LEBANON: JA'JA' CONFIDENT THAT MARCH 14 WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003799

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JA'JA' CONFIDENT THAT MARCH 14 WILL
PREVAIL, MUSES ON AN AOUN PRESIDENCY

REF: BEIRUT 03789

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Ja'ja' expressed confidence
that a compromise is possible that would preserve the
pro-reform movement and a democratic Lebanon, but it would
require resolute handling of the serious challenge launched
by Hizballah last week. Although he discussed the Arab
League initiative, the Patriarch's Statement for Dialogue,
and a possible mediation effort by the Saudi government,
Ja'ja' said the surest way to resolve the current crisis is
to retrieve Michel Aoun from the grasp of Nasrallah, but that
may require giving him what he covets above all -- the
presidency. Ja'ja' was dispassionate about the prospect of
an Aoun presidency, blandly stating the former general would
certainly be unreliable and unpredictable, but rationalized
that it would almost assuredly break the current stalemate
and allow the country to move forward with a still viable
(albeit diluted) Siniora government. (We note, however, that
he seemed unconvinced by his own arguments and later
contradicted himself.) Concerning demonstrations, Ja'ja' was
markedly less confrontational than one of his advisors had
indicated earlier this week, and said that while the
potential remained for confrontation, particularly on
December 12 when the Siniora cabinet will meet on the
anniversary of the assassination of MP Gibran Tueni only a
block away from Hizballah's on-going demonstrations, he was
confident the LAF could and would provide the necessary level
of security. In terms of assistance, Ja'ja' asked the U.S.
to press its ally Saudi Arabia to exert pressure on Syria
and, in words almost identical to PM Siniora, to reconsider
the issue of Shebaa Farms as a means to corner and ultimately
disarm Hizballah. End summary.


2. (C) Samir Ja'ja' and one of his advisors, Elie Khoury,
met with the Ambassador and emboff at his heavily-guarded
retreat in north Lebanon on December 8. It was evident
throughout the nearly two-hour meeting that the Lebanese
Forces leader was confident about the chances for Lebanon's
pro-reform movement to dodge yet another (Syrian) bullet. At
times it seemed that the former Phalange militia leader,
long-time death row prisoner, and now (almost) rehabilitated
pro-democratic leader was using the Ambassador as a sounding
board, trying out possible solutions to the latest crisis to
confront Lebanon. He is clearly in close communication, not
only with his March 14 allies, but with some of the March 8
leadership as well. Rather than the cold-blooded militia
leader his archenemies often describe (and the killer he
undisputedly once was),Ja'ja' in his political meetings
comes across as almost philosophical in his approach to
problem solving and is not adverse to thinking outside the
box. The overriding impression from this meeting was one of
quiet confidence that Hizballah and its Syrian/Iranian
masters could be bested.

ADVICE FOR THE U.S.
--------------


3. (C) Ja'ja' listened with evident satisfaction to the
message that the findings of the recent Iraq Study Group did
not presage an approach to Syria that would jeopardize
Lebanon's sovereignty. On the contrary, it was explained to
the Lebanese Forces leader that the report recommended
definite preconditions before any U.S.-Syrian dialogue could
commence, most importantly, clear evidence that Syria has
ceased its destabilizing meddling in Lebanese affairs. More
importantly, President Bush has rejected dialogue with Syria
and will not trade away Lebanon. Ja'ja' did, however,
express concern when warned that one or more congressional
delegations may include Damascus on their schedules. Ja'ja'
stated that the insular Syrian regime routinely
misinterpreted such attention as validation of their
misguided policies, rather than hearing the intended
repudiation. He said visits by U.S. officials, combined with
the often supine behavior by European emissaries, embolden
the Syrians and usually make life much more difficult for
Lebanon.


4. (C) But the veteran politician said he understood the
realities of diplomacy. Ja'ja' did, however, urge the U.S.

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to issue a sharp, clearly worded rebuke to Syria that
continued interference in Lebanon would have considerable and
long-lasting consequences. Ja'ja' also suggested that the
good offices of the Saudis be energized in warning Syria to
cease and desist it hostile activities. More than any other
Arab country, Syria fears the economic and political power of
Saudi Arabia. A subtle, but firm warning from the rulers of
Arabia that continued Syrian destabilization would result in
painful penalties (e.g. expulsion of Syrian workers from the
kingdom, closure of the Syrian/Arabian border, forfeiture of
access to Saudi financial resources) may give the Asad regime
pause more than would similar threats from the West.


5. (C) In particular, Ja'ja' urged the U.S. to dissuade the
Saudis from listening to Nabih Berri's advice that the Saudis
should re-establish warmer relations with the Asad regime in
what would be a "misguided" attempt to moderate Syrian
behavior. Ja'ja' warned the effect would be just the
opposite with the Syrians, who in his experience are
amazingly adept at getting things backward. As for the Arab
League initiative that Amr Moussa is shopping around the
diplomatic circuit, Ja'ja' felt its emphasis on re-initiating
dialogue couldn't hurt, but that in the end the crisis in
Lebanon could only be solved by reconfiguring the political
line-up, and that meant prying Michel Aoun from the astute
manipulations of Hassan Nasrallah.

PRESIDENT AOUN -- PLUSES AND MINUSES
--------------


6. (C) In an unexpected turn, Ja'ja' rhetorically asked
what would be the disadvantages of an Aoun presidency. He
remarked that it would certainly be characterized by
unpredictability, but that Aoun would probably surprise
Nasrallah as often as he would Siniora. Ja'ja' is convinced
that Nasrallah simply doesn't trust the former general, and
far from wanting his ascent to the presidency, is actually
quite anxious about such a development. A second undesirable
trait of Aoun is his unreliability. Ja'ja' indicated it
wasn't necessary to review all the changes of heart Aoun has
had over the years, but again this unreliability would
undoubtedly cut both ways -- making the Syrians who
supposedly helped him to power ultimately unsure about
whether Aoun would dance to their tune.


7. (C) On the other side of the ledger, Ja'ja' stated that
Aoun's best selling point was that he wasn't the Syrian
puppet Lahoud. Despite his isolation in the near empty halls
of Baabda, Lahoud has effectively used the quirky Lebanese
constitution to great effect -- hamstringing Siniora at
nearly every turn to prevent badly needed economic and
political reforms. Aoun, on the other hand, has made a
cottage industry out of his criticism that the government
should be replaced because it is incompetent and has very
little to show for nearly 20 months in power. In Ja'ja's
view, Aoun would find it exceedingly difficult to be the same
obstructionist as Lahoud, without losing much of his platform
and popular support.


8. (C) When asked if Aoun could be mollified if he were
allowed to influence, perhaps even control, the selection of
Lebanon's next president, Ja'ja only smiled and repeated a
now-famous Aoun quote, "...why choose a copy, when the
original is standing before you." Ja'ja felt that only
attainment of the presidency would convince Aoun to step away
from his alliance with Hizballah, but he was certain if it
was indeed offered to the 73-year old war-horse, Aoun would
switch with amazing alacrity.


9. (C) Almost as if he were engaged in a dialogue with
himself, Ja'ja turned pensive and commented that six years of
President Aoun would be a "remarkably long time." But then
immediately followed with the conviction that the idea should
not be dismissed out of hand due to its obvious benefits. It
was clear that Ja'ja' has been mulling this possibility for
some time when he stated that not only was his protege, MP
George Adwan, in regular communication with Aoun, but that he
himself maintained "other channels" with his principal
adversary in the Christian community. But when the
Ambassador asked later in the conversation about the
presidency, Ja'ja' said that it was probably better to avoid
a compromise president immediately and wait instead for an
opportunity to elect someone of integrity like Nassib Lahoud.
(

BEIRUT 00003799 003 OF 004



THE COMING WEEK
--------------


10. (C) In marked contrast to the dire analysis offered up
by his advisor Elie Khoury on December 5 (reftel),Samir
Ja'ja' was remarkably sanguine about the outcome of two
critical days fast approaching: Sunday, December 10 - the
date on which Hassan Nasrallah has called for a "massive"
show of force by the March 8 alliance, and Tuesday, December
12 - the anniversary of the assassination of MP Gibran Tueni,
when the opposing camps will have large numbers of supporters
in extremely close quarters in downtown Beirut.


11. (C) The former militia leader plainly stated he was not
seeking confrontation with Hizballah's mob. He stated with
aplomb that both camps would demonstrate peacefully and was
confident the LAF would capably maintain public order.
Although he admitted that December 12 could be more
problematic, Ja'ja' pointed out that General Michel Sleiman's
LAF had already proved their reliability and he did not
anticipate any change in the coming days and weeks.


12. (C) In fact, Ja'ja' unexpectedly said he believed the
March 8 demonstrations were beginning to fray around the
edges and he expected that the soon-to-arrive (and, in
reality, already delayed) cold, wet weather would greatly
accelerate the melting of Hizballah's crowds in Riad Solh
square. Rather than feeling anxious over Nasrallah's ranting
televised speech of Thursday evening, Ja'ja' said he
interpreted the slashing attacks as signs that Nasrallah
himself is anxious that his campaign to topple the Siniora
government may be wavering, without any sign that Siniora has
moved an inch.


13. (C) Samir Ja'ja' even expressed nonchalance toward the
critical December 12 cabinet meeting that will presumably
approve and pass to parliament the decree authorizing the
establishment of the Special Tribunal. Although this meeting
will be held outside the relative safety of the Grand Serail
in a building only blocks from Hizballah's supporters, Ja'ja'
once again said the LAF was more than up to the task. Ja'ja'
seemed supremely confident that Hizballah would be compelled
to keep its word that their crowds would be disciplined and
non-violent.

STRATEGY FOR THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


14. (C) Ja'ja' explained his strategy for getting the
Special Tribunal through the next wickets. Rather than
trying to force a supremely reluctant and unhelpful Nabih
Berri into convening a special session of parliament, Ja'ja'
said he would advise PM Siniora to push the process as far as
it could go -- and then make a direct appeal to the Security
Council itself for the last few steps of the journey.
Specifically, PM Siniora would proceed as planned with his
December 12 cabinet meeting at which he would receive the
constitutionally-mandated simple majority approval from his
remaining ministers.


15. (C) At that point, Siniora would submit the decree to
parliament and, faced with certain inaction from the
Hizballah-controlled Speaker, make a direct appeal to the UN
Security Council. The Prime Minister's letter to the
Secretary General would state that "due to political impasse"

SIPDIS
the government of Lebanon was asking for the
previously-authorized assistance of the Council in the
establishment of the tribunal. This GOL request would
presumably meet the requirements of previously reluctant
Council members who did not want to move on the issue unless
the GOL itself had initiated a request.


16. (C) However, Ja'ja' insisted it was extremely important
that PM Siniora have assurances that his request would be
favorably received by the Council members (or at least not
vetoed) before he took the considerable risk involved. The
Ambassador stated he would consult with Washington and return
with an answer early next week.

OTHER PLANNED MOVES
--------------


17. (C) Ja'ja' stated that March 14 wasn't standing still

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while the March 8 bloc was grabbing all the headlines. The
pro-reform movement was actively wooing the 2-seat
parliamentary bloc of the Armenian-affiliated Tashnaq party.
Even though it was a small number of seats, a switch to the
March 14 bloc would be doubly effective, because up until the
present, the two deputies had been voting with the Aoun bloc.


18. (C) Ja'ja' also indicated the March 14 alliance was
assiduously working with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir to be
bolder in his pro-democratic pronouncements and efforts to
promote dialogue. But most of all, Ja'ja ' assured the U.S.
that March 14 was resolute and confident that democratic
Lebanon would survive. He closed with the surprising remark
that he didn't believe Nasrallah really had a definite plan
following his "massive" protest on December 10, stating, "he
has an objective, but he really doesn't know his next steps
after Sunday" implying the widely-feared Nasrallah may have
badly slipped up.
FELTMAN