UN OFFICIALS ON COORDINATION, TRIBUNAL,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003603 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM UNSC PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: UN OFFICIALS ON COORDINATION, TRIBUNAL, OVERFLIGHTS, HIZBALLAH Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Over lunch with the Ambassador on 11/10, UN officials Geir Pedersen, Michael Williams, and Salman Shaikh claimed that Israeli officials, whom they had met earlier that week, had hinted at stopping overflights if the USG could provide equivalent intelligence. Rejecting the Ambassador's skepticism, Pedersen argued reports of Hizballah moving weapons from the south was actually good news, as it indicated progress toward establishing a weapons-free zone south of the Litani. The UN officials acknowledged that UNDP-led donor coordination in Lebanon was a disaster, but they despaired of any quick fix unless UNDP was made subservient to a higher UN official (e.g., Pedersen),an outcome they hoped the U.S. would push. Regarding the Hariri assassination, they had, on Kofi Annan's behalf, delivered the tribunal documents to Prime Minister Siniora earlier in the day. They worried that Serge Brammertz would leave the UNIIIC as scheduled in December unless given guarantees (UN employment, return to the ICC) for his post-UNIIIC career. Brammertz, they thought, had more information than he would let on in his December report that they expected, again, would be largely procedural. End summary. "EXCELLENT" MEETINGS IN ISRAEL -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Lebanon Geir Pedersen hosted the Ambassador to a lunch on 11/10 that also included UN DPA officials Michael Williams (in his temporary capacity as special advisor to Annan on the Middle East) and Salman Shaikh. Having returned from three days in Israel the previous evening, they summarized their meetings with Israeli officials. In general, they said, the discussions were "excellent," with the Israelis eager to talk creatively and constructively about what to do to strengthen 1701 implementation. For the first time, Pedersen said, "we talked like partners, not adversaries." Williams said that the UN and Israeli analysis about the challenges ahead and the options available were strikingly similar. HOPING USG WILL PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE TO ISRAEL TO SOLVE OVERFLIGHT ISSUE -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The UN officials claimed to have raised the issue of Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory in each meeeting, arguing that the overflights were not in Israel's interest and made 1701 implementation more difficult. Williams expressed pleasant surprise by the willingness of the Israelis to talk about the issue, with some reportedly admitting that there were political dimensions in addition to intelligence benefits of the overflights. The UN officials were most encouraged by their talks with Israeli military intelligence, where they reportedly heard that overflights could cease if the USG would provide needed intelligence through other channels. Williams and Pedersen expressed hope that the U.S. and Israel would be able to develop arrangements through which Israeli overlights of Lebanese territory would cease. HIZBALLAH ARMS SMUGGLING -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Pedersen and Williams expressed some frustration that the Israelis, while claiming that arms smuggling from Syria to Hizballah was continuing, were unwilling to provide the kind of details that they could use to confront Syria, Hizballah, and even the GOL. The UN has no independent information one way or another regarding smuggling across the Syrian border. The Ambassador suggested that, instead of seeking examples of specific smuggling incidents, the UN should, in the context of UNSCR 1701, push the GOL to establish the kind of border regime that would make any kind of smuggling more difficult. Williams disagreed, saying that a high-profile UN campaign would backfire, as the pro-Syrians build a case that Siniora is once again trading away Lebanese sovereignty. Williams said that he would be talking to the Germans and other EU states about quiet bilateral help to the GOL on border security. ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the UN had specific BEIRUT 00003603 002 OF 003 reports about Hizballah moving weapons within Lebanon. Nodding that he had heard "quite a few stories," Pedersen said that he actually found such reports "encouraging" in a couple of aspects. First, Hizballah seems to be taking seriously the implications of UNSCR 1701 that the area south of the Litani should be free of any weapons except those belonging to UNIFIL and the LAF. Second, Hizballah is feeling "squeezed," or its leaders wouldn't feel the need to move its weapons. Third, Hizballah is implicitly acknowledging the primacy of the LAF and, more broadly, the GOL, by being forced to coordinate the movement north of its weapons with Lebanese officials. "Can you imagine Hizballah in June asking the Government of Lebanon for permission to move its rockets?" Pedersen asked. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador noted that he disagreed sharply with Pedersen's analysis: if, as the UN argues, Hizballah is moving weapons north and in coordination with the LAF and GOL, that is contrary to the spirit of 1701 and the letter of ¶1559. It is also contrary to Siniora's "seven points," in which the state should acquire the monopoly over arms. Pedersen should use the examples he has to raise strong objections to the GOL, the Ambassador urged. Pedersen stuck to his more optimistic analysis, saying that it was important to concentrate first on stabilizing the south and encouraging the weapons-free zone south of the Litani. NEGATIVE PRESS ON UNIFIL -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked the UN officials of their interpretation of the recent flurry of negative press, particularly in pro-Syrian media, about UNIFIL: soldiers shoplifting, soldiers destroying agricultural crops while on patrol, soldiers showing disrespect for young women of the south, and so forth. The Ambassador wondered whether the pro-Syrian press had initiated a propaganda campaign to turn the Lebanese population against UNIFIL and whether there were security implications for the UNIFIL troops or contributors. While refusing to draw conclusions about any linkages between the flurry of press reports, Williams and Pedersen said that they were monitoring the situation very closely. They asked that the USG keep in close touch with the UN on any threat information. UNSCO PROPOSAL FOR LEBANON "FROZEN" -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked about the UN's organization in Lebanon on the civilian side. Exchanging glances with Pedersen, Williams said the idea of elevating Pedersen to UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, overseeing all civilian aspects of the UN's work in Lebanon, was now blocked. While UN officials expressed reluctance to force a change in structures so close to the transition in UN headquarters, Williams acknowledged that Lebanon needs special consideration, given the upcoming donor conference in early ¶2007. The UN officials agreed that UNDP head of mission Mona Hammam is (to quote Pedersen) "a disaster" who has alienated donors and has proven repeatedly to be incapable of managing complicated donor efforts. But, unless "someone powerful" tells UN headquarters to do something to sideline Hammam, such as by making Pedersen senior to her, there's "no hope of improvement," as Williams said. HARIRI ASSASSINATION: UNIIIC AND TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Regarding the Hariri assassination, the UN officials reported that they had, earlier that morning, delivered to Siniora the official tribunal documents from UN/OLA, with a cover letter from Kofi Annan. (We have faxed the package to NEA/ELA for distribution.) Siniora, they reported, vowed to table the documents before the cabinet on Monday. They expressed satisfaction with the texts and gratitude that the Russians had softened their position. ¶10. (S/NF) Asked by the Ambassador for their prediction of the next Brammertz report, they reponded that they expected another largely procedural report. This, they said, is linked to UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz' character and history as a prosecutor: he doesn't want to give away secrets prematurely. And he is keen to avoid the mistakes of SIPDIS his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis, who wielded his reports "like BEIRUT 00003603 003 OF 003 a political sledge hammer," as Pedersen said. The Ambassador argued that, by downplaying his analysis too much, Brammertz, whether he admits it or not, is also making political contributions, but ones that help the wrong side. Also, he is contributing to what could be a credibility problem once the details do start coming out, as people may question the revelations since Brammertz (who is consideredly broadly credible) had not included them. While sharing the Ambassador's concerns, Pedersen said that he had the strong impression that Brammertz indeed now had some solid leads but would not disclose them in his report. REPLACING BRAMMERTZ -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Expressing his view that Brammertz's vow to leave the UNIIIC when his term expires at the end of the year is serious, Williams urged that the international community focus now on identifying a replacement for Brammertz. The UN has done no work on this question, he said. Given the politics, it would be impossible to invite Mehlis back, yet having a third commissioner also "does not look serious." The Ambassador asked if anything could be done to retain Brammertz, such as promising to make him the prosecutor once a tribunal is up and running. Williams responded that Brammertz, meeting recently with Annan, had been clear in rejecting the possibility of becoming the prosecutor. If there is any hope of keeping Brmmertz in 2007, Williams mused, it would have to be linked to a commitment to a good onward job for Brammertz -- either something in the UN system or something back at the International Criminal Court. Williams said that, based on preliminary consulations, he thought the Germans and Dutch in particular were opposed to extending Brammertz' leave of absence from the ICC any longer, and that even Brammertz' direct supervisors at the ICC would dismiss rather than extend him again. While expressing his belief that retaining Brammertz is best for the investigation, Williams said that he had no idea how to achieve that. FELTMAN