MGLE01: ONE YEAR AFTER HARIRI ASSASSINATION --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000377

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: ONE YEAR AFTER HARIRI ASSASSINATION --
THE MARCH 14 COALITION IS CHALLENGED

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In the aftermath of the February 5 destruction of
the Danish consulate in Beirut and the paradigm shift of the
February 6 joint communique between Michel Aoun and
Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah, discussion in Parliament and
among Lebanon's political leadership has focused on the
direction and ramifications of Siniora's political strategy
after next week's planned commemoration of the first
anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's assassination. According to
Mahmoud Berri, advisor and brother to Speaker of Parliament
and Amal leader Nabih Berri, the March 14 Coalition is in
disarray and they only have themselves to blame. This
Amal/Hizballah minion insisted that the Siniora government
and Future Movement's parliamentary bloc has exhausted its
goodwill with the Lebanese electorate. He argued they had
their chance at leadership and failed to deliver. MP
Mohammad Hajjar, a reform-minded Sunni deputy from the Chouf
region, argued that Siniora and Hariri have to constantly
protect their flanks from Hizballah and Aounist attacks, to
say nothing of the still-lethal interference from Syria.
Hajjar insisted there was still time for genuine national
dialogue, not the puppet show that he said was on display at
the Aoun-Nasrallah press conference. A respected voice form
the Maronite community, Emir Hares Chehab, admitted the
coalition was in serious trouble, but largely due to the
Syrian-backed president, Emile Lahoud. Chehab maintained it
was imperative to move the illegitimate president out of
Baabda Palace to move forward with critically-needed
political and economic reform. End summary.

AN IMPRESSIVE OFFICE FOR SOMEONE
WITHOUT AN OFFICIAL POSITION
--------------


2. (C) Mahmoud Berri, advisor and younger brother of
Speaker Nabih Berri met with poloff in his spacious office in
the parliament building on February 8. He was accompanied by
political advisor to the Amal movement, Ali Hamdan. Although
Mahmoud, a former university economics professor from France,
holds no official title, he is viewed among parliamentarians
as the person to deal with when his powerful brother is not
available. With little hesitation, Mahmoud leapt into a
discourse of the current "political crisis," focusing largely
on last Sunday's violent Sunni demonstrations in downtown
Beirut.


3. (C) With Ali Hamdan nodding vigorously in agreement,
Mahmoud Berri argued that the Future Movement had unwisely
and unnecessarily released a Sunni fundamentalist element in
an ill-conceived attempt to score political points. Berri
maintained that the government was now trying to convince the
people of Lebanon that "Syrian agents" had provoked the most
serious incidents, including the relatively light, but
symbolically troubling, damage to nearby Christian churches.
According to Berri, the violence was simply the latest in a
series of miscues by the Future Movement and Siniora. With
evident relish, Berri then described the "significance" of
the Aoun-Nasrallah joint communique.


4. (C) Oddly echoing some of the same phrases that Aounist
advisor Gibran Bassil had used during a discussion with
poloff on February 7, Mahmoud Berri insisted the joint
statement presented a "thoughtful and comprehensive plan to
address the needs of the Lebanese nation." He then
contrasted the "clarity of the statement's ideals" with what
he described as the opaqueness of Siniora's plans for
progress. When Berri was asked if it was unfair to compare
the Aoun-Nasrallah plan, which is not encumbered by the
constraints of governance, with the difficult task Siniora
faces in trying to reach national consensus in the face of
ministerial walkouts and sharp attacks, Mahmoud Berri simply
waved his hand and stated the government "had had its
chances." When pressed to state whether there was still time
for "national dialogue," Berri indicated it was "possible,"
but it must occur in the weeks immediately following the
February 14 rememberence.

A SUNNI PERSPECTIVE
--------------


5. (C) Moderate MP Mohammad Hajjar, who represents a
populous Sunni district in the Chouf region southeast of
Beirut, discussed the fragile political situation with poloff
on February 8 in his office at Parliament. Inadvertently

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revealing the growing divide between the governing Future
Movement and the new Aoun-Hizballah "cooperative alliance,"
Hajjar interpreted each of the events described earlier by
Berri in almost an exact opposite manner. Yes, Hajjar
admitted, the Sunni community's leadership had badly
underestimated the potential that Sunday's demonstration
could get out of hand, however, he maintained that the Future
Movement was facing a determined Syrian effort to exploit
legitimate concerns, and were being aided by numerous subtle
supporters of Syrian objectives in Lebanon's body politic.
Hajjar argued that despite a concerted effort to undermine
the government's reform program, steady progress was being
made and was evident to anyone not blinded by competing
agendas.


6. (C) The member of parliament from the Chouf pointed to
the inherent difficulty of sharing the cabinet with
Hizballah/Amal ministers, who on any serious issue always
responded to Nasrallah -- who himself followed outside
dictates. Hajjar stated that Siniora was well aware
Hizballah represented the great majority of the Shia
community and therefore had to be included in the government,
but that did not make things any easier for governance.
Hajjar reiterated an argument heard frequently from Future
Movement parliamentarians -- that patience and communal
cooperation were critically needed for Lebanon's democratic
transition to succeed. Hajjar conceded that Aoun may have
temporarily seized the spotlight, but when serious questions
regarding Hizballah's ability to deliver on its new
commitments arose, Hajjar predicted the blush would fade from
the Aoun rose.

THE SYRIAN REGIME'S PLAN
--------------


7. (C) In a meeting with poloff on February 7, Mohammad
Sammak, a respected advisor to Sunni leadership, who also
enjoys close relations with Lebanon's Maronite community,
postulated that almost all the political events since the
assassination of Gebran Tueni on December 12 were part of an
orchestrated Syrian effort to destabilize Siniora's reform
government and weaken the position of Hariri's Future
Movement. Beginning with the illogical withdrawal of the
Shia ministers from Cabinet deliberations, recurrent
Hizballah activity along the Blue Line, the unnecessarily
prolonged negotiations to reunify the cabinet, secret
negotiations between Hizballah and FPM leadership,
"infiltration and agitation" of a legitimate Sunni protest,
and finally, the February 6 joint communique -- all this,
according to Sammak, was part and parcel of a deliberate and
relatively effective Syrian strategy.


8. (C) At the same meeting, Sammak's cross-confessional
colleague in Lebanon's Islamic-Christian Dialogue Committee,
Emir Hares Chehab, concurred with his friend's assessment and
continued that it was imperative for Siniora, despite the
setbacks, to continue to reach out and coordinate strategy
with his March 14 partners. Only by maintaining unity on
reform efforts could Hizballah be forced to engage in
constructive dialogue.


9. (C) In addition to this coordination, Chehab insisted
that the time had arrived to deal with President Lahoud. He
conceded it would be difficult now that Aoun had publicly
positioned himself with Nasrallah, but the former director of
the Maronite League said the task would not get any easier
with time. Chehab expressed his belief that Aoun had
over-reached his base in the Christian community with the
joint communique and would suffer at the polls because of it.
If the balance of the Christian community, particularly with
the support of Patriarch Sfeir, could compel Lahoud to
relinquish his office, the Syrians would suffer a significant
political defeat in their effort to re-establish their
influence in Lebanon. Chehab declared that Lahoud supports
Hizballah and Hizballah supports Lahoud -- if Lahoud could be
removed, the Shia organization would be forced to moderate
its behavior and finally have to deal with its Lebanese
responsibilities.
FELTMAN