GEMAYEL MEETS NASRALLAH, WILL TEST HIZBALLAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003757

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2026
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: GEMAYEL MEETS NASRALLAH, WILL TEST HIZBALLAH
INTENTIONS

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Amin Gemayel -- former President, grieving father,
and presidential aspirant -- met with Hizballah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah on 12/3. Briefing the Ambassador on
the meeting, Gemayel said that he was taken aback by
Nasrallah's hatred of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, MP Saad
Hariri, and Ambassador Feltman. But Gemayel also held out
hope that Nasrallah wanted a way out of the increasingly
dangerous political impasse (an impasse authored, of course,
primarily by Nasrallah himself). While Nasrallah would not
back down from his insistence on a blocking minority in the
cabinet, Gemayal picked up hints of flexibility regarding the
special tribunal. He hoped that a messenger Nasrallah
promised to send to Gemayel could work with a March 14
representative on a deal that would combine four elements to
be implemented simultaneously: acceptance of the tribunal,
national unity cabinet (with blocking minority),change of
president, and adoption of a Paris III reform plan.
Acknowledging the Ambassador's skepticism, Gemayel said that
he felt he had no choice but to try, given the precarious
situation in Lebanon. Gemayel's first test will be whether
Hizballah lowers the temperature of the ongoing downtown
demonstrations. Saad Hariri and Marwan Hamadeh told the
Ambassador that they, too, were skeptical but were willing to
give Gemayel a day or two to see if a Hizballah-Gemayel
initiative shows promise. End summary.

DEEP HATRED FOR SAAD, SINIORA
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2. (S) Squeezing the Ambassador in for a discussion on 12/4
before receiving the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Gemayel said
that his three-hour meeting in the southern suburbs with
Nasrallah the previous evening was surprising on several
levels. First, Nasrallah's hatred and bitterness about Fouad
Siniora and Saad Hariri was alarming. Dwelling on various
examples of betrayal and treasonous activity, Nasrallah said
that he has evidence that Siniora and Hariri infiltrated
spies into the southern suburbs who spent July and August
spotting for the Israeli bombers, via the U.S. Embassy, in
hopes of killing Nasrallah. Gemayel noted that he was also
surprised by the depth of hatred Nasrallah expressed for
Ambassador Feltman himself, repeating arguments that the
Ambassador had scuttled various deals between March 14 and
Hizballah and had pushed the cabinet to the fateful 11/11
tribunal decision that provoked the Shia resignations. Also
surprising was Nasrallah's "mild attitude" regarding Walid
Jumblatt, with Nasrallah insisting that he had tried as late
as June to broker a reconciliation between Bashar al-Asad and
Jumblatt. Bashar was even less interested than Walid,
Nasrallah reported.

CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN VICES
--------------


3. (S) Gemayel said that he was also surprised by
Nasrallah's comments on Syria. Searching for a word and
sounding several out, Gemayel eventually settled on
"unenthusiastic" to describe Nasrallah's attitude about the
Syrians. The Syrian secret police only want women and money;
they are without morals. Nasrallah has tried to sensitize
Bashar to the prodigal ways of his advisors, to no avail.
But, Nasrallah told Gemayel, it was in Lebanon's interest to
help preserve the Alawite regime, as the only alternative to
Bashar are "the Salafis."


4. (S) Gemayel said that he, too, had his say in the
conversation, criticizing Hizballah's arms and its decision
to take Lebanon to war in July. The language of Hizballah
speeches and al-Manar broadcasting is "criminal." Lebanese
are not traitors for opposing Hizballah's weapons and should
not be accused of being U.S.-Zionist agents. Hizballah is
driving the country to civil war in its current campaign to
topple Siniora, and Hizballah is putting at risk financial
stability and Paris III-type economic assistance. At times,
the atmosphere in the meeting was "very tough," Gemayel said.

NO COMPROMISE ON BLOCKING MINORITY
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5. (S) Getting down to business for final hour, Nasrallah
told Gemayel that there was no reason to discuss different

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cabinet formulas: Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and Amal had all
agreed that they would not back down from their demand for at
least a one-third-plus-one blocking minority in the cabinet.
"There is no compromise," Gemayel quoted Nasrallah as saying.
If March 14 wants to reduce tensions in the country and
avoid catastrophe, then March 14 leaders should accept that
formula now. Nasrallah (like Berri) offered unspecified
guarantees that they would not use the threat of resignations
to topple the government frivolously.

NASRALLAH PURPORTS FLEXIBILITY
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6. (S) Rejecting that any guarantees would be sufficiently
reassuring, Gemayel said that he focused Nasrallah on what
Gemayel described as "compensation" for a potential yield by
March 14 of the blocking minority. He said that he found
another surprising element of his Nasrallah meeting when he
raised the issue of the tribunal as one such compensation.
Nasrallah appeared "eager to find a way out" of the impasse
over the tribunal. Nasrallah also did not reject a change in
the presidency and he came across as positively inclined to
facilitate what Lebanon needs to do for Paris III.

ATTEMPT TO SEE WHETHER
FOUR-PART DEAL MIGHT WORK
--------------


7. (S) Gemayel said that he and Nasrallah agreed to see if
they could build a package that would include something on
four elements (tribunal, national unity cabinet with a
blocking minority, presidency, and Paris III). Nasrallah
promised to send a messenger to Gemayel either today or
tomorrow to say who would represent Nasrallah in any talks;
Gemayel hoped Marwan Hamadeh would represent him (a curious
choice, in our view, since Hamadeh has explicitly accused
Hizballah of planting the car bomb that nearly killed him
10/1/04). In Gemayel's concept, the two envoys would put
together the basic agreement, with Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri then renewing the national dialogue to work out the
details. The actual implementation would have to take place
more or less simultaneously, to prevent March 14 from being
tricked into giving up its two-thirds' majority with nothing
tangible in return.


8. (S) The Ambassador expressed skepticism and asked
whether Nasrallah wasn't really simply buying time, putting
the March 14 movement off balance while Hizballah and Michel
Aoun continued to ratchet up the pressure on the cabinet.
Gemayel said that he was not convinced himself of Nasrallah's
intentions, but that he felt that the dangers to Lebanon's
stability are so great that he had to try to pursue all
opportunities. Gemayel said that he would test Hizballah and
be able to tell within a day or two whether Nasrallah
seriously wants a way out. Once the messenger has made
contact, Gemayel will insist upon a reduction in the
political rhetoric and a lowering of the temperature of the
anti-government demonstrations.


9. (S) Separately, MPs Marwan Hamadeh and Saad Hariri both
expressed doubt to the Ambassador that Gemayel would get
anything from Nasrallah. But lacking any ideas for new
initiatives themselves, they approved Gemayel pursuing the
contact for now. Hamadeh predicted that Gemayel "like Saad
and Walid" would quickly learn that Nasrallah cannot be
trusted.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) We believe that Gemayel -- torn between feelings of
grief and ambition -- is engaged in wishful thinking about
being the Great Compromiser/Savior of Lebanon. Like so many
people before him, Gemayel believes that he might have the
magic formula of being able to tap into that part of
Nasrallah that he believe keeps Lebanese interests in mind.
By all other accounts, Hizballah will do all that it can to
block the establishment of the special tribunal and has
already worked out with its allies a plan to push Lebanon
more aggressively toward civil war in the coming days. In
playing with Gemayel's mind, Nasrallah probably intended to
get March 14 to adopt a wait-and-see attitude for now, giving
March 8-Aoun alliance more time to increase its offensive.
But one can hardly blame Gemayel for wanting to try to help
avert the catastrophe everyone sees coming. And if Gemayel
can pull off a change in the presidency to someone broadly

BEIRUT 00003757 003 OF 003


acceptable and get the tribunal accepted simultaneously, then
handing the March 8-Aoun alliance a blocking minority is a
price worth considering. We note that Arab League Secretary
General Amr Moussa's bridging proposal, also tabled on 12/3,
contained variations on the same four elements as Gemayel's
initiative. We suspect that both Moussa and Gemayel will
quickly see that, even if they can get agreement in
principle, there is no meeting of the minds on the details.
If Hizballah and Aoun wanted an agreement in detail, they
would not have taken the steps toward civil disobedience and
war over these past few days.
FELTMAN