MGLE01: AOUN'S ADVISOR GIVES HIS INTERPRETATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000352 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 TAGS: IS KPAL LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: AOUN'S ADVISOR GIVES HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE AOUN-NASRALLAH COMMUNIQU Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Gibran Bassil, close advisor to Michel Aoun and a participant in the February 6 meeting between Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah, insists Aoun has achieved a political breakthrough by getting Nasrallah to sign on to a comprehensive list of commitments that will protect Lebanon's sovereignty, establish a "relationship of equals" between Lebanon and Syria, and eventually, compel Hizballah to abandon its weapons in accordance with UNSCR 1559. Bassil described what he characterized as a "lengthy and difficult" negotiation process with Hizballah to produce a document that, despite some necessary ambiguity, achieved what PM Siniora could not -- specifically, a commitment by Hizballah to become a responsible supporter of Lebanese interests, rather than foreign interests. Bassil maintained that Aoun had attempted repeatedly to engage the Hariri/Siniora/Jumblatt coalition to develop a similar statement of national goals, but had always been rebuffed. The Aoun advisor vehemently denied the Free Patriotic Movement was now firmly in a pro-Syrian Hizballah orbit, but in fact, had succeeded in starting to pull Hizballah away from Syrian/Iranian tutelage. Reining in his enthusiasm, Bassil commented that Aoun was not naive and understood the possibility that Hizballah could not deliver on its new commitments, but he argued the ten national goals addressed in the communiqu were the first time that Hizballah's "feet had been nailed to the floor." End summary. ¶2. (C) Gibran Bassil met with POLOFF in Beirut on February ¶7. He was clearly prepared for the meeting as he frequently referred to a point-by-point list of achievements that he argued had been attained by the joint communiqu. Bassil is probably the closest advisor to Michel Aoun and has been the former general's primary emissary to various political blocs for the past several years, particularly Hizballah. He has a mixed reputation in Lebanon, where some political analysts regard him as inexperienced and pro-Syrian, but there is no denying his influence and access to Aoun. SUNDAY'S GIFT -------------- ¶3. (C) Bassil energetically defended the February 6 communiqu as an unalloyed political triumph for the "politically excluded" Aoun bloc. An ill-concealed anger toward Saad Hariri's Future Movement and dismissal of the efforts of PM Siniora peppered his discourse. He admitted that Aoun and Nasrallah had taken advantage of the Prime Minister, who has been weakened by a serious mishandling of a violent Sunni protest on February 5. Referring to the comprehensiveness and length of the communiqu, Bassil said it was the product of many difficult negotiating sessions with Hizballah representatives over several months and had reached its final form only after the return of the Shia ministers to the Siniora cabinet on February 2. Aoun and Nasrallah decided to wait for an opportune release date and, according to Bassil, received an unexpected gift this past Sunday, when demonstrations went out of control. PURPORTED ACHIEVEMENTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Bassil started his defense by emphasizing the document's first two commitments: the importance of national dialogue and the criticality of maintaining a consensual democracy. Bassil referred to the always present concern of the Christian community that it is losing the demographic race in Lebanon by stating that rule by consensus was the Lebanese version of minority rights, that is, it would prevent a minority community from being swept aside, with Bassil punctuating his argument with, "...as Hariri has done to us." In Bassil's interpretation, the Aounists had used Hizballah's fondness for consensus politics and won a concession that would protect Lebanon's minorities, no matter how numerically powerful the Shia community may become. ¶5. (C) The Aoun confidant continued that the signatories' commitment to a new electoral law that included assurances on equal access, restraints on the use of outside funds in elections, and two items that he clearly wanted to be noted: the right of ex-patriate Lebanese to vote in national elections and the intention to create a "civil society." Bassil's voice rose as he asked, "...do you know how hard it was to get them to agree to those principles?" BEIRUT 00000352 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) The wording in the section regarding the structure of the state, according to Bassil, may sound banal, but in the context of Lebanon's recent past, the need to clearly list governing principles of integrity, transparency, an independent judiciary, and competence-based appointments was essential. He particularly emphasized the commitment to competently investigate past abuses of public trust; this is not to destroy careers, but to re-establish public confidence in public institutions and officials. ¶7. (C) Bassil referred to the need to address and reach closure on still pending issues remaining from Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war in explaining the purpose of Articles 5 and 6 of the communique. He said it was this commitment which formed the basis of Nasrallah's promise in the February 6 joint press conference to try to resolve the issue of the South Lebanese Army, whose soldiers and families fled Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal from the country in 2000. He admitted nothing had yet been resolved, but even reasonable discussion of this issue was a commitment that strongly resonated in the Christian community. ¶8. (C) According to Bassil, Article 7 addressed an issue that, unless resolved, would permanently cripple the country's effort to transition to a stable democracy. He argued that unless public security was re-established, Lebanon's citizens would continue to emigrate in increasing numbers and severely handicap political and economic reform. Bassil maintained that not only was it important to find those responsible for serious acts of political violence, but it was necessary to reorganize the security services and replace cronyism with a competency-based selection process. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA -------------- ¶9. (C) With regard to Article 8, the Aoun advisor admitted it could be argued by critics that Lebanon was attempting to reconcile with its Syrian neighbor too soon and without resolution of its continuing interference in its internal affairs. But Bassil countered that Michel Aoun wanted to get Hizballah to accept the principle of equal relations between the two countries, with clearly demarcated borders and a formal diplomatic relationship. The timing could always be negotiated, he continued, but of additional significance was the commitment to obtain an accounting of Lebanese citizens held in Syrian prisons, an issue not well known, but of deep concern to the families involved. ¶10. (C) Bassil maintained that Article 9, the section dealing with Palestinian affairs, was very similar to the Siniora government's initiative, but as an important component of political discourse in Lebanon, it warranted inclusion in the communiqu. ¶11. (C) Article 10, on Hizballah's arms, which Bassil conceded contained the most ambiguous (and troubling) wording, was in Aoun's opinion the most important. He argued that in the eyes of the Aoun camp, this commitment effectively fenced in Hizballah with regard to its arms. If the issues of Shebaa and prisoners could be resolved, Bassil argued Hizballah would be hoist on its own petard. When asked how the phrase "protect Lebanon from the menace of Israel" could be construed as "fencing in" Hizballah, Bassil responded it was a negotiating necessity, but emphasized that the definition of the threat would be determined through national dialogue, which meant that a national consensus on the issue would force Hizballah to relinquish its arms. "SINIORA'S GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED" -------------- ¶12. (C) Bassil finished his 90 minute discourse by stating that Michel Aoun, and by extension the majority of the Christian community, viewed the Siniora government as a failed exercise. According to this committed Aoun loyalist, the leader of the FPM bloc would continue to press for Siniora's resignation. He stated that Aoun personally admired Siniora's fortitude, but he abhorred a perceived leadership vacuum and maintained that the time had come for sweeping change. When asked if the new closeness with Nasrallah would hurt Aoun in the Christian community, Bassil confidently predicted that the electoral returns from the upcoming by-election in Baabda-Aley would prove their point. With regard to the trustworthiness of Nasrallah, Bassil admitted the communiqu was a big gamble, but the precarious state of Lebanon, he argued, demanded aggressive action. BEIRUT 00000352 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The lengthy argument in defense of the communiqu was made by a determined Aoun partisan, who may be partly blinded by ambition, but the arguments possessed an internal logic and consistency, even if they assumed a great deal of sincerity on the part of Hizballah's leader. There is a considerable amount of material in this document and the public debate has just begun, therefore, the next steps taken by both Siniora and Aoun will only carry added significance and risk. Most controversial is the issue of the conditions for allowing Hizballah to maintain its arms, and specifically for as long as Israel presents a "menace" to Lebanon. We see this as a disturbing, potentially open-ended license for Hizballah to retain its arms indefinitely. It contradicts, by reasonable interpretation, the requirements of UNSCR 1559. The Aounists are arguing, however, the opposite interpretation that this language means that what constitutes an Israeli "menace" must be decided by national dialogue rather than by Hizballah alone, thereby denying Hizballah an open-ended license to maintain its arms. End comment. FELTMAN