LEBANON: AOUNIST ADVISOR WARNS TIME IS SHORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003772 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUNIST ADVISOR WARNS TIME IS SHORT FOR COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Close Aoun advisor MP Ibrahim Kanaan acknowledges that the standoff in Riad Solh Square has created a flammable situation. He knows that plans percolating from Samir Ja'ja's Lebanese Forces to stage counter-demonstrations could result in violence. For these reasons, Michel Aoun is allegedly ready to negotiate a pact that meets the critical needs of each faction in Lebanon. Aoun continues to believe that he can convince Hizballah to relent in its effort to topple the Siniora government, at a price that is acceptable to the March 14th coalition. But, according to Kanaan, the time remaining for such action is exceedingly short. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a December 6 meeting in Rabieh, Aounist MP Ibrahim Kanaan indicated to emboff that most of the leadership of General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM),including Aoun himself, understands that anti-government demonstrations in downtown Beirut have nearly reached the limits of their effectiveness, and that continuing the intense political argument in the street risks violent confrontation. Kanaan, who said that the FPM maintains tenuous contact with Samir Ja'ja's Lebanese Forces through MP George Adwan, acknowledged that Aoun realizes Ja'ja' will soon feel compelled to unleash counter-demonstrations. He emphasized that this would be a scenario that "no sane person" would want. Accordingly, it is high time for serious, direct, expedited talks to produce a comprehensive "grand compromise" acceptable to all parties. Kanaan commented that Aoun does not want to go down in Lebanon's history books as the man who "lost" his country's sovereignty. ¶3. (C) Kanaan is a relative moderate who has worked for the Aounist movement since 1989 and is one of the General's most trusted advisors (although not as influential as the ever-present Gibran Bassil). He described Aoun as a proud and stubborn individual who feels vilified by the Hariri camp and misunderstood by Paris and Washington. As with all Aounist true believers, Kanaan characterized the nearly year-old FPM-Hizballah alliance as the only viable way to moderate Hizballah's behavior, allay Shi'a fears of �00A;exclusion, and ultimately disarm their militia. But unlike many Aounists, Kanaan said he has also advised the General to test Hizballah's professions of Lebanese-ness and Nasrallah's implied claim of political independence from Syria. A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) This test, Kanaan stated, could be accomplished by a comprehensive deal that would require all parties to commit themselves to the preservation of a democratic Lebanon, while allowing each faction to achieve some of its political goals. Essentially, the compromise would consist of: 1) an agreement on the presidency (presumably an Aoun presidency that would protect Hizballah (but not its arms),2) a commitment to pass a new electoral law, 3) the holding of new parliamentary elections in the coming year, 4) an immediate re-allocation of ministerial seats that would give the Shia a "blocking" minority, but not the ability to dissolve the government, and finally, 5) approval of the Special Tribunal. In an interesting aside, Kanaan maintained that the much-discussed 19-9-2 cabinet formula had never "really" been rejected by Aoun. ¶5. (C) Kanaan revealed that Siniora's senior advisor, Mohammad Chattah, has been to see Michel Aoun "a number of times" in recent weeks, but complained that Chattah merely listens and never gives an indication that there may be room for political maneuver. While the tactic is understandable in difficult negotiations, Kanaan said Aoun finds it infuriating and proof that the March 14th camp is not serious in its claim of inclusiveness. ¶6. (C) In Kanaan's interpretation of events, Michel Aoun tried to convey a tone of reason and possible compromise as early as the first night of the demonstrations, by refraining from red meat rhetoric, while still laying down his marker to Siniora that either the government expand or lose its legitimacy. Kanaan conceded that this message could have been less opaque, and the FPM did not fully appreciate that BEIRUT 00003772 002 OF 002 images rather than words dominated initial news coverage of the event. BREAKING THE STALEMATE -------------- ¶7. (C) Although both the Maronite Patriarch's heavily-shopped plan to unify the Christian community (as a counter-weight to Shia and Sunni dominance) and the more recent proposal from the Arab League's Amr Moussa have advantages, Aoun reportedly distrusts both emissaries. Aoun's relations with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir have never been good, and the Free Patriotic leader apparently believes Moussa has too many agendas, especially with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to be trusted to mediate in good faith. ¶8. (C) Instead of these suspect intermediaries, Aoun would prefer to engage in direct negotiations with the Siniora government through already-existing channels, specifically Mohammad Chattah, as well as keeping other key players informed -- namely Samir Ja'ja' through MP George Adwan and Walid Jumblatt through MP Farid el Khazen. Aoun is convinced that both Ja'ja' and Jumblatt are extremely uneasy that their constituencies will be denied a fair share of Lebanon's resources under an Aoun presidency and for that reason he wants to reassure them that any grand compromise will not threaten their communities. According to Kanaan, Aoun himself will complete the loop with Hassan Nasrallah. In the Aounist view, Parliament Nabih Berri is now almost irrelevant, except that in order to prevent mischief, the "self-centered" Speaker has to be assured he will not be cut loose following any new elections. ¶9. (C) Kanaan urged the U.S. and other concerned nations to convince Hariri and Siniora to engage immediately in genuine power-sharing negotiations. Aoun (however much we doubt his ability to see the situation clearly) is apparently confident he can persuade Nasrallah to join the agreement if respective equities are protected. Kanaan said he understood U.S. skepticism over the FPM's relationship with Hizballah, but declared that Aoun is the last person in Lebanon who wants to see Hizballah's militia keep its arms. The Aoun loyalist asked us to remember where Aoun came from -- as former commander of the LAF, he more than anyone wants to see it regain its constitutional primacy as the nation's sole protector and guarantor of sovereignty. FELTMAN