serious negotiations at this point. Laughing at Aoun's curious all-orange outfit for his speech the previous day, Harb said that Aoun is starting to grasp that the presidency is slipping out of his hands, "making him crazier than ever." CABINET MEETING TUESDAY TO APPROVE TRIBUNAL; -------------- ¶6. (C) Hamadeh assured us that March 14 leaders and PM Siniora are not blinking, despite the unexpectedly large attendance at the Sunday March 8-Aoun rally. As for next steps, Hamadeh said that Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman and Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister Elias Murr have both assured PM Siniora that the LAF will be able to protect the cabinet at its scheduled 4 p.m. meeting on Tuesday to approve the Special Tribunal on Lebanon. Hamadeh said that all ministers are keeping low profiles between now and Tuesday, to minimize the chances for assassination. (The cabinet will rely exclusively on the LAF for security, as the "human shield" idea was dropped when the memorial mass for Gibran Tueni was moved to a church away from the cabinet room and nearby March 8-Aoun sit-ins.) GOL WANTS TRIBUNAL SIGNED IMMEDIATELY -------------- ¶7. (C) Hamadeh said that the cabinet also has to decide who to authorize to sign the tribunal on behalf of Lebanon. If either Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq Mitri or Minister of Justice Charles Rizk goes to New York, then UNSYG Kofi Annan will sign the tribunal documents, Hamadeh said he had learned from UN envoy Geir Pedersen. But the cabinet may opt for a lower-key signing, with Judge Ralf Riachi and Ministry of Justice DG Omar Natour signing for Lebanon and Nicolas Michel signing for the UN. Whoever ends up going, Hamadeh said that they plan to rush them on a flight early Wednesday morning for a signing in New York as soon as possible. Harb agreed that, under Lebanese constitutional rules, the signing of a treaty can take place before parliamentary approval. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) We tend to believe Hamadeh's statement that, despite lots of diplomatic activity, there is no deal about to be consummated to solve Lebanon's political crisis. (But, as we readily admit, we've been wrong before in our predictions, and nothing should surprise us any longer about the Lebanese talent for muddled compromises.) The essential factor in any deal will be Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's agreement to sell it to his zealous followers. He was able to persuade them that having their houses destroyed and losing Hizballah's freedom of action in the south constituted a victory this summer, so he has the power to persuade them that a compromise less than his current demands is a victory. But he, of course, needs to be convinced first that he cannot get what he seems to want, which is control of the cabinet. ¶9. (C) On the tribunal, we note that there are now two entirely parallel realities in Lebanon. One, symbolized by the Siniora cabinet, has patiently gone through the legal and constitutional procedures to approve the tribunal documents, losing one minister to assassination in the process. On the other, Hizballah, Emile Lahoud, Michel Aoun, and Nabih Berri reject Siniora's cabinet as illegitimate and its decisions null and void. These two parallel interpretations will come into collision when the cabinet submits the signed documents to the parliament for ratification. The majority of the MPs will clamor for a parliamentary session to approve the BEIRUT 00003810 003 OF 003 tribunal, while Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri will maintain the position that no cabinet existed to approve the tribunal first. We should work with the UN, Europeans, and others to welcome the cabinet's decision to approve the tribunal and the actual signing, in order to reinforce in Lebanese public opinion the reality and legality of these steps. ¶10. (C) But we also should keep in mind that the Syrians (or at least their proxies in Lebanon tend to be sore losers: when UNSCR 1559 was passed, the Syrian answer was to blow up Marwan Hamadeh (who survived, of course) and kill Rafiq Hariri. When the Syrian troops were forced to leave Lebanon in April 2005, Samir Kassir and George Hawi were killed. When parliamentary elections resulted in an anti-Syrian majority, Elias Murr was attacked. After Siniora's government was sworn into office, then Syria imposed an economic blockade and May Chidiac was blown up. And the list continues, including the murder of Pierre Gemayel (11/21) answering the cabinet's 11/13 decision to approve the tribunal the first time. So it is unfortunately safe to assume that there will be a dangerous response to the cabinet decision to approve the tribunal tomorrow. FELTMAN