AFTER ROUND TWO OF CONSULTATIONS, MINDEF MURR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: AFTER ROUND TWO OF CONSULTATIONS, MINDEF MURR,
HAMADEH EXPECT STREET ACTION

REF: BEIRUT 3565

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 11/07 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr said that, based on
his current understanding of the political consultations
chaired by Parliament Speaker Berri, he felt certain that
Hizballah and Michel Aoun would take their fight to the
streets immediately after the cabinet debates the UN/OLA
tribunal documents. Murr expected the March 14 majority to
respond in kind. He expressed confidence in the army
preventing violence or strangulation of key institutions, but
he worried that March 14 and PM Siniora in particular may not
have the stomach for sustained protests. Citing confidential
sources, Murr said that Hizballah and Aoun were prepared to
stay on the streets for two months or more. Their goal, he
said, is the blocking minority in the cabinet, in order to
stop the tribunal, stall implementation of UNSCR 1701, derail
Paris III, and prevent a March 14 president from taking
office. Murr said that his father, pro-Syrian MP Michel
Murr, had met privately with Berri, Aoun, and Hizballah
representatives but failed to work out a compromise.
Separately, reporting on the 11/7 round of consultations,
Minister Marwan Hamadeh told us that neither side had moved
an inch from the previous day's positions (reftel),although
the language and threats to take to the streets were more
frightening. Consultations are suspended until Thursday.
Hamadeh, like Murr, thought street action inevitable, and he
wondered about the timing of Berri's upcoming trip to Iran.
End summary.


MURR PREDICTS STREET ACTION
--------------


2. (C) Comparing notes with the Ambassador on 11/7
regarding the just-concluded second round of political
consultations, Murr, citing his father as well as other
sources in the talks, claimed that the two sides hardened
their positions. Based on his current reading of the
situation, Murr expected Hizballah and Michel Aoun to make
good on their threats to take their fight to change the
cabinet to the street. And he expected March 14 forces to
respond in kind, in order not to be perceived as weak. Right
now, he said, "I don't see any way out of this except by the
street. And who knows where the street will take us."

TRIBUNAL DOCUMENTS TO BE THE TRIGGER
--------------


3. (C) The timing of the consultations, he predicted, will
be linked to the formal submission to the cabinet of the
tribunal documents. At that point, March 14 ministers will
insist on quick cabinet approval to forward the documents to
the parliament immediately for ratification. Citing the need
to study the details and picking up on Russian reservations,
the Shia ministers will storm out of the cabinet session ("as
they did on December 12"),on the pretext that they are being
rushed into something. The next day, Hizballah and Aoun will
muster hundreds of thousands of people for sit-ins and
protests. Murr said that neither Berri nor Walid Jumblatt
want to take to the streets, but neither have yet figured a
way out of the current impasse. More than anyone else, Murr
said, "Berri will lose" on the streets, as Hizballah will be
so obviously stronger and better organized than Berri's Amal
movement that disaffected Berri supporters will switch to the
winning team. Berri, unfortunately, has little choice in the
matter.

CAN MARCH 14 SUSTAIN POWER
IF DEMONSTRATIONS LAST TWO MONTHS?
--------------


4. (C) Murr expressed confidence that the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF),which will take the lead from the ISF to handle
civil unrest, will be able to keep major roads open and
prevent the sacknig or cutting off of key facilities. PM
Siniora's Grand Serail office will not be sacked. But he
worried that the March 14 forces and PM Siniora in particular
may not have the stomach for the sustained demonstrations
Aoun and Hizballah have planned. He said that Hizballah and

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Michel Aoun have calculated that it may take up to two months
to reach their goals, and they plan to have ongoing protests
and sit-ins well into 2007.

PLANNING FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES --
INCLUDING SIT-IN AGAINST EMBASSY
--------------


5. (C) While he said that he had no specific information,
he added that he was prepared for the all contingencies,
including the possibility of sit-ins near the American
Embassy. Hizballah may want to send a message that the March
14 governing majority is composed of U.S.agents, and what
better way than to make headlines by protesting near the
Embassy. Aoun would "never" join such a sit-in, given the
notorious Aounist attack against the Embassy in 1989. Thank
heavens, Murr said, that the Embassy had not moved to its
planned new cite near the Shia southern suburbs, where
Hizballah would be able to mobilize "100,000 people in half
an hour." Now, Hizballah cannot easily move mass numbers of
supporters to the Embassy, given its distance from the
Hizballah neighborhoods, and the army can place numerous
checkpoints along the way.

GOAL: STOP 1701, TRIBUNAL, PARIS III,
AND ELECTION OF MARCH 14 PRESIDENT
--------------


6. (C) According to Murr, Hizballah and Aoun's goals are
simple -- to gain the blocking minority in the cabinet, in
order to prevent four developments: the establishment of the
special tribunal, further implementation of UNSCR 1701, the
realization of Paris III and a reform plan that puts Lebanon
squarely on a western-oriented course, and the election of a
March 14 president. While Hizballah and Aoun insist on the
removal of Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and Minister of
Culture Tariq Mitri, as both are seen as having betrayed
Lahoud and the pro-Syrians in the international arena, Rizk
and Mitri are "minor issues." If a way could be found to
gain the blocking minority without kicking off Rizk and
Mitri, then Hizballah could achieve its goals anyway and a
neutered Rizk could stay at Justice.

MICHEL MURR FAILS WITH COMPROMISE
--------------


7. (C) Murr said that he had just seen his father Michel,
who briefed him on a private meeting he had with Berri, Aoun,
Hizballah MP Mohammed Ra'ad, and Hizballah Minister of Energy
and Water Mohammed Fneish. Michel Murr (who participates in
the consultations) proposed to the others what Elias thought
a reasonable option: that they offer to March 14 to keep the
current 24-member cabinet but kick off three ministers (Rizk,
Mitri, and Minister of Economy and Trade Sami Haddad) in
favor of three Aoun ministers. Aoun was intrigued, but
Hizballah refused, saying that they did not have a guarantee
of the blocking minority of "more than a third" with only
eight (three Aounists, five Shia). Michel Murr tried to
argue that Elias was, in fact, a neutral voice that could
swing back and forth depending on the issue.


8. (C) Ra'ad responded that Elias is the "most American" of
all the ministers, as bad if not worse than Siniora. Michel
Murr also failed to convince Ra'ad that Minister of
Environment Yacoub Sarraf could be counted upon for the
blocking vote; Ra'ad claimed that Sarraf, a Greek Orthodox
like the Murrs, was falling under the bad influence of Elias
and untrustworthy. Elias Murr also shared several other
complicated formulas for potential cabinet expansion
discussed by his father with Aoun and the Shia (including a
26-member and a 30-member cabinet) but expressed doubt that
any could be sold to the March 14 leaders. Aoun, Murr said,
would insist on three ministers in a 24-member cabinet, four
ministers in a 26-member cabinet, and five ministers ina
30-member cabinet.

HAMADEH CITES TOUGHENED RHETORIC;
WONDERS ABOUT BERRI'S TRIP
--------------


9. (C) Separately, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan
Hamadeh (close to Jumblatt) told the Ambassador that neither
the March 8 or March 14 sides had moved "one inch" during the
11/07 comsultations. The rhetoric, he said, was far tougher
than on Day One (see reftel),with Hariri in particular

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warning explicitly that, if Hizballah and Aoun demonstrate,
then they will not be alone in the streets. Aoun was
curiously low key, a stance Hamadeh interpreted as Aoun not
wanting to frighten his followers that he was leading them
into adventurism with Hizballah. Hamadeh mused about any
linkage between Berri's trip to Iran (starting Sunday) and
timing for ending the consultations: would Berri dare to go
to Teheran without an answer about what happens next?
Hamadeh thought that, given the lack of any flexibility by
either side, street action was inevitable, at least based on
the atmosphere after the second round of consultations.
Perhaps the individual talks to take place on Wednesday will
lead to a breakthrough when the participants resume formal
consultations on Thursday. But he was doubtful.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C/NF) As always, there was a touch of the self-serving
in Murr's presentation: did Hizballah MP Ra'ad really call
Murr "the most American" minister when Hizballah consistently
reserves that charge for Hamadeh, Nayla Mouawad, and Siniora?
Is Murr as confident as he says that the Grand Serail will
be protected? In any case, we think Murr the Father's
proposal was not as benign as Elias' casual description would
have us believe: We have seen no evidence indicating that
Yacoub Sarraf would ever side in a cabinet showdown with the
March 14 majority, meaning that, out of 24 cabinet members
under Michel Murr's formula, a solid blocking minority of
nine would be with the Syrians: five Shia, Sarraf, and three
Aounists. In that scenario, as the power starts shifting
back to Elias Murr's former masters, March 14 ministers would
probably have their suspicions about Elias Murr's
reliability, too.


11. (C/NF) As of now, Hizballah appears to be in this fight
for however long it takes to achieve at least a blocking
minority. Whatever the imperfections of UNIFIL and LAF
deployment in the south, despite whatever unseemly informal
understandings UNIFIL and the LAF may have concluded with
Hizballah, it is clear that Hizballah is far more constrained
in south Lebanon than it was before July 12. Today,
Hizballah would have trouble blatantly snatching Israeli
soldiers from across the international frontier. We doubt
Hizballah wants to be seen as having trapped the LAF between
the Israeli forces and Hizballah fighters. The exhausted
Shia population probably would not currently support action
that would attract a ferocious Israeli response.


12. (C/NF) So, with the Israeli front currently closed,
Hizballah -- along with its Syrian and Iranian backers,
presumably -- has changed its focus to reversing the Cedar
Revolution and using all means to seize effective control of
what passes for the Lebanese state. It is sad that Aoun has
stoked anti-Sunni ("Wahabi") fears in order to lure his
following into providing Christian cover for Hizballah's
efforts. Without Aoun, the pro-Syrian actions would be seen
for what they are: a threat to use force to seize decisive
power and reverse a victory most Lebanese welcomed in spring

2005. We wish that the delight that Hizballah, Syria, and
Iran must feel about Aoun's opportunistic position was
somehow revealed to Aoun's followers, who might start to
question where their leader is taking them.
FELTMAN