SINIORA DEFENDS CABINET, VOWS TO PASS TRIBUNAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003606

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: SINIORA DEFENDS CABINET, VOWS TO PASS TRIBUNAL


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Meeting with the Ambassador late on 11/12, Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora projected serenity and strength, as
lawyers, aides, and ministers whirled in and out of his
office offering advice on transcending Lebanon's latest
made-in-Damascus political crisis. Siniora provided a
detailed chronology in rejecting President Emile Lahoud's
demand for more time to study the UN drafts regarding the
special tribunal. The PM cited the constitution in
countering Lahoud's claim that, with the resignation of the
five Shia minsiters, the cabinet is no longer legitimate.
Siniora vowed that the cabinet would meet at noon Monday
(11/13) as announced, but he mused about whether it was
tactically better for cabinet approval of the tribunal now or
later in the week, after Speaker Nabih Berri's return from
Iran. One way or another, the cabinet would pass the
tribunal, Siniora insisted. Meeting with the Ambassador
later on 11/12, Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, and Ghattas
Khoury said that, while March 14 leaders understood why
Siniora was contemplating delaying a vote on the tribunal
until later in the week, it was "too dangerous" to wait:
Hizballah will have too much time to promote chaos. Better
to pass the tribunal on Monday, they said. (We understand
that Saad Hariri passed that message to Siniora last night;
the cabinet is preparing to start its session as of this
writing.) Jumblatt and Siniora both expressed deep concern
about their physical safety, with Jumblatt saying that he has
been told that the Syrians have a plan to use Ahmed Jibril's
PFLP-GC to attack Jumblatt's Mukhtara fortress. Siniora
asked that, in any U.S. public remarks, we omit praise of him
in favor of criticism of others and support for the special
tribunal. End summary.

"WAR ROOM" ATMOSPHERE IN SINIORA'S QUARTERS
--------------


2. (S) The Ambassador met with Siniora for 90 minutes on
11/12. Shaking his head that the pro-Syrians were
demonstrating "suicidal behavior" and "desperation," Siniora
appeared confident, calm, and strong -- "serene" is how
Siniora answered when the Ambassador asked how he was
feeling. The atmosphere in the Grand Serail, however, was
anything but serene, with a "war room" atmosphere similar to
that when UNSCR 1701 was being negotiated. Aides, lawyers,
and ministers interrupted the meeting frequently, rushing in
and out with ideas and comments. Siniora, remembering
something, would sometimes stop mid-sentence to make phone
calls and then pick up the conversation with the Ambassador
exactly where he left it. Minister of Culture Tariq Mitri,
Acting Minister of Interior Ahmed Fatfat, Minister of
Education Khaled Qabbani, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs
Michel Pharaon, Tourism Minister Joe Sarkis, advisor (and
outcoming ambassador to the UN) Nawaf Salam, and former
Minister (and Hariri legal advisor) Bajih Tabbarah were among
those who came to see the PM during the Ambassador's call.


3. (S) Inter alia, Siniora called Minister of Justice
Charles Rizk to check on a legal issue, Deputy Prime Minister
Elias Murr seeking assurances (which Murr readily gave) that
the Lebanese Armed Forces were prepared to protect the
cabinet meeting the following day, and Minister of
Environment Yacoub Sarraf (allied with Lahoud) to urge his
attendance at the controversial Monday cabinet meeting. When
Sarraf (who surely is being ordered by Lahoud not to go)
reported that he needed to consult his spiritual leader,
Greek Archbishop Audi, Siniora immediately deployed Mitri
(also Greek Orthodox) to enlist Audi in persuading Sarraf to
attend the cabinet. (On Monday morning, Sarraf submitted his
resignation letter.) Siniora sent Minister of Social Affairs
Nayla Mouawad, Pharaon and Mitri to see Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir, who assured them of his support for the government,
and senior advisor Mohamed Chattah to see Michel Aoun.
Chattah, who came back while the Ambassador was still there,
reported that Aoun was "remarkably reconciliatory" (although
Aoun subsequently lashed out at Siniora in television
interviews) and said that he had no intentions of sending his
followers to the street. Aoun also offered to mediate
between March 14 and Hizballah.

SINIORA'S CHRONOLOGY
OF TALKS WITH LAHOUD
--------------


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4. (C) Siniora told the Ambassador that he would stick to
the noon cabinet meeting on Monday (11/13) that he had called
on Saturday morning, per the constitutional requirement that
the Prime Minister announce cabinet meetings and provide an
agenda at least 48 hours in advance. The cabinet agenda
contains a single item: the special tribunal, now that the
UN has delivered the drafts that have P-5 concurrence. In
rejecting the argument by pro-Syrian politicians that more
time is needed to study the documents, Siniora said that he
wanted to share with the Ambassador in detail the chronology
of conversations he had with President Emile Lahoud on this
issue,

-- Thursday, 11/9: The cabinet met in regular session, and
Siniora then announced a cabinet meeting for Monday, to
discuss inter alia the Telecom Regulatory Agency (TRA)
appointments Lahoud has been blocking.

-- Friday morning, 11/10: Siniora, after receiving the
tribunal documents from the UN, called Lahoud to say that he
would send them immediately to Baabda, which he did. He told
Lahoud that Monday's cabinet meeting consider both the TRA
and the tribunal. Lahoud responded that he would have to
study the documents for both issues.

-- Saturday morning, 11/11: Before the fourth round of
political consultations started, Siniora called Lahoud to say
that, given the escalating rhetoric in the country, the
tribunal discussion was urgent and he was about to circulate
formally the agenda for Monday's cabinet (in accordance with
the 48-hour rule). Siniora told Lahoud that, out of
deference to Lahoud's concerns, he would remove the TRA until
a later date. Lahoud claimed not to have read the tribunal
documents yet and argued that Siniora was moving ahead too
quickly. Siniora responded that the drafts have not changed
substantially from those Lahoud studied when he submitted 34
pages of comments a couple of weeks ago. Siniora offered to
travel to Baabda and discuss the drafts in detail with
Lahoud. Let's finish this now, Siniora told Lahoud, so we
solve an issue that is causing worry and pressure. Siniora
also went through with Lahoud on the phone the negotiating
history fo the drafts, arguing that, as the Russians approved
"everything down to the comma" that meant that Syria already
had input in the process. Lahoud insisted on more time,
which Siniora refused to give. Siniora took the decision to
call the cabinet and circulated the official agenda and
supporting documents before leaving to attend the Saturday
political consultations.

-- Saturday afternoon, 11/11: Siniora received a letter
from Lahoud, claiming that Siniora was violating Article 52
of the constitution (regarding authorities for negotiating
treaties) "and so forth and so forth." Siniora, in response,
conveyed an oral message to Lahoud that he would cancel his
Asia trip ("which I was taking for the good of Lebanon, to
build support for Paris III and to meet the new Secretary
GeneQ") in order to reschedule the cabinet meeting for
Tuesday or Wednesday. Siniora repeated his offer to go to
Baabda to go over the drafts with Lahoud. "I wanted to pull
the rug out from under his excuses," Siniora said; "he said
he needed more time, well I was willing to give him some, but
not unlimited time."

-- Sunday, 11/12: Siniora sent a letter to Lahoud outlining
the above chronology and asking him to attend the cabinet
meeting on Monday. Siniora said that he planned to leak that
letter to the press, to show that he had bent over backwards
to talk with Lahoud about the tribunal.

VOWING TO HAVE CABINET APPROVE TRIBUNAL,
BUT MAYBE ON THURSDAY RATHER THAN MONDAY
--------------


5. (S) Siniora said that, despite Lahoud's objections and
the Saturday afternoon resignation of the five Shia
ministers, he would proceed with the Monday cabinet meeting
and table the tribunal drafts. He vowed to have the cabinet
approve the drafts. But, he said, has still thinking about
whether, tactically, it might be better to table the drafts
but not actually vote on them until later in the week,
perhaps at the regular Thursday cabinet session. Perhaps,
Siniora said, Berri could be brought around once he returns
(reportedly on Tuesday night) from Iran, as the comments from
the Amal ministers suggest that the split from the cabinet
might not be permanent.


6. (S) The tribunal, Siniora said, would be seen as far

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more legitimate if there were Shia support for the drafts or
at least Shia participation in the debate. By holding a
cabinet meeting on Monday but delaying a vote until Thursday,
Siniora could posture himself as having "gone that extra
step" to secure Berri's endorsement. On the other hand,
Siniora said (admitting he was thinking outloud),Berri might
actually prefer that the inevitable cabinet approval of the
tribunal drafts occurs when he is out of the country, to
absolve him of any blame in Syria or Iran. Siniora noted
that he had tried, but failed, to reach Berri twice in Iran.
And any delay, he said, would also permit the others to rally
the street in a way that makes cabinet meetings difficult to
arrange. The Ambassador asked him when he would decide
whether or not to bring the tribunal drafts to a cabinet
decision Monday. Siniora said that he still needed to
consult with March 14 leaders and "gauge the atmosphere."

REJECTING LAHOUD'S ARGUMENT
THAT CABINET IS NOW UNCONSTITUTIONAL
--------------


7. (S) Siniora also rejected Lahoud's claim that the
government was now unconstitutional because of the Shia
resignations and thus not not permitted to take decisions
such as regarding the tribunal. Thumbing through a copy of
the constitution, Siniora noted that cabinet resignations,
like cabinet appointments, only become effective with a
decree signed by both the PM and the President (per Article
53),"and I haven't agreed to their resignation." Moreover,
he said, "very good constitutional lawyers including those
who don't normally like us," including former Baalback MP
Hassan Rifai, agree that the constitution's guarantee about
representation for all of Lebanon's confessions means that no
government can force out a community against its will or form
a cabinet without representation from one community. But
there is no formal "confessional veto," something that the
Taif accord did away with when Maronite supremacy ended.
Vetoes are done by numbers, Siniora said (referring to the
"blocking minority" concept specified in the constitution),
not by confession. Siniora acknowledged that the cabinet is
politically weaker without Shia representation, but it is
not, as Lahoud claims, "illegitimate." Siniora mused about
sending Lahoud five Shia nominees for the ministerial posts,
knowing full well that Lahoud would reject them all. "Then
I'll tell him, 'fine, send me any five Shia you want, and
I'll accept them.'"


8. (S) Asked about the longer term prospects for the Shia
ministers, Siniora said that the Berri ministers and Berri
himself were at pains to make it appear as though the breach
with the cabinet majority was not permanent, which Siniora
hoped would prove to be the case when Berri returns. But
Hizballah rhetoric against the majority was on becoming
"nastier," suggesting that Hizballah ministers will not
rejoin the cabinet unless they get the blocking minority.
Siniora found it significant that Hizballah was, in fact, no
longer talking about a blocking minority ("thilth
al-mu'atal") but rather guaranteeing minority ("thilth
ad-dhamin"),"as if only Hizballah has the right to decide
what decisions to allow to proceed."

MARCH 14 FIGURES BACK MONDAY DECISION
--------------


9. (S) After leaving Siniora, the Ambassador then met with
Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, and Ghattas Khoury, who had
just attended a March 14 political meeting. While expressing
understanding of Siniora's tactical consideration of putting
off the tribunal draft approval until Thursday, they said
that Saad Hariri would tell Siniora later that night that the
risks of delay were too great: the cabinet must approve the
tribunal on Monday. Jumblatt thought it "too dangerous" to
wait, given Hizballah's goal of "making problems, causing
chaos."

SECURITY CONCERNS FROM PFLP-GC AND QAIDA
--------------


10. (S) Jumblatt and Siniora separately expressed great
concern to the Ambassador about security issues. Jumblatt
said that he was considering traveling abroad again, and he
heard that his usual safehaven of Mukhtara was now under
threat from Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC which, he claimed, has
prepared for attacks on Mukhtara. Siniora and Jumblatt both
expressed concern about reports circulating in Beirut that
al-Qaida was makings to attack March 14 leaders and the
Siniora cabinet as U.S. agents. In Jumblatt's view, this was

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a worrying ruse by the Syrians that sets the stage for
attacks Syria can deny. The Hizballah and Syrian hatred for
Siniora is particularly worrying, Jumblatt said, referring to
"the way" Hizballah MP Mohammed Ra'ad glared at Siniora
whenever the latter spoke during the four rounds of political
consultations. Asked what the U.S. can do now to help,
Siniora responded that he prefers that our public messages
avoid praising Siniora but concentrate on "the neighbors" and
international support for the special tribunal instead.
FELTMAN