RUMP CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL; HIZBALLAH PLANS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003695

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: RUMP CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL; HIZBALLAH PLANS
STREET ACTION

REF: BEIRUT Q3

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambasador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Last-ditch shuttle diplomacy between the March 14
majority and Speaker Berri on 11/24 failed to find a
political breakthrough to Lebanon's cabinet crisis.
Lebanon's rump cabinet -- missing its Shia members, one
Lahoud ally, and the murdered Pierre Gemayel -- thus
proceeded on 11/25 to approve the special tribunal documents
forwarded to the GOL by the UN. President Emile Lahoud,
Berri, Hizballah, and Michel Aoun refuse to acknowledge the
decision, insisting that the cabinet is unconstitutional and
thus not able to act. About half the remaining cabinet
ministers, worried about risks to their lives before they
again discuss the tribunal (15 days hence, to override
Lahoud's refusal to sign the decision),have bunked down in
the fortified Grand Serail seat of the prime minister. While
the pro-Syrians remain coy about the timing of their next
move, observers believe that Hizballah is intent on taking to
the streets, initially through small sit-ins (perhaps
beginning as early as Tuesday) but escalating as needed, to
overthrow Siniora's cabinet and, specifically, to get rid of
Siniora, seen as a proxy for U.S. interests in Lebanon.
Increasing numbers of March 14 leaders subscribe to Saad
Hariri's analysis that the pro-Syrians have two goals:
first, block the establishment of the special tribunal;
second, roll back UNSCR 1701 implementation. Ridding Lebanon
of Siniora's cabinet helps achieve both goals, the pursuit of
which could include additional assassinations and attacks
against UNIFIL. While being advised repeatedly that the
option is not realistic, March 14 leaders -- and Berri --
continue to plead with the U.S. and French Ambasadors and UN
envoy Pedersen to have the Security Council establish the
tribunal under Chapter VII, without reference back to
Lebanon, because of the dangers involved in further debate
here. End summary.

MARCH 14 LEADERS FIND
SPEAKER BERRI INFLEXIBLE
--------------


2. (S) Reftel covered Speaker Berri's message to the
Ambassador (which we learned subsequently was also conveyed
to the French and the UN) to encourage March 14 leaders to
delay the Saturday (11/25) cabinet meeting, with hints
floated that Berri might be flexible on other issues in
return. As a result of French-U.S.-UN prodding, MP Walid
Jumblatt, Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Minister Ghazi Aridi, and
MP Boutros Harb all met separately with Berri on Friday
night. Siniora requested an appointment as well, but Berri
-- unwilling to undermine his position that Siniora's
premiership is, subsequent to the Shia cabinet walk-out,
unconstitutional and illegitimate -- refused to take
Siniora's call or receive him. Saad Hariri, for his part,
told us that he was so angered by Berri's treatment of
Siniora that he refused various requests (including ours)
that he see the Speaker instead.


3. (S) The March 14 envoys to Berri shared three proposals
from Siniora. The PM would accede to the Speaker's request
to delay the Saturday cabinet discussion on the tribunal if
Berri would, in turn, agree to one of three offers: 1)
announce his support for the tribunal documents; that is,
shift from Berri's stated position of supporting the tribunal
"in principle" to supporting the tribunal in practice; 2)
return the Shia ministers to the cabinet, thus ending the
constitutional crisis; or 3) accept the expanded cabinet
option (with 30 ministers split 19-9-2, with the last two
being neutral) Siniora had floated earlier. Any of these
options would allow postponenment of the tribunal issue.


4. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh told the Ambassador that Berri
was inflexible and had nothing to offer except a vague
promise to try to stop street demonstrations, were Siniora to
postpone the cabinet session. It is clearer than ever,
Jumblatt said, that Berri is a "prisoner" of Syria, Iran, and
Hizballah. Sighing, Jumblatt said that Berri remarked that
he doesn't want to speak of the special tribunal at all.
Jumblatt's impresssion was that Berri doesn't personally
object to the tribunal but prefers "not to touch it himself.
He's scared he'll be killed."


BEIRUT 00003695 002 OF 004


MARCH 14 CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL;
MINISTERIAL SLEEP-OVER AT THE SERAIL
--------------


5. (S) Lacking any March 14 political breakthrough with
Berri, the Saturday evening cabinet session -- with 17
members present (as Hassan Saba' has now returned to the
Ministry of Interior) -- proceeded to take the decision
approving the statute and UN-GOL agreement on establishing
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Pierre Gemayel's seat was
covered with a large portrait of the assassinated minister,
draped in black. Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad
told the Ambassador that the meeting was "very tense," for
everyone there recognized the seriousness of their action.
Per the constitution, the decision now goes to President
Lahoud; when Lahoud refuses to sign, the cabinet must wait 15
days and then approve the decision again. At that point, the
cabinet can forward the decision directly to parliament for
the ratification process. Given the fears of further
assassinations between now and that second cabinet decision,
about half the remaining cabinet has now taken up PM
Siniora's offer for a kind of cabinet slumber party, by
moving into the heavily fortified Grand Serail headquarters
of the prime minister in order to minimize movements that
could expose them to assassination attempts.

BERRI, LAHOUD REFUSE
TO RECOGNIZE DECISION
--------------


6. (S) Predictably, Lahoud, Berri, and Hizballah officials
have all denounced the cabinet meeting as illegal and
unconstitutional, given the absence of any Shia
representation. Lahoud announced that he refuses to receive
the decision, since, in his view, the cabinet and its
decisions do not exist. This attitude will cause legal
problems later, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk warned the
Ambassador on Sunday. Rizk noted that Berri will never even
refer to parliamentary committees a decision he considers to
be illegal. While March 14 politicians worry that Berri
could easily find parliamentary procedures to delay floor
debate on the tribunal beyond December 31 (when the normal
parliamentary session closes, per the constitution),Rizk
argues that those politicians, in fact, miss the point: Berri
will not accept the decision at all, and there's nothing the
cabinet can do to force his hand. Rizk commented that the
tribunal debate has made him realize that the Taif amendments
to the constitution have resulted in the Speaker's elevation
to become the most powerful office in Lebanon. (Indeed, as
Rizk foreshadowed, Berri announced later on Sunday that he
does not recognize the cabinet or its decision at all.)

HIZBALLAH-INITIATED ACTION
EXPECTED TO BEGIN SOON
--------------


7. (S) Most observers believe that the cabinet decision
will now trigger the long-awaited street action threatened by
Hizballah and other pro-Syrians. So far, Hizballah has been
coy about the timing, sending contradictory messages keeping
everyone on edge. The earliest street action could begin is
Tuesday, it seems, when the official mourning period for
Minister Pierre Gemayel ends. Most Embassy contacts believe
that, in any case, Hizballah will still start small, with
modest sit-ins. Hizballah will also, they predict, look for
ways to paint the street action as "national" rather than
"Shia," by getting pro-Syrian Sunnis in Tripoli and
pro-Syrian Christians such as Suleiman Franjieh to start
action in other areas besides Beirut.


8. (S) While Michel Aoun, too, has rejected the cabinet
decision on the tribunal, the General's intentions regarding
street action are not clear. Aoun his MPs have given mixed
messages in the aftermath of Minister Pierre Gemayel's
murder. As for Hizballah, Geir Pedersen, after meeting with
Hizballah contacts on 11/25, told the Ambassador that "there
is no turning back" in their attitudes. Pedersen, who
usually strives to find some reason to be optimistic about
Hizballah's intentions, was extremely downbeat, saying "it
seems that they are going all the way." He found the
Hizballah hatred of Siniora and of the Ambassador "worrying."
"They really seem to believe that you control Siniora,"
Pedersen said; "it's no longer just political rhetoric."
Pedersen said that he told his Hizballah contacts that they
were living up to everyone's worst stereotypes about their
promotion of Iranian and Syrian agendas at Lebanon's expense,

BEIRUT 00003695 003 OF 004


"but they don't care."

HIZBALLAH'S GOALS: STOP TRIBUNAL,
THEN ROLL BACK UNSCR 1701
--------------


9. (S) A variety of March 14 politicians over the weekend
told the Ambassador that they now subscribe to Saad Hariri's
analysis of Hizballah's intentions. According to this
theory, Syria is shocked by how decisively and quickly the UN
and GOL are moving toward establishment of the special
tribunal, and Iran and Hizballah are shocked at how
constrained Hizballah now is in south Lebanon, given the
deployment of the LAF and UNIFIL. Moreover, all three
parties see Siniora's cabinet as a proxy for the U.S. These
concerns thus lead Syria, Iran, and Hizballah to focus on two
goals: first, blocking the special tribunal, something to be
done immediately; second, rolling back UNSCR 1701
implementation, which can take a bit more time. To achieve
those goals, Hizballah and its allies will use any means,
including violence, to topple Siniora's cabinet.


10. (S) Faced with Hariri's argument that
Hizballah-inspired attacks (disguised as al-Qaida) against
UNIFIL are probable, Pedersen does not discount the
possibility, agreeing that Hizballah wants to find means to
drive out European components and gut the force. French
Ambassador Bernard Emie found "quite worrisome" a comment
Berri made to French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy, in town
for Pierre Gemayel's funeral: Berri said that UNIFIL was
performing acceptably "so far." Hariri, as he has before,
sent us messages over the weekend urging that the U.S. and
its allies come up with contingency plans that will emphasize
to Syria the consequences of any destabilizing action.
"What's your Plan B?" Ghattas Khoury, quoting Saad, asked the
Ambassador. The United States, Khoury argued (for Saad),is
about to face a strategic defeat in Lebanon, and "all you
have are statements and visitors, which are nice but not
enough. Threaten Syria!"

SINIORA, BERRI, MARCH 14 LEADERS
ALL WANT UN TO ESTABLISH TRIBUNAL
--------------


11. (S) Despite the lack of any breakthrough between Berri
and March 14, there is one issue on which they remain united:
As we noted in reftel, Berri shares the March 14 hope that
the international community can somehow impose the special
tribunal upon Lebanon, without the need for further action by
the Lebanese. Siniora, speaking by phone to the Ambassador
on Saturday, pleaded especially hard for the Security Council
to assume the responsibility for the tribunal's
establishment. Such UNSC "will protect us," Siniora said.
Emie and Pedersen received similar messages over the weekend.
All of us have patiently explained to the Lebanese,
including Siniora, that what they are asking is difficult if
not impossible to accomplish. Siniora responded that he and
his ministers are also in an "impossible situation."

COMMENT
--------------


12. (S) Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah first
started hinting at street action to topple the "American"
government of Siniora on September 22, during his "divine
victory" speech. Hizballah leaders and Michel Aoun then
talked openly about a post-Ramadan street offensive that has
so far not materialized. Aoun, in the aftermath of Christian
venom against him after the Gemayel murder, must be thinking
twice about using the street (particularly given Pariarch
Sfeir's increasingly vocal opposition to such action),and
Hizballah will hope to avoid being seen as unilaterally
propelling Lebanon toward civil war. So we hesitate to play
the role of the boy who called wolf: while Lebanon seems
closer today to the abyss than it did a week ago, street
demonstrations, while likely, remain just short of being
inevitable. And even if street demonstrations begin and turn
violent, sustained sectarian violence and outright civil war
still remain more of a hypothetical than real threat, with
civil war fear-mongering one of the pro-Syrian tools to
demoralize March 14 forces.


13. (S) Indeed, the Monday newspapers are full of reports
about possible compromises. The idea of a grand trade by
which Lahoud and Siniora are both ousted, giving something to
each side, is openly debated. (Former President Amin

BEIRUT 00003695 004 OF 004


Gemayel, seen as having performed with grace and
statesmanship during a period of intense personal grief, is a
new front-runner for the presidency. Gemayel won his first
term in office by the murder of his brother Bashir. Yet,
despite whatever sympathy he now receives over the murder of
his son, Gemayel is too closely associated with March 14 to
be realistic as a "bridging" candidate.) Thus, a
characteristically muddled Lebanese solution may yet be
within grasp,


14. (S) But, unfortunately, while a last-minute compromise
could still prevent street violence, such a compromise (even
if it comes after street action starts) would no doubt lead
to erosion of power and authority for the March 14
pro-independence forces. The question is not whether, but
how much, erosion. Even if Siniora is replaced by a
moderate, pro-independence Sunni (say, someone along the
lines of MP and Minister Mohamed Safadi),his departure will
be portrayed by Hizballah as a defeat for the U.S. and our
Lebanese "agents," the March 14 leaders. We've seen from the
"divine victory" rhetoric how well Hizballah can make fiction
appear to be fact to many Lebanese.


15. (S) And, whatever the muddle the Lebanese may still
work out, it is not at all clear how March 14 leaders will
persuade Nabih Berri, whose fear for his life is apparently
genuine, to associate himself with a parliamentary process
approving the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Assuming no
meaningful, visible, and new international pressure on Syria
and Iran, March 14 leaders will have to offer up a lot of
concessions to the pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon in order to
win Berri's support for the tribunal. Ironically, then, the
price to be paid for Berri's approval of the tribunal -- if
his approval is possible at all -- could severely damage the
pro-independence movement the tribunal's establishment would
otherwise strengthen. This reality, along with fear of being
murdered one-by-one until the pro-Syrians prevail, is what
makes the March 14 leaders so insistent that the
international community find a way to impose the tribunal on
Lebanon without further need for Lebanese official action.


16. (S) The debate in the U.S. media about possible
re-engagement with Syria, provoked by widespread cover of the
Iraq Study Group, could not be coming at a worse time for
Lebanon's beleagured March 14 leaders. The Lebanese public
is being force-fed by the pro-Syrian press a constant message
that the United States is about to "sell Lebanon out to Syria
again." Like so many annoying Lebanese myths that sustain
the paranoid and conspiracy-prone, the one that the U.S. has
repeatedly handed Lebanon over to Syria in the past, and will
do so again in the future, has no basis in fact but is
nevertheless widely believed. We hope that, with the attempt
by Syria's allies in Lebanon to delegitimize and destabilize
Lebanon's government now so obvious to all, it will be easier
for the United States and France to enlist other European and
regional countries to warn those who would propel Lebanon
over the abyss that there will be severe consequences.
FELTMAN