DIFFICULT EXISTENTIAL BATTLE FOR LEBANON LOOMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003766 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY SUBJECT: DIFFICULT EXISTENTIAL BATTLE FOR LEBANON LOOMS Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN ON THE ASCENDENCY -------------- ¶1. (S) With Nabih Berri's Amal movement trapped as an unenthusiastic partner, Hizballah, Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, and various pro-Syrian politicians are on the ascendency. They appear prepared to use all available means to implement an agenda hostile to U.S. interests in Lebanon: destroy Fouad Siniora's cabinet (or render it impotent by controlling it); dismantle and discredit the March 14 pro-independence movement; prevent the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; roll back UNSCR 1701 implementation and restore Hizballah freedom of action along the Israeli border; pave the way to early parliamentary elections in hopes of reversing the pro-independence gains of 2005; ensure a pliable replacement for President Emile Lahoud in 2007; and -- last but not least -- deliver a blow to U.S. interests and prestige in the Middle East. The growing perception on the ground is that the March 8-Aoun alliance is winning or will win, and that time favors the pro-Syrians. MARCH 8-AOUN WILLING TO USE ALL MEANS -------------- ¶2. (S) In February and March 2005, the leaders of the pro-independence movement (which later acquired its March 14 name),recognizing that mob action against the presidential palace risked plunging Lebanon into sectarian violence, stayed within Lebanon's constitutional framework and accepted their inability to remove President Emile Lahoud by legal means. The feeling at the time -- that we shared -- was that leaving a discredited and isolated Lahoud in place was preferable to the armed confrontation that would have been necessary to oust him (and that might have failed, given the Syrian presence in Lebanon at the time and the potential for Hizballah to use its arms domestically to defend their man in Baabda). Today, the March 8-Aoun alliance, in its efforts to topple the Siniora cabinet, respects no such red lines. Lacking the legal ability to change Siniora's cabinet or to trigger early parliamentary elections, the March 8-Aoun alliance nevertheless has the advantage of flexibility. Adhering to the philosophy that the ends justify the means, March 8-Aoun will use non-constitutional ways in an attempt to force ministerial resignations and create vacuums in the constitutional system. And everyone knows that Hizballah is heavily armed. PRESSURE ON SINIORA CABINET TO RISE -------------- ¶3. (S) So far, the Siniora cabinet shows no signs of imminent collapse. Thus, all signs indicate that March 8-Aoun will respond to this unexpected perseverance by greatly escalating pressure over the coming days and weeks. Last Friday's brief siege of the Grand Serail was only a dress rehearsal. Soon, we predict, Hizballah and Amal will order Shia members of the civil service, army, and police to follow the 11/11 ministerial resignations and walk off their jobs. Few would dare defy such an order. Shia bloc and Aounist MPs will resign from parliament if March 14 MPs try to use their parliamentary majority in any kind of counteroffensive. Resiognations resulting in an absence of Shia representatives in parliament and public institutions rob them of political legitimacy and create exactly the kind of gross inequity March 8 accuses the Siniora cabinet of promoting. Michel Aoun, repeating his circa 1989 knack for irresponsible leadership, has already publicly announced that blocking roads, cutting off access to the airport, and generally shutting down Lebanon economically will be employed if needed. We find credible the "Avignon papacy" rumors that Lahoud is meeting with legal advisors to figure out how to underscore the March 8-Aoun dismissal of Siniora's cabinet as null and void by appointing a replacement prime minister. SECURITY INCIDENTS INCREASE -------------- ¶4. (S) In the meantime, security incidents -- so far mostly clashes between Sunnis and Shia -- are starting to break out wherever opposing camps meet, with increasing frequency and intensity. The March 8-Aoun camp has successfully (and unfairly) discredited the Internal Security Forces (national police),branding it a Sunni militia, making any ISF intervention by definition a provocation to the Shia and Aounists. Lebanese Armed Forces contacts offer varied BEIRUT 00003766 002 OF 003 estimates about how long the overstretched army units can function without relief, equipment, and supplies (and with the specter of schism in the ranks or of fifth-column activity sapping LAF morale). But all estimates talk of days, not weeks, before the situation exceeds the LAF's ability to maintain control. Based on current trends, Lebanon -- with state institutions weak even at the best of times -- is weeks, not months, away from becoming ungovernable. Siniora might be able to continue to receive visitors and well-wishers at his Grand Serail office indefinitely, but March 8-Aoun forces will use the street to render him practically irrelevant until such time as he is finally legally or physically eliminated. MARCH 8-AOUN FORCES UNLIKELY TO BACK DOWN -------------- ¶5. (S) While March 14 leaders hope to wait out the March 8-Aoun alliance, we do not see Hizballah and Aoun backing down. For Aoun, Hizballah, and the pro-Syrians, the stakes are too high to give up: they either prevail now, or their ability to control Lebanon diminishes sharply over the next year. For Aoun, life expectancy suggests that 2007 is his last realistic shot at the presidency -- and his last chance to destroy the Hariri power he hates as intensely as he desires Baabda Palace. Moreover, Aoun's MPs and party officials must know that their fortunes are linked completely to his success in this last gambit; his party, while seemingly well-resourced, does not appear to possess the organizational strength to survive his political retirement, after which they can be expected to disunite quickly. ¶6. (S) For Hizballah leaders, implementation of UNSCR 1701 has stripped them of freedom of action along the Israeli border and must be reversed. They are also suspicious (rightly, we believe) that the March 14 movement was losing patience with foot-dragging on serious discussion of Hizballah's weapons in the aftermath of the summer war. For the pro-Syrians including Hizballah, the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a potential blow to Syria that they seem to be under order to derail, lest they lose their Alawite allies and patrons. The 2007 presidential elections are key to the ability of pro-Syrians to restore political primacy in Lebanon. We note that, according to Lebanon's constitution, Nabih Berri faces a vote of confidence as Parliament Speaker in July 2007, too. For all these reasons, March 8-Aoun are determined to win, here and now. SINIORA'S CABINET EMBATTLED SINCE DAY ONE, IN JULY 2005 -------------- ¶7. (S) Like the March 8-Aoun alliance, March 14 leaders understand this fight for what it is, an existential battle over the kind of state Lebanon will become. But March 14 leaders are exhausted and out of innovative ideas, having been in battles ever since the Siniora government took office in late July 2005: inter alia, the cabinet faced a Syrian economic blockade, disruption of electricity supplies, a near fatal bomb attack against a prominent broadcaster (with associated smear campaign against Siniora, who asked for FBI assistance in the investigation),the murder of MP Gibran Tueni, a seven-week walk-out by Shia ministers (even before the current resignations),a Hizballah-provoked war, and so forth. All March 14 attempts at political and economic reform have been stymied by President Lahoud, exposing them to the additional March 8 charge of being an incompetent, do-nothing government. We can now see that the pattern of escalating pressure precedes the current, ferocious campaign against Siniora. WHAT THE BLOCKING MINORITY MEANS -------------- ¶8. (S) At its most basic level, the struggle is about the blocking minority in the cabinet that would enable March 8-Aoun to veto any government decision and to threaten to topple the cabinet at any time (triggered constitutionally by the resignation of one-third-plus-one of the cabinet). March 8-Aoun representatives all insist that there is no flexibility in this demand. While uniformly refusing to concede the blocking minority under threat, March 14 leaders are divided about whether they will ultimately have to give in. Some argue that, if certain principles -- primarily the Special Tribunal -- can be part of the deal, then the BEIRUT 00003766 003 OF 003 potential for cabinet vetoes is less problematic. After all, they note, the existing Siniora cabinet passed nearly 5,000 decrees since July 2005, and all but two were adopted by consensus. (Hizballah's complaints about Siniora's cabinet being weak are intentionally misleading: Siniora tried to govern by consensus in order not to offend the Shia by using the cabinet majority to overrule them.) ¶9. (S) Other March 14 leaders argue that trading establishment of the tribunal for the blocking minority gives March 14 very little beyond an immediate easing of tension. While buying time in this critical atmosphere may be the best one can hope for, the crisis is put off, not eliminated. Even with the tribunal, they note, the cabinet will have to pass additional decrees on annual financial contributions, assignment of judges, etc. The skeptics fear that March 8-Aoun will be able to use the blocking minority to cripple the tribunal even once it is established. (We would be very interested in State/L and USUN's views on what additional or recurring GOL actions will be needed if the existing tribunal documents are signed.) ¶10. (S) But the bigger fear regarding the blocking minority demand among March 14 skeptics is the ability of March 8-Aoun to trigger a constitutional cabinet collapse via resignations. Flipping madly through Lebanon's convoluted constitution, March 14 representatives build a case that, in the hands of March 8-Aoun forces, this power to topple the cabinet can be used to create quasi-legal scenarios to prevent the 2007 presidential elections (if March 8-Aoun dislikes the expected outcome) and even permit the president to dismiss parliament, to trigger early parliamentary elections expected to result in gains for March 8-Aoun. Seemingly innocuous phrases in the constitution -- such as the president's ability to dismiss parliament if parliament doesn't meet in its regular session (an outcome Nabih Berri can guarantee, if he chooses) -- become tools in the March 8-Aoun hands to strip March 14 from its ability to govern, especially if March 14 has also lost the ability to use the cabinet. UNPALATABLE OPTIONS BEFORE MARCH 14 -------------- ¶11. (S) Unless real pressure can be put on March 8-Aoun forces and their foreign backers to lower the pressure now, March 14 leaders and Siniora's cabinet will very rapidly face unpalatable choices: stand fast indefinitely and try to govern, including by reaffirming passage of the tribunal documents and nominations of new Shia ministers (actions which will provoke the March 8-Aoun crowd into further action of its own); give in to the blocking minority concept (while getting as many guarantees as possible about its use and about the tribunal); watch March 8-Aoun propel Lebanon toward civil war; try to mount counter demonstrations that could lead to clashes; propose a separate deal with either Aoun or Hizballah to break down the alliance (which in Aoun's case would surely require an Aoun presidency); or opt for a caretaker government and early parliamentary elections, which, in this tense environment, would in themselves probably lead to violence. ¶12. (S) For now, March 14 leaders are simply holding firm and trying to win some tactical advantages. But the public expressions of support to Siniora and the many visitors (foreign and Lebanese) he receives in his besieged Serail offices, however welcome, are not sufficient to get March 8-Aoun forces to back down. The current status quo strikes us as dangerous and unsustainable and not in either our or March 14's favor. Now that Hizballah and Aoun have proven their point that they, too, can turn out large numbers of people in the street, sufficient pressure can be brought to bear to force them to leave the streets in favor of a return to dialogue with the March 14 leaders. Unfortunately, we believe that the March 8-Aoun alliance aims to win this time once and for all. FELTMAN