Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3693
2006-11-24 16:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:
BERRI ASKS USG INTERVENTION FOR CABINET DISCUSSION
how-toVZCZCXRO7998 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #3693 3281653 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 241653Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6627 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0557
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 003693
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: BERRI ASKS USG INTERVENTION FOR CABINET DISCUSSION
DELAY
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
1, (C) Explaining that he had an urgent message from
Speaker Berri, Amal foreign policy advisor Ali Hamdan, in a
11/24 meeting, pleaded with the Ambassador to use USG
influence with March 14 leaders to delay the scheduled 11/25
cabinet discussion of the special tribunal documents. Berri,
Hamdan said, is trying hard to prevent Hizballah from
mounting street demonstrations protesting against the
"unconstitutionality" of the Shia-less cabinet. March 14
leaders could assist Berri in his quest by agreeing to
postpone the discussion of the tribunal for now. "They
(March 14 leaders) lose nothing by waiting a few days,"
Hamdan said (to which the Ambassador replied, "nothing except
maybe their lives"). Hamdan said that Berri complained that
Siniora "always" makes the same mistake, tabling something
too early when a delay of a few days would allow the Speaker
time to cool tempers. Asked by the Ambassador, Hamdan
confirmed that Berri and Siniora had spoken by phone about
the Speaker's hope for a delay, but Siniora had been
noncommittal.
2. (C) Hamdan, quoting Berri, also urged that Lebanon not
be asked to bear the burden of the tribunal. Berri hopes
that the international community through the Security Council
can create the tribunal on its own. "Take this off our
shoulders," Hamdan urged. The Speaker wants the tribunal but
doesn't want to be part of its creation. The Ambassador
questioned whether the tribunal would really have the
credibility inside Lebanon it needs if it is imposed upon
Lebanon. Hamdan insisted that would be a better option than
the current plan of trying to secure, at great danger to
Lebanese political figures, GOL and parliamentary
concurrence. Hamdan said that, if Siniora would delay the
cabinet debate as Berri hopes, then the international
community would have the time to work the issue in New York
while Berri worked with Hizballah to cancel planned street
demonstrations.
3. (C) The Ambassador noted that there is considerable risk
to the March 14 forces to delay the cabinet debate, as that
gives murderers more time to eliminate cabinet members and
ministers. Doesn't the Speaker have something positive to
offer in return for a delay? Hamdan speculated that Berri,
besides trying to stop demonstrations, may also be able to
offer something regarding the cabinet composition or the
presidency. Berri was convinced that now was the time to
drop Lahoud, but he needed March 14 assistance to get
Hizballah and Syria on board. Going for the tribunal now
will make it more difficult to oust Lahoud. In addition,
maybe cabinet harmony could be restored by an agreement (a)
to approve the tribunal and (b) operate on all other issues
by consensus only. But this, too, would require delaying the
cabinet debate for now. The Ambassador suggested that
perhaps Berri could overcome March 14's justifiable fear of a
few days' delay if he would return the favor by having Shia
ministers, or at least the three Berri-allied ministers,
return to the cabinet, thus ending the constitutional issue.
Hamdan looked unconvinced.
4. (C) Later on 11/24, the Ambassador passed on Hamdan's
plea to Mohamed Chatah (Senior Advisor to Prime Minister
Siniora),Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh (allied
with Jumblatt),and Ghattas Khoury (advisor to Saad Hariri).
While acknowledging that Berri is most likely is stalling for
time, the Ambassador suggested that March 14 at a minimum
send a messenger to Berri tonight (11/24) to see whether
Berri might move now on removing Lahoud. After all, a March
14-Berri exchange tonight does not preclude a cabinet meeting
tomorrow, and March 14 would be seen as making a last-minute,
positive gesture toward the other side by seeing Berri.
Chatah, Hamadeh, and Khoury all expressed skepticism that
Berri would have anything new to offer, and they expected
that the 11/25 cabinet session would approve the tribunal
documents as scheduled. Nevertheless, given their conviction
that Hizballah would soon launch street demonstrations, they
agreed that March 14 should test Berri by reaching out to him
tonight.
FELTMAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: BERRI ASKS USG INTERVENTION FOR CABINET DISCUSSION
DELAY
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
1, (C) Explaining that he had an urgent message from
Speaker Berri, Amal foreign policy advisor Ali Hamdan, in a
11/24 meeting, pleaded with the Ambassador to use USG
influence with March 14 leaders to delay the scheduled 11/25
cabinet discussion of the special tribunal documents. Berri,
Hamdan said, is trying hard to prevent Hizballah from
mounting street demonstrations protesting against the
"unconstitutionality" of the Shia-less cabinet. March 14
leaders could assist Berri in his quest by agreeing to
postpone the discussion of the tribunal for now. "They
(March 14 leaders) lose nothing by waiting a few days,"
Hamdan said (to which the Ambassador replied, "nothing except
maybe their lives"). Hamdan said that Berri complained that
Siniora "always" makes the same mistake, tabling something
too early when a delay of a few days would allow the Speaker
time to cool tempers. Asked by the Ambassador, Hamdan
confirmed that Berri and Siniora had spoken by phone about
the Speaker's hope for a delay, but Siniora had been
noncommittal.
2. (C) Hamdan, quoting Berri, also urged that Lebanon not
be asked to bear the burden of the tribunal. Berri hopes
that the international community through the Security Council
can create the tribunal on its own. "Take this off our
shoulders," Hamdan urged. The Speaker wants the tribunal but
doesn't want to be part of its creation. The Ambassador
questioned whether the tribunal would really have the
credibility inside Lebanon it needs if it is imposed upon
Lebanon. Hamdan insisted that would be a better option than
the current plan of trying to secure, at great danger to
Lebanese political figures, GOL and parliamentary
concurrence. Hamdan said that, if Siniora would delay the
cabinet debate as Berri hopes, then the international
community would have the time to work the issue in New York
while Berri worked with Hizballah to cancel planned street
demonstrations.
3. (C) The Ambassador noted that there is considerable risk
to the March 14 forces to delay the cabinet debate, as that
gives murderers more time to eliminate cabinet members and
ministers. Doesn't the Speaker have something positive to
offer in return for a delay? Hamdan speculated that Berri,
besides trying to stop demonstrations, may also be able to
offer something regarding the cabinet composition or the
presidency. Berri was convinced that now was the time to
drop Lahoud, but he needed March 14 assistance to get
Hizballah and Syria on board. Going for the tribunal now
will make it more difficult to oust Lahoud. In addition,
maybe cabinet harmony could be restored by an agreement (a)
to approve the tribunal and (b) operate on all other issues
by consensus only. But this, too, would require delaying the
cabinet debate for now. The Ambassador suggested that
perhaps Berri could overcome March 14's justifiable fear of a
few days' delay if he would return the favor by having Shia
ministers, or at least the three Berri-allied ministers,
return to the cabinet, thus ending the constitutional issue.
Hamdan looked unconvinced.
4. (C) Later on 11/24, the Ambassador passed on Hamdan's
plea to Mohamed Chatah (Senior Advisor to Prime Minister
Siniora),Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh (allied
with Jumblatt),and Ghattas Khoury (advisor to Saad Hariri).
While acknowledging that Berri is most likely is stalling for
time, the Ambassador suggested that March 14 at a minimum
send a messenger to Berri tonight (11/24) to see whether
Berri might move now on removing Lahoud. After all, a March
14-Berri exchange tonight does not preclude a cabinet meeting
tomorrow, and March 14 would be seen as making a last-minute,
positive gesture toward the other side by seeing Berri.
Chatah, Hamadeh, and Khoury all expressed skepticism that
Berri would have anything new to offer, and they expected
that the 11/25 cabinet session would approve the tribunal
documents as scheduled. Nevertheless, given their conviction
that Hizballah would soon launch street demonstrations, they
agreed that March 14 should test Berri by reaching out to him
tonight.
FELTMAN