LEBANON: BERRI FOR BOTH SINIORA AND CABINET

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 003782

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI FOR BOTH SINIORA AND CABINET
EXPANSION, SEEKS SAUDI-SYRIAN SOLUTION

REF: BEIRUT 3775

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador, a curiously jubilant
Speaker Berri laid out his positions: he is for the current
GOL, including PM Siniora, staying; opposed to any confidence
or no-confidence vote or a new Ministerial Declaration; but
in favor of the opposition obtaining a "blocking minority" in
the cabinet (one-third-plus-one),due to their representation
by 44 percent of the Parliament. Berri would offer the PM
guarantees that the opposition would not employ their
one-third-plus-one to force the resignation of the cabinet;
those guarantees might include assurances from regional
governments, and Berri talked up the need for a Saudi-Syrian
agreement. Berri would not consider using the Parliament to
change the President under current circumstances, in
opposition to March 8-Aoun. Berri categorically ruled out
calling a new Parliamentary session now -- doing so would
provoke MP resignations -- and assured us that Hizballah
would take no action against UNIFIL or to split the LAF. In
a private conversation with the Ambassador at the end, he
said that his bottom line regarding the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon never appear before the Lebanese parliament. He also
suggested Michel Aoun has a deeper relationship with Syria
that Aoun will acknowledge and pushed hard for Syrian-Saudi
reconciliation as the key to solve Lebanon's crisis. End
Summary.

LAUGHING ON THE WAY
TO THE POLITICAL GRAVEYARD
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador called on Chamber of Deputies Speaker
Nabih Berri at his Ain-al-Tina office on December 6. Berri's
advisor Ali Hamdan as well as his brother Mahmoud Berri also
attended the meeting; Polchief was notetaker. In contrast to
the generally gloomy mood in Beirut, Berri was in a visibly
ebullient mood. The Ambassador joked to Berri that, with
President ("Rais al-Jumhuria") Lahoud in diplomatic isolation
and Prime Minister ("Rais al-Wuzara") Siniora surrounded by
protesters, Berri as Speaker of the Parliament ("Rais Majlis
al-Nuab") is the only "Rais" of the three presidents
remaining with whom we could meet. Berri, who has often been
reticent to meet with USG visitors, welcomed the Ambassador
warmly and, in fact, admitted into his office an unusually
large gaggle of press photographers for a photo spray,
laughing and joking with the Ambassador as the cameras
rolled. Security at Ain-al-Tina was noticeably high.


3. (C) Berri also encouraged us to call on Siniora, saying
"it will be good for him." He brushed aside the suggestion
that a highly visible U.S. Embassy motorcade winding its way
through protesters to the Serail could undermine Siniora, as
his opponents denounce him as a U.S. puppet. (Note: We are
not visiting Siniora now at the PM's own request, who fears
that our visits would simply reinforce the image of him as a
U.S. proxy. But we are in regular communication with Siniora
by phone and via advisors. End note.)

REDUCING MEDIA INCITEMENT
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador offered condolences to Berri on the
death of an Amal supporter who was shot by a suspected Sunni
extremist the night of December 3. But these sorts of
incidents are inevitable in the tense situation that has been
created by the ongoing demonstrations. "Thank God," Berri
replied, "that if that had to happen -- if it had to happen
-- that it happened to an Amal supporter" and not to a
Hizballah or Mustaqbal (Hariri movement) member. Berri
agreed with the Ambassador that feelings are very tense in
Beirut and that any violence could quickly get out of hand.
Berri assessed that the competing television stations
Mustaqbal and Manar are both pushing extreme views and
inciting their respective March 14 and opposition supporters
to ever-higher emotions. He told us he is embarked on an
effort to persuade both stations to lower their tone.


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AL-QAEDA THREAT GROWING
--------------


5. (S) Al-Qaeda is a growing concern, the Ambassador informed
Berri, and while their operatives would gladly target the
U.S. Embassy they would, in Lebanon, also likely target a
Shia leader like Berri, especially when the Shia are now seen
as attacking Lebanon's Sunni politicians and institutions.
The Speaker replied that in the eyes of al-Qaeda, the
Christians, Jews and Sunni Muslims are "people of the Book,"
and therefore (generally) immune to killing but, he lamented,
Shia Muslims are fair game. The Ambassador underscored that
Hizballah's actions to destabilize Lebanon and threaten
Sunnis and their interests here are completely
counterproductive to Shia interests, as they can be used to
recruit and incite al-Qaeda to action. Berri agreed.

BERRI LIFTS SERAIL SIEGE
--------------


6. (C) Berri spent much of the meeting recounting for us his
efforts throughout the crisis, and throughout the duration of
the Siniora government, to mediate between the two opposing
sides and attempt to stave off a confrontation. Apparently
forgetting he had also talked with the Ambassador by phone on
the subject, he told us that on December 1, the first full
day of the opposition "sit-in" in Riad al-Solh Square, he was
awakened from a nap (either an unlikely or an irresponsible
activity by a Shia leader on that particular day) by a
frantic call from the Prime Minister: the Grand Serail was
surrounded and cut off from the rest of the city. Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) G-2 Georges Khoury and Commander Michel
Sleiman also called, with the latter telling Berri he "would
have to attack" to drive the protesters away from the
Serail's entrances. Berri told Sleiman he would have a path
to the Serail open within 30 minutes, faster than the LAF
could. He accomplished it in 35, he told us, by liaising
with March 8 leaders.
BERRI WANTS ARMY TO BE NEUTRAL,
WON'T PARTICIPATE IN SPLITTING LAF
--------------


7. (C) The Speaker reported that he had also told Sleiman
that, in the event that large-scale arrests become necessary,
he must act equitably toward all parties. If Amal supporters
create problems, they should face arrest in equal measure
with supporters of every other group. When the Ambassador
asked whether Hizballah would order Shia members of the LAF
and civil service to leave their posts, Berri said that if
that should happen he would order that they remain in their
jobs. Splitting the LAF was a red line Berri would not
permit to be crossed.

ASSIGNING BLAME FOR CURRENT MESS
TO MARCH 2005 DEMONSTRATIONS
--------------


8. (C) Berri could not resist revisiting the events of March
2005 with an air of I-told-you-so. The March 14 crowd had
"prepared the ground" for the current demonstrations then, he
averred, with their own (anti-Syrian) sit-in of Martyr's
Square, where small groups of youth camped out from March
until the departure of the Syrian troops in late April. Due
to diplomatic pressure, especially from the West, the
demonstrators were held back from turning President Lahoud
out of the Baabda Palace and the March 14 revolution was not
completed. The Ambassador reminded Berri that an attempt to
remove Lahoud by force, especially before the Syrian army
left Lebanon, could have caused a civil war and that
diplomatic representatives had, in fact, given that message
to those leading the 2005 demonstrations. "You do not fear a
civil war now?" Berri quipped, to which the Ambassador noted
that diplomatic representatives were repeating the same
warning now. Walid Jumblatt (who was in 2005 perhaps the
most zealous of those readying a march on Baabda) understood
the situation well, he added -- the Presidency is the key
that unlocks all the doors of power in Lebanon.

POSTPONEMENT OF STREET ACTION;
PROMOTING SAUDI-SYRIAN RECONCILIATION
--------------


BEIRUT 00003782 003 OF 006



9. (C) Berri shared with us more of his mediation efforts
that, in his view, had deferred street protests twice
already. He first proposed his end-of-Ramadan national
consultations on August 14, he said, as March 8 leaders were
first talking of street action to topple Siniora. His push
for dialogue and then for consultative talks delayed the
resort to the street up to the present time. Berri also
pushed for help from King Abdullah, he added, during his
early October visit to Saudi Arabia. He told Abdullah that
Bashar Asad, "is making mistakes, and you need to be a father
to him." The secret to keeping order in Lebanon, Berri
claimed, is Saudi-Syrian agreement and reconciliation, and
that lofty goal (at least as it relates to the Lebanon
question) was the purpose of his trip.

ONLY AOUN BLOC TO BE ADMITTED
INTO THE (ENLARGED) CABINET CLUB
--------------


10. (C) Berri's current position, he told us, is the same as
it was going into the failed consultation sessions of early
November. He is for the current government staying in power;
for Prime Minister Siniora staying in power; he is against
any confidence or no-confidence vote in Parliament; and
against any new Ministerial Declaration. (Note: the current
Declaration, issued at the formation of the Siniora
government in mid-2005, expresses among other things support
for Hizballah's "National Resistance" and its right to
possess heavy weapons. So keeping the existing declaration,
which Siniora and March 14 ministers would no longer support,
is hardly the concession Berri suggests. End note.) Berri
is also against bringing "anyone new" -- i.e., any new
opposition party -- into the cabinet, with the exception of
Michel Aoun. He specifically excluded Marada Party leader
and ex-Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh, and said that he
refused to talk to other regime opponents such as former PM
Omar Karami and Druze opposition leader Talal Arslan.

INSISTING ON THE PARLIAMENT
WOULD TRIGGER MP RESIGNATIONS
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the Chamber of
Deputies has met only twice in the current legislative
session, which expires December 31. The Speaker replied that
he had also repeatedly refused the demands of March 14
leaders to convene a parliament session in response to the
current political crisis. To do so, he said, would provoke
the resignation of 40-50 deputies and rob the body of its
legitimacy. Additionally, the current cabinet already has
the confidence of the Parliament, so a confidence vote is
beside the point. As for the legislative agenda, he added,
"one day, I will use the Parliament to correct everything
necessary." With President Lahoud "outside the law,"
however, attempts to legislate or to use Parliament to
resolve the political crisis would be fruitless.

INSISTENCE ON BLOCKING MINORITY
BUT OFFERING (VAGUE) GUARANTEES
--------------


12. (C) On the cabinet, Berri is convinced that the
opposition has at least the right to a one-third-plus-one
representation. Berri cited the 57 deputies, or 44 percent
of the Chamber, belonging to March 8 and argued that
one-third-plus-one of the cabinet was in fact under what the
opposition deserved. He did not respond to the Ambassador's
reference to Saad Hariri's quip that, in that case, the
majority deserved 56 percent of the presidency. In return,
Berri added, the government would have to receive guarantees
that the opposition deputies would not withdraw from the
cabinet and precipitate its fall. "What collateral or
guarantee can I offer," Berri added, other than a solemn
oath. With Lebanon's current lack of trust, regional and
international guarantees are the only option, he said. "The
real problem," he again mentioned, "lies between Saudi Arabia
and Syria."


13. (C) A new President could be among the guarantees, the
Ambassador suggested. Berri replied that the same suggestion
had been made by the French Ambassador and by March 14
leaders, but he categorically ruled out using the Parliament

BEIRUT 00003782 004 OF 006


to replace Lahoud in the current climate. He would have to
change the constitution again, he said, and to do so in the
face of Hizballah and Aounist opposition would constitute a
confrontation that would be in the interest of no one,
neither in Lebanon nor abroad.

COY ON MOUSSA PROPOSAL
--------------


14. (C) Berri mentioned Arab League Secretary-General Amr
Moussa's proposal of 19 government ministers, 10 opposition
ministers, and one additional "neutral" minister nominated by
Berri with Siniora's blessing. Staying studiously coy, Berri
refused either to commit himself or reject Moussa's proposal.
(See reftel for comments on Moussa's proposal. March 14
leaders fear Berri will manipulate the appointment of the
"neutral" minister in order to convince Hizballah and Aoun
that they have, in fact, acquired the blocking minority.)

UNIFIL AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
--------------


15. (C) At several times in the conversation, the Ambassador
reviewed with Berri just how dangerous the current atmosphere
is and how much the language of incitement used in the
demonstrations and in the media was hurting the chances of
finding a non-violent solution. While supporting the right
to demonstrate, Berri reiterated his loathing for the
confrontational language used by opposition speakers at the
sit-in, in particular those comments that appeared to be
directed against the USG. "I'm their ally, even if I don't
like to oppose your policies."


16. (C) Berri similarly condemned the rhetorical attacks on
the expanded mission of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL). Berri told opposition organizers that they
must do nothing to compromise the unity of the LAF or
threaten UNIFIL. He assured us that, as he had told UNIFIL
official Milos Strugar in a recent meeting, no relationship
could be closer than that between Amal and UNIFIL, which has
been on the ground in south Lebanon for over two decades.
Security Council Resolution 1701 is inviolable, he declared,
and nothing will happen to UNIFIL. "I would resign first."
Furthermore, "is UNIFIL more threatened by Israel or by
Hizballah?" Berri asked. "Who attacked the Germans, who made
provocative overflights and mock bombing raids, and who is
causing problems in Ghajjar?" he inquired. Berri made it
clear that attacking UNIFIL was a red line he insisted he
would not cross.

AVOIDING PARLIAMENTARY ROLE
FOR SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
--------------


17. (C) At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador asked to
see Berri alone. Presumably to avoid any listening devices,
the Speaker ushered the Ambassador to staff chairs on the
opposite side of the room. The Ambassador asked Berri for
his bottom line regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Avoid the parliament, Berri said (citing examples of
international treaties -- including the notorious 1969 Cairo
Agreement -- Lebanon has signed that never needed
parliamentary ratification). He urged that either the
Security Council create the tribunal on its own or that
Article 52 of Lebanon's constitution be carefully studied so
that no parliamentary ratification is needed. The Ambassador
asked whether Berri would support a tribunal created by
either of those methods, given that surely some Lebanese and
the Syrians would use the absence of parliamentary action to
denounce the establishment of the tribunal. Berri said that
he would not oppose the tribunal; he just could not be part
of its establishment.

HINTS OF AOUN'S COOPERATION
WITH THE SYRIANS
--------------


18. (S) The Ambassador asked whether the Speaker wasn't
worried that March 14 might make a deal with Michel Aoun,
obtaining Aoun's approval of the tribunal in exchange for an
Aoun presidency. That would leave the Shia isolated in the
presidential elections; the Speaker would be reduced to a

BEIRUT 00003782 005 OF 006


minor player in choosing the next president, in such a
scenario. Berri (whose hatred for Aoun is well known) looked
shocked and asked whether the Ambassador had discussed such a
possibility with March 14 leaders. Responding negatively,
the Ambassador noted that he was merely thinking aloud: at
least theoretically, trading Aoun's support for the tribunal
with March 14 support for an Aoun presidency seemed one
promising way to break the current impasse. Berri hissed
that Syria would never permit Aoun to make such a deal. The
Ambassador asked Berri whether, then, Aoun had deep
cooperation with the Syrians. Berri looked at the ceiling
and did not respond.

SYRIA-SAUDI RECONCILIATION
KEY TO WHAT AILS LEBANON
--------------


19. (C) As the one-on-one meeting came to a close, Berri
returned to a theme he had touched upon throughout the
meeting: the terrible state of relations between Saudi
Arabia and Syria. "If you listened to me," Berri chided, the
United States would have promoted reconciliation between the
two Arab states. Such reconciliation would have permitted a
replacement of Emile Lahoud and a solution to the current
political impasse. Syria knows how important Siniora's
government is to King Abdullah; since Saudi Arabia refuses to
deal with Bashar, Syria thus is responding by making life
difficult in Lebanon. The Ambassador feigned astonishment
that Berri was admitting the depth of Syrian interference in
Lebanon. Berri growled that he has said "repeatedly" that it
is impossible to kick Emile Lahoud out of Baabda without some
kind of signal from Damascus. "I have told you, no one wants
to get rid of Emile Lahoud more than I do. Help me -- talk
to Syria about it."

RE-EMERGENCE OF (RESIGNED)
FOREIGN MINISTER SALLOUKH
--------------


20. (C) As the Speaker and the Ambassador left the
Speaker's office, (resigned) Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh
(who had been kept cooling his heels as the Ambassador's
meeting went half hour beyond schedule) leaped out of Berri's
waiting room. Salloukh warmly greeted the Ambassador,
complete with the Lebanese triple cheek kiss. Amused by the
scene, Berri said to Salloukh, "Fawzi, I thought when you
were still in the cabinet, it wasn't the 'Feltman
government.' But when I look at you, now I think maybe it
was already!" Salloukh looked chagrined.

COMMENT
--------------


21. (C) We don't know how to interpret Berri's joyful,
teasing mood, a complete contrast to the depressed, downbeat
spirits he conveyed to the Ambassador by phone over the
weekend. Given the intensity of Berri's hatred for Hizballah
and its way of politics (so different from Berri's
traditional Lebanese patronage-spoils system),does Berri
sense that Hizballah is overplaying its hand? Or does he
feel that he has hitched himself to the winning
Hizballah-Aoun side? Was his happiness, then, good news or
bad news for our interests? We guess that part of his
soaring morale must be the realization that the parliamentary
calendar (with expiration of the regular session only three
weeks away) means that he has escaped dealing with the
tribunal question, and thus provoking the annoyance of Syria
and Iran, for now.


22. (C) Like March 14 contacts (reftel),we are skeptical
about Berri's claims that Syrian-Saudi reconciliation is the
miracle cure to Lebanon's problems or that we can promote a
decent president by engaging Damascus. Berri is probably
trying to exploit our concern about the Lebanese situation to
trick us into giving him something he can deliver to
Damascus, to prove that, despite declining influence in
Lebanon, he has continuing worth to the Syrians.


23. (C) Finally, while we teased the Speaker that he is the
last of the three "presidents" we can visit, in fact all
three of Lebanon's primary constitutional bodies are
currently dysfunctional. Berri himself has participated in

BEIRUT 00003782 006 OF 006


varying degrees of willingness to crippling them all. The
presidency is now irrelevant, given Lahoud's Syrian-directed
mandate extension (done under a Berri-led parliament) and
Berri's refusal to help remove him. The cabinet is rendered
politically suspect because Berri participated in
manufacturing the Shia resignations. And now Berri refuses
to call the parliament to session, a move that perhaps saves
the parliament (by allowing him to evade any Syrian orders to
have the Shia and Aoun MPs resign) but makes it incapable of
addressing current problems. Berri could use his
parliamentary bloc and ministers to be part of Lebanon's
political solution, starting with removing Emile Lahoud from
office (which Berri's bloc combined with March 14 deputies
could accomplish) and approving the special tribunal. Alas,
we do not see him playing that role.


24. (C) Someday, we would like to have a conversation with
Berri, where we note the irony of the Shia politicians
complaining about weak constitutional bodies, when the Shia
political forces themselves have done so much to prevent the
effectiveness of those bodies. The much-criticized weakness
of the Siniora cabinet, for example, is actually a concerted
effort by Fouad Siniora to ensure that he has obtained buy-in
from Hizballah and Amal for cabinet decisions. When all but
two of the 4,800-plus cabinet decisions passed since July
2005 were adopted by cabinet consensus, Berri's arguments
about the need for a blocking minority to prevent the
unfettered ambition of March 14 hardly sound sincere or
legitimate.
FELTMAN