LEBANON: POLITICAL ADVISOR TO SFEIR SEES LITTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003756 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: POLITICAL ADVISOR TO SFEIR SEES LITTLE HOPE TO RETRIEVE AOUN FROM HIZBALLAH Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) For the past two weeks, Emir Hares Chehab, co-chair of the Islamic/Christian Dialogue Committee and a long-time political advisor to Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, has been relaying messages from Sfeir to the leading Maronite political leaders, Michel Aoun, Samir Ja'ja' and Amin Gemayel, in an attempt to unify the fractured Christian community. Sfeir's effort has thus far been to no avail. ¶2. (C) Chehab, who when necessary also acts as intermediary between the Patriarch and representatives of Hizballah, indicated the primary challenge in any effort to create a unified Christian bloc was to somehow reconcile the excessive ambition of Michel Aoun with the distrust of Samir Ja'ja'. This past week, Sfeir has circulated a proposed agreement that contained three principal points: acceptance of the Special Tribunal, an expeditious removal of President Emile Lahoud, and a new power sharing arrangement in the Council of Ministers that would reallocate the so-called "Christian" seats in the cabinet to give Aoun a substantial and respected voice in the government. ¶3. (C) The Patriarch's advisor stated that the agreement was not as much an acknowledgment of the still-considerable power of Aoun in Lebanon's Christian community, as it was a final attempt to preserve the authority of the presidency -- the one remaining national position that "belonged" exclusively with the ever-diminishing Christian minority. If the present political crisis continues, or if Hizballah wins its current confrontation with the Siniora government, the presidency will become no more than an afterthought in the governing of Lebanon, and as a result, the Christian community, in his view, would be relegated to second-class status. TRYING TO CONVINCE AOUN -------------- ¶4. (C) Chehab stated the key argument being used with Aoun in particular was that if the Maronite leaders could agree on a unified set of principles, the Christian community would be able to function as a viable political force, independent of both Sunni and Shia control. Although there is still considerable bad blood between the Patriarch and Aoun, the Patriarch believes the only way to shake off the dominance of Saad Hariri and resist the growing power of the Shia is to pull Aoun away from his alliance with Hizballah. To the cleric's dismay, his entreaties thus far have fallen on deaf ears. ¶5. (C) According to his advisor, Patriarch Sfeir now wonders if Aoun's resistance to appeals for Christian unity are due to more than just presidential ambition. Sfeir has allegedly asked his closest advisors if they believe Aoun is receiving funds from Iran, which if true, would intensify his seemingly unbreakable bond with Hassan Nasrallah. Emir Chehab opined that if this suspicion is accurate, it would be near impossible to retrieve the former general back into the Maronite fold. LEBANON AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Chehab, the current stand-off between Hizballah/Aoun and the Siniora government will quickly come to a head, because a prolonged static position would be politically unacceptable to Hassan Nasrallah. Therefore, only a limited amount of time remains available to reach a compromise and peaceful outcome to the crisis. The key question for the Patriarch is whether Aoun is still within reach. ¶7. (C) Chehab ventured his faint hope that Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun may have misjudged the temper of the street and the willingness of the Christian community to be used as the means to bring down the Siniora government. He acknowledged the surprising fortitude of the Prime Minister and his proven ability to withstand enormous pressure, but pessimistically remarked that at any time, the Syrian regime could step in, and with another act of violence, place the government under almost impossible strain. BEIRUT 00003756 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) The influential advisor (who drafted the unification poposal for Sfeir, as well as some of the earlier satements from his office) said he has urged Sfei to make public his efforts to re-unite the Chrisian community, but thus far the Patriarch is anxous that such a move would embarrass Aoun to suc an extent that relations with the prickly generalwould be irreparable. As a final point, Chehab sked if the UN Security Council would consider esablishing the Special Tribunal under its own autority, because doing so, in his view, would consderably diminish Syrian pressure and was well woth the associated political risk. FELTMAN