LEBANON: DOD A/S RODMAN DISCUSSES SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003618

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2106
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY LE IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DOD A/S RODMAN DISCUSSES SECURITY
ASSISTANCE WITH PM SINIORA


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) PM Siniora expressed his appreciation for Assistant
Secretary Rodman's message that U.S. security assistance for

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Lebanon will remain solid due to the bi-partisan support that
Lebanon's pro-reform forces enjoy in Congress. A/S Rodman
also assured Siniora that the U.S. is not about to engage
with Syria to the detriment of Lebanon, and stated that this
position is shared by most of the Arab regimes he has spoken
with in the region. A/S Rodman informed Siniora that his
discussions with Lebanon's Defense Minister and Army
Commander were productive and would help the U.S., in
coordination with other donor countries, determine the
optimum mix of training and equipment to rapidly and
comprehensively improve the capabilities of the LAF. PM
Siniora said he understood the need for a "coordination
mechanism" to produce the greatest progress, but cautioned
A/S Rodman that the Lebanese Army was just now emerging from
a period of enforced passivity and would require long term
assistance in matters pertaining to modernization. The Prime
Minister also discussed broad regional issues, notably the
Middle East Peace Process, Lebanon's relations with Syria and
Shebaa Farms, and urged the U.S. to use its influence to
create movement on these matters, not just for stability in
Lebanon, but also for Israel's long term security, and an
improved image for AMERICA in the Arab and Islamic world.
End summary.


2. (SBU) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal
Security Affairs Peter W. Rodman and the Ambassador met with
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at the Serail Palace in Beirut
late on November 9. Prime Minister Siniora was joined by
Lebanon's Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Antoine Chedid,
senior advisor Mohammed Chatah, military advisor LAF General
Saad Eid, and advisor Rola Nouraddine. A/S Rodman and the
Ambassador were joined by Paul Hulley, Director, Middle East
North Africa, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mara
Karlin, Levant Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense -
Policy, and Emboff (notetaker).


3. (C) PM Siniora came to the meeting fresh from the third
session of "national consultations" in which Lebanon's
diverse political factions are attempting to resolve the
long-standing dispute of the Lahoud presidency and the role
of government outsider and leader of the powerful Free
Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun. Siniora appeared confident
and at one point assured his guests that Hizballah will not
be successful in its effort to leverage its self-declared
"divine victory" into a controlling position in his
government. Siniora indicated the consultations were
scheduled to resume this Saturday and he may postpone planned
travel next week if the talks made progress.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL NOT CHANGE
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4. (C) A/S Rodman stated it was time to back up rhetorical
support with tangible equipment and training assistance. He
told the Prime Minister that his discussions with Lebanon's
defense leaders were detailed and helpful in refining
priorities and timelines. A/S Rodman also assured PM Siniora
that U.S. support to pro-reform elements in Lebanon,
including its security forces, had solid bipartisan support
in Congress and could be relied upon. He stated that, of
course, the U.S. could not be expected to meet all the
massive training and equipment needs of the Lebanese Armed
Forces, but based upon his extensive consultations with other
donor countries in the region, he was confident that as long
as Lebanon continued on its democratic trajectory, the
modernization objectives would be achieved. A/S Rodman
stated the U.S. would continue to encourage both the EU and
Lebanon's regional allies to provide a comprehensive,
coordinated package of security assistance.


5. (C) As the embodiment of Lebanon's national sovereignty,
the LAF carried an enormous constitutional responsibility,
and PM Siniora asked the U.S. and Lebanon's other allies to
proceed as quickly and comprehensively as possible. PM
Siniora implied that a modern, fully capable LAF would be a
guarantor of stability not only for Lebanon, but for the
region, because it would enable the disarmament of the highly
destabilizing militia of Hizballah.


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6. (C) In response, the Assistant Secretary said he
understood the urgency of the situation and was instructing
his staff to expedite the process wherever possible. In a
related matter, A/S Rodman also explained that, despite some
stories to the contrary, the U.S. was not about engage with
the Syrian regime to the detriment of Lebanon. He emphasized
that the U.S. was not pleased with Syria and its
destabilizing activities in both Iraq and Lebanon, and as a
result, Syria would face a very difficult task in convincing
the U.S. it had truly changed its course.

LAF'S EXPANSION REQUIRES MASSIVE ASSISTANCE
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7. (C) PM Siniora said he was gratified by the size and
specificity of the U.S. security assistance package thus far,
but emphasized that nearly 30 years of working under Syrian
control had decimated the LAF, not only materially, but in
terms of initiative and confidence. He asked the Assistant
Secretary to keep this in mind when formulating the follow-on

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phases of the security assistance program. Siniora said that
focused training programs and working closely with the
enhanced UNIFIL forces in south Lebanon would transform the
LAF, because Lebanese officers and soldiers would be able to
see up close how democratically-committed military forces
operate to protect a nation's sovereignty and its citizens.


8. (C) Siniora confided that one of his primary objectives
in so adamantly pursuing the massive LAF deployment to south
Lebanon at the end of the July-August conflict was that it
would inevitably "drain the water from the stream in which
Hizballah swims." He implied that with both a capable,
motivated LAF and a highly professional UNIFIL in the south,
it would reduce the operating space that Hizballah had
previously enjoyed and exploited. Siniora said that over the
past several months, both the LAF and the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) had grown 25 percent by adding some 20,000 new
troops. But he cautioned that such rapid expansion could not
be sustained unless Lebanon's friends continued, and even
increased, their considerable security assistance. Siniora
conceded a fully trained LAF would take time, but also
pointed out that each step forward in capability and
confidence would result in measurable improvements in
Lebanon's security and sovereignty.


9. (C) PM Siniora proudly stated that the LAF now patrols
the entire border of the country and were gradually earning
the respect and confidence of the Lebanese people. Starting
with a force that sometimes even lacked rifles, Siniora said
the LAF were steadily learning from UNIFIL and would advance
even more rapidly once the various international training
programs are initiated. The Prime Minster said he understood
A/S Rodman's call for a "donor assistance coordination
mechanism" to ensure that diverse international assistance
was properly sequenced and balanced against actual needs.
Although PM Siniora did not commit to a specific mechanism,
he stated that he understood the requirement and would
address it.

SINIORA ADDRESSES BROADER SECURITY ISSUES
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10. (C) As he has with other recent U.S. visitors, PM
Siniora urged A/S Rodman to focus not only on the nuts and
bolts of assistance, but to also consider Lebanese and
regional security issues that, in his view, would determine
the success of democracy and political moderation in the
Middle East. Most important in his estimation is the
critical need to have some movement on the Middle East peace
process. He emphasized that both the Arab and Islamic worlds
were "humiliated on a daily basis" and the lack of redress
was, in his eyes, producing extremely fertile ground for
extremism and a harsh anti-Western political climate.


11. (C) Not unexpectedly, Siniora used the latest incident
in Gaza as a prime example of the spiral of violence that
could engulf the region if some form of relief did not soon
surface. Siniora said he understood the complexities and
pitfalls of any genuine peace process, but passionately
asked, "What alternative do we really have?" Siniora
described the present regional stalemate as a recipe for
disaster, not only for Arab moderates and democrats, but for
long term inter-religious relations, and for Western
interests.


12. (C) The Prime Minister next raised the always-present

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issue of Shebaa Farms. As he has stated on numerous
discussions, PM Siniora strongly argued that Shebaa was a
strategically unimportant piece of land that was
unnecessarily prolonging the "occupation" debate in Lebanon
and giving the troublesome regimes in Syria and Iran a
valuable gift by allowing President Bashar al-Asad to
incessantly criticize the Siniora government as weak and
incompetent.


13. (C) As he repeatedly argued in last summer's 1701
negotiations, Siniora countered Israel's concern that
concessions on Shebaa would be viewed as a Hizballah victory
with the contention that continued Israeli presence in Shebaa
was an even more valuable "gift" to Hassan Nasrallah.
Siniora urged the U.S. to convince Israel that it could
safely transfer control of Shebaa to UN authority without
giving Hizballah any strategic or political advantage. He
implied, again as he has on previous occasions, that UN
stewardship could last almost indefinitely, especially
considering that Syria's recognition that the land was
Lebanese was constantly shifting and would require sustained
bi-lateral negotiations.

"BLOOD ONLY BEGETS MORE BLOOD"
--------------


14. (C) PM Siniora asserted that without Shebaa Farms, the
entire rationale of Hizballah's "resistance" would crumble.
Siniora acknowledged that Nasrallah and company might shift
their demands if Shebaa was resolved, but the Prime Minister
said that to do so, such a shift would unveil Hizballah for
what it currently is -- an Iranian proxy.


15. (C) Not only would settlement of the Shebaa issue
expose Hizballah and force it to decide whether its
allegiance lay with Lebanon or Iran, but removal of the
deeply-felt grievance would, he argued, finally give Israel
the security along its northern border that it had sought for
decades. PM Siniora said if anything could be learned from
the six wars fought on Lebanon's territory since 1948, it was
that violence only resulted in more violence. He
rhetorically asked how much more force could Israel actually
use against Hizballah. Certainly, he admitted, it could use
even more overwhelming force, but to what end, and at what
cost. He asked whether Israel really wanted to go down that
road.


16. (C) Lastly, PM Siniora addressed the issue of relations
with Syria. He implied that the U.S. really doesn't
understand the necessity of Lebanon having good relations
with Syria and asked the U.S. to have patience as Lebanon
gradually, but steadily, asserted its sovereign rights in a
manner that had the greatest chance of success. He stated,
"Syria has to get used to the fact that we are an independent
people," and added that relations between the two counties
was not only desirable, but unavoidable. Siniora noted that
the Syrian regime was under intense pressure, both from the
international community and the steadily advancing UNIIIC
investigation, and he welcomed this pressure because, in his
view, it would inevitably force them to reconsider their
recalcitrant international behavior.


17. (C) In closing, Prime Minister Siniora sincerely
thanked the U.S. for standing by his government and Lebanon's
pro-reform forces. Having just left the rancorous "national
consultations," PM Siniora admitted that Lebanon was facing
difficult days, but he expressed strong confidence that with
perseverance, democratic forces would prevail. He proudly
recounted the successes of his pro-reform government during
and since last summer's conflict and boldly stated that they
were not affected by the steady barrage of criticism from
Aoun, Syria and Hizballah. Siniora assured his guests that
Nasrallah had badly miscalculated if he thought Hizballah's
hollow "divine victory" could somehow be parlayed into
dominant control of the government. The Prime Minister
finished by urging the U.S. to steadfastly use its influence
for stability and peace in the region, because it would be
the deciding factor.


18. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Rodman.
FELTMAN