LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH, PREOCCUPIED WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003568

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE PATRIARCH, PREOCCUPIED WITH
RISING TENSIONS, SEEKS "NEUTRAL" PRESIDENT

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Maronite Patriarch expressed his concern over the
potential for confrontation over Michel Aoun and Hizballah's
demand for a cabinet expansion. Having met with Aoun in
recent days, the Patriarch confirmed that he is as
single-minded as ever in his pursuit of the presidency.
While Aoun agreed in their meeting not to join Hizballah in
potential street protests to bring down the government, the
Patriarch fears that Aoun may find an excuse to involve his
followers in such actions nevertheless. The Patriarch doubts
that Hizballah will stand by Aoun to the end, but Aoun
believes it will. Syria and Iran are actively interfering in
Lebanon and attempting to subvert the GOL. Finally, in a
departure from previous comments to us supporting March 14
candidates like Nassib Lahoud, the Patriarch expressed his
opinion that Lebanon should have a "neutral" president
beholden to neither political bloc and respected by both.
Recent moves by three Maronite leaders suggest that he may
have hinted at this to them as well. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador called on Maronite Patriarch
Nasrallah Boutros Sfayr in Bkirke November 6. Polchief
accompanied as notetaker. Referring to recent Washington
consultations, the Ambassador conveyed to Sfayr the
continuing deep USG support for Lebanon. The Patriarch said
he was aware of USG support and grateful, but that the
situation in Lebanon is "not good." He mentioned his concern
over Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's pledge to
take to the streets unless progress is made toward a cabinet
expansion within the first week of talks in the Speaker
Berri-sponsored national consultations. The Ambassador
agreed that the Hizballah threat is tantamount to blackmail
and that Lebanese parties must not resort to the street to
solve their differences.

AOUN'S AMBITION
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador mentioned his deep concern over the
position of Michel Aoun. He noted that Aoun's supporters
appeared to be coordinating their actions with Damascus as
well as Hizballah. The Patriarch replied that Aoun wants to
be President at any price. "It is his only idea." It will
not be easy for him, however, he predicted.


4. (C) The Patriarch noted that he had told Aoun in his visit
to Bkirke the previous week that Aoun should not go into the
streets with Hizballah. Aoun said that he would not but,
Sfayr predicted, Aoun will arrange for a pretext to be pulled
into any demonstrations that do occur. "If we tell him not
to go to the street, he will agree" but his followers will go
and he will claim that it was without his authorization or
encouragement. Aoun will follow Hizballah and do what it
does, Sfayr added.


5. (C) The Ambassador reminded Sfayr of the role he played
following the March 14, 2005 demonstrations at a time when
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and other anti-Syrians were
prepared to march on Baabda Palace to turn out President
Emile Lahoud by force. The Patriarch almost singlehandedly
called the proposed move to a stop, saying that it would be
unacceptable to remove the President by force. When asked,
Sfayr said that he would make a similar appeal, should it
become necessary, for Maronites to eschew demonstrations
designed to topple the Siniora government. Differences must
be resolved in institutions, not in the streets, Sfayr said.
The Patriarch claimed that his Sunday homily contained
exactly those sentiments (albeit in a more veiled version
than used in March 2005, no doubt because Sfayr is sensitive
to Aoun's popularity).


6. (C) Many Christians are no longer following Aoun, Sfayr
said, and "that is why he came to see me." His reputation
and popularity are slipping. Aoun told Sfayr, "I am a
candidate, but if you tell me which other candidate you
support I will support him too." This was a ruse, Sfayr and
the Ambassador noted, as Aoun realizes Sfayr would not openly
endorse any particular candidate and risk annoying all other

BEIRUT 00003568 002 OF 003


Maronite candidates. The Ambassador noted that should Aoun
become President due to his relationship with Hizballah, USG
relations could become more difficult.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether there is any way to move
Aoun away from Hizballah. Sfayr did not know, and replied
that Aoun believes Hassan Nasrallah will sustain him until he
is President. Sfayr expressed doubt that Nasrallah would
continue to be loyal to Aoun to that point. Aoun's alliance
with Hizballah is a threat to the balance of Lebanese
politics, and it is this potential for disequilibrium that
has convinced many Christians to leave Lebanon, perhaps as
many as 200,000 during the war, Sfayr lamented.

THE SECURITY SITUATION
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador noted that USG support for the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) is accelerating and asked what else else
we might do to strengthen Lebanon's state institutions. The
Patriarch responded that the USG is doing well to help the
army but that Syria and Iran are interfering and giving
orders to their agents here. Despite the denials of many,
this is a reality. Hassan Nasrallah's vision for Lebanon is
not accepted by the Lebanese people, but he feels his
strength and believes he can govern by force. Problems
between Israeli forces and the French and German components
of UNIFIL do not help the situation.


9. (C) The Ambassador noted that Sfayr talks to LAF G-2
Georges Khoury regularly and asked Sfayr what he thought the
LAF would do in the case of a threat from street
demonstrations against the government. Sfayr responded that
the LAF is ready to oppose demonstrators but that no one
knows what the Shia members in the LAF might do in the case
of an actual confrontation.


10. (C) Lebanon's problems are the problems of its neighbors,
Sfayr said. "We are the puppets. Hassan Nasrallah is proud
that he has kept 20,000 rockets and lost none of his arsenal.
For him, 1,000 killed is nothing. The life of a man is
worthless. Aoun ignores this because he has one obsession."

A "NEUTRAL" PRESIDENT
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador noted that at the opening of the
October parliamentary session, there was widespread dismissal
and disrespect for President Lahoud. With no one rising to
defend the presidency, such attacks erode the credibility of
the office. Moreover, with Lahoud's long and ineffectual
tenure, there may be an erosion of the power of and respect
for the presidency over the long term. Isn't it time, the
Ambassador asked, to solve the problem by finding a way to
replace Lahoud. The Patriarch responded that Michel Aoun can
not fulfill the President's role nor restore the office. "We
need someone who will be neutral toward all the parties," he
added. "Aoun cannot, because of his arrangement with
Hizballah."


12. (C) Sfayr emphasized that Lebanon needs a change of
presidents soon because the country needs both a government
and an opposition (i.e., a loyal opposition) but also
national unity. He added that he had not told Aoun this (as
Aoun opposes the election of a president by the current
Parliament). The Ambassador suggested that March 14
representatives would push for an early presidential election
during the ongoing national consultations, but Sfayr doubted
that Lahoud could be replaced before the end of his term
because of the Syrian and Iranian and Syrian backing he
enjoys.


13. (C) When pressed to name a potential Lahoud successor,
Sfayr said that Lebanon does not need a "party man." He
could not be a March 8 or March 14 figure, he suggested; the
successor must be an "honorable man" who keeps equal distance
from both groups. This idea will be opposed by both parties,
both of which want the office.


14. (C) The Patriarch then raised the name of Jean Obeid. He
noted that Obeid would come to see him in two days. While
Obeid had been "Damascus' man" before last year, he had

BEIRUT 00003568 003 OF 003


allegedly fallen out with Bashar al-Assad. When asked by the
Ambassador whether he is sufficiently influential among
Lebanese, Sfayr replied that Obeid remains close to Syrian
"collaborators" in Lebanon. (Note: It was unclear whether
Sfayr meant to suggest that he might support Obeid, a former
Foreign Minister and Maronite MP from Tripoli, as a potential
candidate, or just sharing gossip. We suspect the latter.
We noted also that MP and clear presidential hopeful Boutros
Harb may be trying to position himself as a neutral
candidate, for example by skipping the most recent March 14
coordination meeting. Finally, Justice Minister Charles Rizk
is a neutral candidate by default, having been appointed by
and recently falling out with President Lahoud, and has been
spreading word that he enjoys the Patriarch's support. End
note.)

ELECTORAL LAW AND TIMING
--------------


15. (C) The Ambassador noted that Aoun insisted on having
parliamentary elections before choosing a new president.
Sfayr said that March 14 parties might not win another
parliamentary election; "I don't know if they have the
means." Sfayr expressed frustration on the electoral law,
complaining that the project to draft a new law has been in
process for five months. It should be sent to the Chamber of
Deputies to be examined without delay.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Not so long ago, Patriarch Sfayr was clearly behind
a March 14 candidate for president. Even though he demured
from backing a specific candidate, one could play a game of
process of elimination by providing names of presumed
presidential aspirants and gauging his reaction. Nassib
Lahoud seemed to be an early favorite, for example, with
Boutros Harb close behind. But, this time, the often cryptic
Patriarch was uncharacteristically clear that, given
Lebanon's severe political divisions, Emile Lahoud's
successor should be able to bridge the divide between March 8
and March 14 movements. That eliminates Aoun, of course, as
well as Nassib, Boutros, Nayla Mouawad, and others. While
opportunistic Maronites eager for the presidency abound, few
come to mind who could credibly be considered "neutral" and
of bridge-building capabilities. Minister of Justice Charles
Rizk indeed comes to mind as one possibility. But we are
hearing from a variety of sources that, by virtue of his
unexpectedly strong support of the special tribunal, Rizk is
now at the very top of the list of ministers Syria and
Hizballah most wish to kick out of the cabinet, meaning that
garnering March 8 support would be tough for Rizk. Other
"technocrats" like Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh,
believed to have covered up the Bank al-Medina scandal, will
be a hard sell for the March 14 crowd.


17. (C) In any case, the pro-Syrians and Aoun have by virtue
of their saber-rattling and escalating rhetoric scored a
victory in moving Sfayr away from March 14 presidency.
Frightened by the loss of Christian influence in Lebanon,
Sfayr seems to envision that Lebanon's parliament would be
headed by the pro-Syrians, Lebanon's cabinet by March 14, and
the presidency providing the needed balance (and restoring
office's authority in the process). We hope that he is not
been too vocal with his desire for a "neutral" presidency
with others, lest the March 14 Maronites flee the
pro-independence movement in hopes of garnering the
Patriarch's approval.
FELTMAN