LEBANON: FOREIGN MINISTER SALLOUKH OPTIMISTIC ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003539 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: FOREIGN MINISTER SALLOUKH OPTIMISTIC ON POLITICS, TRIBUNAL Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a November 2 meeting, Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh urged to the Ambassador rapid and thorough support for the LAF and action on Israeli overflights and non-withdrawal from Ghajjar. Salloukh was optimistic that Speaker Berri's proposed consultations among political leaders would stave off a street-level confrontation and dismissed Nasrallah's threats as "just politics." The international tribunal to try suspects in the Rafiq Hariri's assassination may be studied formally by the GOL within as little as a week of receiving UNSC approval. On the Guatemala/Venezuela UNSC race, an issue on which Salloukh had been singularly unhelpful last month, he noted that the failure to elect either country was the "best outcome." End Summary. AID FOR LEBANON, SECURITY FORCES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador began by noting the continued strong, bipartisan support for Lebanon in Washington and his belief that the USG will be an active participant in the proposed January Paris III donors conference. The Ambassador confirmed that the U.S. envisions helping with equipment and spare parts for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). The Minister interjected that Lebanon needs new equipment, and quickly. The Ambassador responded that the USG plans to help. ¶3. (SBU) Salloukh described Lebanon as "the most important Arab country" for the U.S. and "the oldest democratic regime" in the region. The United States must support Lebanon's democracy, he continued, and have no fear regarding the integrity of that democracy. ¶4. (SBU) Salloukh hailed the USG project to rebuild the Mudeirej Bridge as a signal of USG commitment to Lebanon. Lebanon had been counting on Italian support which did not materialize, he added. The Ambassador explained that the Italians had inadequate resources to help with the Mudeirej project and had taken on the neighboring Sofar bridge instead. The resulting two-bridge project can be regarded as a partnership. ¶5. (SBU) The Minister noted that he would travel as part of PM Siniora's delegation to South Korea (during the week of November 13) to line up support for Lebanon and meet with UN Secretary-General-designate Ban Ki-moon, whom he knows well. SIPDIS Salloukh said that he expected support for Lebanon from Japan also, as well as other "friendly governments." The Ambassador asked what he should tell U.S. businesses when they hear Nasrallah's rhetoric about street action to topple Siniora's government. Such talk did not ispire confidence, the Ambassador noted. Salloukh dismissed the rhetoric as "just politics" and assured us that "everything will be OK in a few weeks." IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador raised with Salloukh some recent inflammatory remarks in the anti-U.S. al-Akhbar and al-Diyar newspapers, including insinuations that the U.S. Embassy may be involved in potential assassination schemes in Lebanon, and described those remarks as dangerous; they could incite violence against the U.S. Embassy or its personnel. Salloukh responded that al-Akhbar, as a new newspaper, should act responsibly; it will not be successful if it reports falsehoods. The Minister offered, then insisted, to raise this inflammatory coverage with the management of al-Akhbar. He said that he hoped that Lebanese news agencies would "build bridges" to the U.S. Embassy and have good relations with us. BEIRUT 00003539 002 OF 003 NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's call for a return to national dialogue on the issues of a national unity government and a new electoral law, and noted that Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had, unreasonably, given the process a one-week deadline to make progress in talks on the cabinet expansion or face street demonstrations. Foreign Minister Salloukh insisted that the new talks be called "consultations" to distinguish them from the defunct National Dialogue, and expressed his support for Berri's initiative. He said that on the issue of timing, the deadline could be extended if appropriate: first one week, then a second week, then a third week, and so on. No one, not a single party or movement, he insisted, wants to take Lebanon into anarchy or chaos in the streets. In any event, the LAF is strong enough now to control the street. Salloukh intimated that "discussions and negotiations" are ongoing to solve this issue and prevent a resort to the street. ¶8. (C) A national unity government is called for by the Ta'if Agreement, Salloukh continued. "If our government represents 80 percent of Lebanese, why not expand it to represent all Lebanese?" There is no reason to worry about clashes in the street, he said. The language both sides are using in public is harsher than what they say to each other out of the public eye. When Nasrallah threatened demonstrations, he meant "controlled" demonstrations. Despite Walid Jumblatt's statement in Washington that demonstrations would be met with counter-demonstrations, "demonstrations will stop demonstrations." (Note: We believe that by this remark Salloukh meant that should both the March 8 supporters and March 14 supporters demonstrate, the GOL will likely ban all demonstrations. End note.) AIR VIOLATIONS, SMUGGLING AND RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶9. (C) The Minister raised the issue of Israeli overflights of Lebanese airspace and asked when they would stop. The Minister said that Lebanon is fully implementing UNSCR 1701 and that the latest report on UNSCR 1559 implementation is full of unfounded information. The LAF is deployed along the border with Syria and is preventing smuggling, he insisted. "Send people to the south," he said, "and let them find a single pistol." Salloukh added that the failure of Israeli forces to withdraw from Ghajjar is also making full implementation of 1701 difficult and weakening PM Siniora's government. UNIIIC TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked why President Emile Lahoud had shown such surprise and expressed so many objections to the draft statute which, if passed by the Lebanese cabinet, would establish an international tribunal to investigate and prosecute the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri and other crimes. The concept of the tribunal had already been accepted at the Lebanese National Dialogue in March. The Minister told us that Justice Minister Rizk had not properly coordinated the introduction of the draft to the cabinet meeting, and had not officially shared the draft with President Lahoud beforehand. The President's legal advisor was the one who prepared the 32-page document detailing concerns regarding the statute, and he was the one who leaked it to the press. According to his understanding, Salloukh said, the UN Security Council would have to approve the statute before the cabinet could seek a vote on it. The Russian PermRep is returning from Moscow with GOR comments, he added, and the French will also express their view. If the UNSC gives formal or informal approval, Salloukh continued, the GOL is prepared to begin studying the statute within one or two weeks. Salloukh expressed his hope that the tribunal would uncover the truth and find the criminals responsible, saying that this is crucial for the future of Lebanon. BEIRUT 00003539 003 OF 003 UNSC GUATEMALA/VENEZUELA RACE -------------- ¶11. (C) The Minister noted that in the UNGA votes for the empty UNSC seat competed for by Guatemala and Venezuela, the two sides had reached a stalemate and he advised that withdrawal of the two candidates would be the best solution. (Note: Salloukh, a pro-Hizballah Shiite, had advocated for Venezuela within the cabinet and ministry. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Salloukh, of course, was a compromise Foreign Minister candidate, agreed upon by Nabih Berri and Hassan Nasrallah when the cabinet was being formed in July 2005. But, when differences arise between Berri and Nasrallah, Salloukh consistently sides with Berri (including by voting with the cabinet majority in favor of the UNIFIL naval task force, when the two Hizballah ministers rejected it). Thus, we think his comments regarding the duration of next week's consultations, called by Berri, probably reveal Berri's thinking: while Nasrallah threatens to go to the street if his demands aren't met within a week, Salloukh suggested that the deadline could be extended, week after week. This method would be a typically Lebanese muddle rather than a real solution, but it might enable Lebanon to avoid dangerous street confrontations. FELTMAN