MGLE01: ONE YEAR AFTER HARIRI ASSASSINATION --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000377 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016 TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: ONE YEAR AFTER HARIRI ASSASSINATION -- THE MARCH 14 COALITION IS CHALLENGED Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In the aftermath of the February 5 destruction of the Danish consulate in Beirut and the paradigm shift of the February 6 joint communique between Michel Aoun and Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah, discussion in Parliament and among Lebanon's political leadership has focused on the direction and ramifications of Siniora's political strategy after next week's planned commemoration of the first anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's assassination. According to Mahmoud Berri, advisor and brother to Speaker of Parliament and Amal leader Nabih Berri, the March 14 Coalition is in disarray and they only have themselves to blame. This Amal/Hizballah minion insisted that the Siniora government and Future Movement's parliamentary bloc has exhausted its goodwill with the Lebanese electorate. He argued they had their chance at leadership and failed to deliver. MP Mohammad Hajjar, a reform-minded Sunni deputy from the Chouf region, argued that Siniora and Hariri have to constantly protect their flanks from Hizballah and Aounist attacks, to say nothing of the still-lethal interference from Syria. Hajjar insisted there was still time for genuine national dialogue, not the puppet show that he said was on display at the Aoun-Nasrallah press conference. A respected voice form the Maronite community, Emir Hares Chehab, admitted the coalition was in serious trouble, but largely due to the Syrian-backed president, Emile Lahoud. Chehab maintained it was imperative to move the illegitimate president out of Baabda Palace to move forward with critically-needed political and economic reform. End summary. AN IMPRESSIVE OFFICE FOR SOMEONE WITHOUT AN OFFICIAL POSITION -------------- ¶2. (C) Mahmoud Berri, advisor and younger brother of Speaker Nabih Berri met with poloff in his spacious office in the parliament building on February 8. He was accompanied by political advisor to the Amal movement, Ali Hamdan. Although Mahmoud, a former university economics professor from France, holds no official title, he is viewed among parliamentarians as the person to deal with when his powerful brother is not available. With little hesitation, Mahmoud leapt into a �0A;discourse of the current "political crisis," focusing largely on last Sunday's violent Sunni demonstrations in downtown Beirut. ¶3. (C) With Ali Hamdan nodding vigorously in agreement, Mahmoud Berri argued that the Future Movement had unwisely and unnecessarily released a Sunni fundamentalist element in an ill-conceived attempt to score political points. Berri maintained that the government was now trying to convince the people of Lebanon that "Syrian agents" had provoked the most serious incidents, including the relatively light, but symbolically troubling, damage to nearby Christian churches. According to Berri, the violence was simply the latest in a series of miscues by the Future Movement and Siniora. With evident relish, Berri then described the "significance" of the Aoun-Nasrallah joint communique. ¶4. (C) Oddly echoing some of the same phrases that Aounist advisor Gibran Bassil had used during a discussion with poloff on February 7, Mahmoud Berri insisted the joint statement presented a "thoughtful and comprehensive plan to address the needs of the Lebanese nation." He then contrasted the "clarity of the statement's ideals" with what he described as the opaqueness of Siniora's plans for progress. When Berri was asked if it was unfair to compare the Aoun-Nasrallah plan, which is not encumbered by the constraints of governance, with the difficult task Siniora faces in trying to reach national consensus in the face of ministerial walkouts and sharp attacks, Mahmoud Berri simply waved his hand and stated the government "had had its chances." When pressed to state whether there was still time for "national dialogue," Berri indicated it was "possible," but it must occur in the weeks immediately following the February 14 rememberence. A SUNNI PERSPECTIVE -------------- ¶5. (C) Moderate MP Mohammad Hajjar, who represents a populous Sunni district in the Chouf region southeast of Beirut, discussed the fragile political situation with poloff on February 8 in his office at Parliament. Inadvertently BEIRUT 00000377 002 OF 002 revealing the growing divide between the governing Future Movement and the new Aoun-Hizballah "cooperative alliance," Hajjar interpreted each of the events described earlier by Berri in almost an exact opposite manner. Yes, Hajjar admitted, the Sunni community's leadership had badly underestimated the potential that Sunday's demonstration could get out of hand, however, he maintained that the Future Movement was facing a determined Syrian effort to exploit legitimate concerns, and were being aided by numerous subtle supporters of Syrian objectives in Lebanon's body politic. Hajjar argued that despite a concerted effort to undermine the government's reform program, steady progress was being made and was evident to anyone not blinded by competing agendas. ¶6. (C) The member of parliament from the Chouf pointed to the inherent difficulty of sharing the cabinet with Hizballah/Amal ministers, who on any serious issue always responded to Nasrallah -- who himself followed outside dictates. Hajjar stated that Siniora was well aware Hizballah represented the great majority of the Shia community and therefore had to be included in the government, but that did not make things any easier for governance. Hajjar reiterated an argument heard frequently from Future Movement parliamentarians -- that patience and communal cooperation were critically needed for Lebanon's democratic transition to succeed. Hajjar conceded that Aoun may have temporarily seized the spotlight, but when serious questions regarding Hizballah's ability to deliver on its new commitments arose, Hajjar predicted the blush would fade from the Aoun rose. THE SYRIAN REGIME'S PLAN -------------- ¶7. (C) In a meeting with poloff on February 7, Mohammad Sammak, a respected advisor to Sunni leadership, who also enjoys close relations with Lebanon's Maronite community, postulated that almost all the political events since the assassination of Gebran Tueni on December 12 were part of an orchestrated Syrian effort to destabilize Siniora's reform government and weaken the position of Hariri's Future Movement. Beginning with the illogical withdrawal of the Shia ministers from Cabinet deliberations, recurrent Hizballah activity along the Blue Line, the unnecessarily prolonged negotiations to reunify the cabinet, secret negotiations between Hizballah and FPM leadership, "infiltration and agitation" of a legitimate Sunni protest, and finally, the February 6 joint communique -- all this, according to Sammak, was part and parcel of a deliberate and relatively effective Syrian strategy. ¶8. (C) At the same meeting, Sammak's cross-confessional colleague in Lebanon's Islamic-Christian Dialogue Committee, Emir Hares Chehab, concurred with his friend's assessment and continued that it was imperative for Siniora, despite the setbacks, to continue to reach out and coordinate strategy with his March 14 partners. Only by maintaining unity on reform efforts could Hizballah be forced to engage in constructive dialogue. ¶9. (C) In addition to this coordination, Chehab insisted that the time had arrived to deal with President Lahoud. He conceded it would be difficult now that Aoun had publicly positioned himself with Nasrallah, but the former director of the Maronite League said the task would not get any easier with time. Chehab expressed his belief that Aoun had over-reached his base in the Christian community with the joint communique and would suffer at the polls because of it. If the balance of the Christian community, particularly with the support of Patriarch Sfeir, could compel Lahoud to relinquish his office, the Syrians would suffer a significant political defeat in their effort to re-establish their influence in Lebanon. Chehab declared that Lahoud supports Hizballah and Hizballah supports Lahoud -- if Lahoud could be removed, the Shia organization would be forced to moderate its behavior and finally have to deal with its Lebanese responsibilities. FELTMAN