RUMP CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL; HIZBALLAH PLANS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003695 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM LE SY SUBJECT: RUMP CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL; HIZBALLAH PLANS STREET ACTION REF: BEIRUT Q3 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambasador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Last-ditch shuttle diplomacy between the March 14 majority and Speaker Berri on 11/24 failed to find a political breakthrough to Lebanon's cabinet crisis. Lebanon's rump cabinet -- missing its Shia members, one Lahoud ally, and the murdered Pierre Gemayel -- thus proceeded on 11/25 to approve the special tribunal documents forwarded to the GOL by the UN. President Emile Lahoud, Berri, Hizballah, and Michel Aoun refuse to acknowledge the decision, insisting that the cabinet is unconstitutional and thus not able to act. About half the remaining cabinet ministers, worried about risks to their lives before they again discuss the tribunal (15 days hence, to override Lahoud's refusal to sign the decision),have bunked down in the fortified Grand Serail seat of the prime minister. While the pro-Syrians remain coy about the timing of their next move, observers believe that Hizballah is intent on taking to the streets, initially through small sit-ins (perhaps beginning as early as Tuesday) but escalating as needed, to overthrow Siniora's cabinet and, specifically, to get rid of Siniora, seen as a proxy for U.S. interests in Lebanon. Increasing numbers of March 14 leaders subscribe to Saad Hariri's analysis that the pro-Syrians have two goals: first, block the establishment of the special tribunal; second, roll back UNSCR 1701 implementation. Ridding Lebanon of Siniora's cabinet helps achieve both goals, the pursuit of which could include additional assassinations and attacks against UNIFIL. While being advised repeatedly that the option is not realistic, March 14 leaders -- and Berri -- continue to plead with the U.S. and French Ambasadors and UN envoy Pedersen to have the Security Council establish the tribunal under Chapter VII, without reference back to Lebanon, because of the dangers involved in further debate here. End summary. MARCH 14 LEADERS FIND SPEAKER BERRI INFLEXIBLE -------------- ¶2. (S) Reftel covered Speaker Berri's message to the Ambassador (which we learned subsequently was also conveyed to the French and the UN) to encourage March 14 leaders to delay the Saturday (11/25) cabinet meeting, with hints 
floated that Berri might be flexible on other issues in return. As a result of French-U.S.-UN prodding, MP Walid Jumblatt, Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Minister Ghazi Aridi, and MP Boutros Harb all met separately with Berri on Friday night. Siniora requested an appointment as well, but Berri -- unwilling to undermine his position that Siniora's premiership is, subsequent to the Shia cabinet walk-out, unconstitutional and illegitimate -- refused to take Siniora's call or receive him. Saad Hariri, for his part, told us that he was so angered by Berri's treatment of Siniora that he refused various requests (including ours) that he see the Speaker instead. ¶3. (S) The March 14 envoys to Berri shared three proposals from Siniora. The PM would accede to the Speaker's request to delay the Saturday cabinet discussion on the tribunal if Berri would, in turn, agree to one of three offers: 1) announce his support for the tribunal documents; that is, shift from Berri's stated position of supporting the tribunal "in principle" to supporting the tribunal in practice; 2) return the Shia ministers to the cabinet, thus ending the constitutional crisis; or 3) accept the expanded cabinet option (with 30 ministers split 19-9-2, with the last two being neutral) Siniora had floated earlier. Any of these options would allow postponenment of the tribunal issue. ¶4. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh told the Ambassador that Berri was inflexible and had nothing to offer except a vague promise to try to stop street demonstrations, were Siniora to postpone the cabinet session. It is clearer than ever, Jumblatt said, that Berri is a "prisoner" of Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. Sighing, Jumblatt said that Berri remarked that he doesn't want to speak of the special tribunal at all. Jumblatt's impresssion was that Berri doesn't personally object to the tribunal but prefers "not to touch it himself. He's scared he'll be killed." BEIRUT 00003695 002 OF 004 MARCH 14 CABINET PASSES TRIBUNAL; MINISTERIAL SLEEP-OVER AT THE SERAIL -------------- ¶5. (S) Lacking any March 14 political breakthrough with Berri, the Saturday evening cabinet session -- with 17 members present (as Hassan Saba' has now returned to the Ministry of Interior) -- proceeded to take the decision approving the statute and UN-GOL agreement on establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Pierre Gemayel's seat was covered with a large portrait of the assassinated minister, draped in black. Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad told the Ambassador that the meeting was "very tense," for everyone there recognized the seriousness of their action. Per the constitution, the decision now goes to President Lahoud; when Lahoud refuses to sign, the cabinet must wait 15 days and then approve the decision again. At that point, the cabinet can forward the decision directly to parliament for the ratification process. Given the fears of further assassinations between now and that second cabinet decision, about half the remaining cabinet has now taken up PM Siniora's offer for a kind of cabinet slumber party, by moving into the heavily fortified Grand Serail headquarters of the prime minister in order to minimize movements that could expose them to assassination attempts. BERRI, LAHOUD REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE DECISION -------------- ¶6. (S) Predictably, Lahoud, Berri, and Hizballah officials have all denounced the cabinet meeting as illegal and unconstitutional, given the absence of any Shia representation. Lahoud announced that he refuses to receive the decision, since, in his view, the cabinet and its decisions do not exist. This attitude will cause legal problems later, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk warned the Ambassador on Sunday. Rizk noted that Berri will never even refer to parliamentary committees a decision he considers to be illegal. While March 14 politicians worry that Berri could easily find parliamentary procedures to delay floor debate on the tribunal beyond December 31 (when the normal parliamentary session closes, per the constitution),Rizk argues that those politicians, in fact, miss the point: Berri will not accept the decision at all, and there's nothing the cabinet can do to force his hand. Rizk commented that the tribunal debate has made him realize that the Taif amendments to the constitution have resulted in the Speaker's elevation to become the most powerful office in Lebanon. (Indeed, as Rizk foreshadowed, Berri announced later on Sunday that he does not recognize the cabinet or its decision at all.) HIZBALLAH-INITIATED ACTION EXPECTED TO BEGIN SOON -------------- ¶7. (S) Most observers believe that the cabinet decision will now trigger the long-awaited street action threatened by Hizballah and other pro-Syrians. So far, Hizballah has been coy about the timing, sending contradictory messages keeping everyone on edge. The earliest street action could begin is Tuesday, it seems, when the official mourning period for Minister Pierre Gemayel ends. Most Embassy contacts believe that, in any case, Hizballah will still start small, with modest sit-ins. Hizballah will also, they predict, look for ways to paint the street action as "national" rather than "Shia," by getting pro-Syrian Sunnis in Tripoli and pro-Syrian Christians such as Suleiman Franjieh to start action in other areas besides Beirut. ¶8. (S) While Michel Aoun, too, has rejected the cabinet decision on the tribunal, the General's intentions regarding street action are not clear. Aoun his MPs have given mixed messages in the aftermath of Minister Pierre Gemayel's murder. As for Hizballah, Geir Pedersen, after meeting with Hizballah contacts on 11/25, told the Ambassador that "there is no turning back" in their attitudes. Pedersen, who usually strives to find some reason to be optimistic about Hizballah's intentions, was extremely downbeat, saying "it seems that they are going all the way." He found the Hizballah hatred of Siniora and of the Ambassador "worrying." "They really seem to believe that you control Siniora," Pedersen said; "it's no longer just political rhetoric." Pedersen said that he told his Hizballah contacts that they were living up to everyone's worst stereotypes about their promotion of Iranian and Syrian agendas at Lebanon's expense, BEIRUT 00003695 003 OF 004 "but they don't care." HIZBALLAH'S GOALS: STOP TRIBUNAL, THEN ROLL BACK UNSCR 1701 -------------- ¶9. (S) A variety of March 14 politicians over the weekend told the Ambassador that they now subscribe to Saad Hariri's analysis of Hizballah's intentions. According to this theory, Syria is shocked by how decisively and quickly the UN and GOL are moving toward establishment of the special tribunal, and Iran and Hizballah are shocked at how constrained Hizballah now is in south Lebanon, given the deployment of the LAF and UNIFIL. Moreover, all three parties see Siniora's cabinet as a proxy for the U.S. These concerns thus lead Syria, Iran, and Hizballah to focus on two goals: first, blocking the special tribunal, something to be done immediately; second, rolling back UNSCR 1701 implementation, which can take a bit more time. To achieve those goals, Hizballah and its allies will use any means, including violence, to topple Siniora's cabinet. ¶10. (S) Faced with Hariri's argument that Hizballah-inspired attacks (disguised as al-Qaida) against UNIFIL are probable, Pedersen does not discount the possibility, agreeing that Hizballah wants to find means to drive out European components and gut the force. French Ambassador Bernard Emie found "quite worrisome" a comment Berri made to French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy, in town for Pierre Gemayel's funeral: Berri said that UNIFIL was performing acceptably "so far." Hariri, as he has before, sent us messages over the weekend urging that the U.S. and its allies come up with contingency plans that will emphasize to Syria the consequences of any destabilizing action. "What's your Plan B?" Ghattas Khoury, quoting Saad, asked the Ambassador. The United States, Khoury argued (for Saad),is about to face a strategic defeat in Lebanon, and "all you have are statements and visitors, which are nice but not enough. Threaten Syria!" SINIORA, BERRI, MARCH 14 LEADERS ALL WANT UN TO ESTABLISH TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶11. (S) Despite the lack of any breakthrough between Berri and March 14, there is one issue on which they remain united: As we noted in reftel, Berri shares the March 14 hope that the international community can somehow impose the special tribunal upon Lebanon, without the need for further action by the Lebanese. Siniora, speaking by phone to the Ambassador on Saturday, pleaded especially hard for the Security Council to assume the responsibility for the tribunal's establishment. Such UNSC "will protect us," Siniora said. Emie and Pedersen received similar messages over the weekend. All of us have patiently explained to the Lebanese, including Siniora, that what they are asking is difficult if not impossible to accomplish. Siniora responded that he and his ministers are also in an "impossible situation." COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (S) Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah first started hinting at street action to topple the "American" government of Siniora on September 22, during his "divine victory" speech. Hizballah leaders and Michel Aoun then talked openly about a post-Ramadan street offensive that has so far not materialized. Aoun, in the aftermath of Christian venom against him after the Gemayel murder, must be thinking twice about using the street (particularly given Pariarch Sfeir's increasingly vocal opposition to such action),and Hizballah will hope to avoid being seen as unilaterally propelling Lebanon toward civil war. So we hesitate to play the role of the boy who called wolf: while Lebanon seems closer today to the abyss than it did a week ago, street demonstrations, while likely, remain just short of being inevitable. And even if street demonstrations begin and turn violent, sustained sectarian violence and outright civil war still remain more of a hypothetical than real threat, with civil war fear-mongering one of the pro-Syrian tools to demoralize March 14 forces. ¶13. (S) Indeed, the Monday newspapers are full of reports about possible compromises. The idea of a grand trade by which Lahoud and Siniora are both ousted, giving something to each side, is openly debated. (Former President Amin BEIRUT 00003695 004 OF 004 Gemayel, seen as having performed with grace and statesmanship during a period of intense personal grief, is a new front-runner for the presidency. Gemayel won his first term in office by the murder of his brother Bashir. Yet, despite whatever sympathy he now receives over the murder of his son, Gemayel is too closely associated with March 14 to be realistic as a "bridging" candidate.) Thus, a characteristically muddled Lebanese solution may yet be within grasp, ¶14. (S) But, unfortunately, while a last-minute compromise could still prevent street violence, such a compromise (even if it comes after street action starts) would no doubt lead to erosion of power and authority for the March 14 pro-independence forces. The question is not whether, but how much, erosion. Even if Siniora is replaced by a moderate, pro-independence Sunni (say, someone along the lines of MP and Minister Mohamed Safadi),his departure will be portrayed by Hizballah as a defeat for the U.S. and our Lebanese "agents," the March 14 leaders. We've seen from the "divine victory" rhetoric how well Hizballah can make fiction appear to be fact to many Lebanese. ¶15. (S) And, whatever the muddle the Lebanese may still work out, it is not at all clear how March 14 leaders will persuade Nabih Berri, whose fear for his life is apparently genuine, to associate himself with a parliamentary process approving the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Assuming no meaningful, visible, and new international pressure on Syria and Iran, March 14 leaders will have to offer up a lot of concessions to the pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon in order to win Berri's support for the tribunal. Ironically, then, the price to be paid for Berri's approval of the tribunal -- if his approval is possible at all -- could severely damage the pro-independence movement the tribunal's establishment would otherwise strengthen. This reality, along with fear of being murdered one-by-one until the pro-Syrians prevail, is what makes the March 14 leaders so insistent that the international community find a way to impose the tribunal on Lebanon without further need for Lebanese official action. ¶16. (S) The debate in the U.S. media about possible re-engagement with Syria, provoked by widespread cover of the Iraq Study Group, could not be coming at a worse time for Lebanon's beleagured March 14 leaders. The Lebanese public is being force-fed by the pro-Syrian press a constant message that the United States is about to "sell Lebanon out to Syria again." Like so many annoying Lebanese myths that sustain the paranoid and conspiracy-prone, the one that the U.S. has repeatedly handed Lebanon over to Syria in the past, and will do so again in the future, has no basis in fact but is nevertheless widely believed. We hope that, with the attempt by Syria's allies in Lebanon to delegitimize and destabilize Lebanon's government now so obvious to all, it will be easier for the United States and France to enlist other European and regional countries to warn those who would propel Lebanon over the abyss that there will be severe consequences. FELTMAN